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Chicken Littles and Ostriches at NASA


Published: September 27, 2003

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration


Space Shuttle



One hears lots of talk these days about the need to change the culture, habits and attitudes of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to head off any repeat of the disaster that destroyed the space shuttle Columbia. The urgency of that task becomes inescapably clear when one ponders the trials of Rodney Rocha, an obscure engineer who tried repeatedly, and in vain, to warn shuttle managers of a potential catastrophe, only to be rebuffed and ultimately pounded into acquiescing with the prevailing view that all was well.

As recounted by James Glanz and John Schwartz on Friday in The Times, some 30 space engineers became concerned about Columbia's safety after watching films that showed a piece of foam break away during liftoff and strike the left wing at a spot that could not be seen. The engineers chose Mr. Rocha, known for his precision and integrity, to convey their belief to shuttle managers that NASA should immediately request images of the impact area from spy satellites or telescopes on the ground.

At least half a dozen times, Mr. Rocha prodded the shuttle managers to take a look. Each time he got nowhere or earned a sharp rejection. One manager called the need for more images a dead issue. Another said he refused to be a Chicken Little by raising alarms, leading Mr. Rocha to complain that NASA was acting more like "an ostrich with its head in the sand." Faced with such resistance, Mr. Rocha lost steam. He shrank from sending an e-mail note accusing shuttle managers of borderline irresponsibility and accepted a Boeing analysis (later shown to be fatally flawed) that the foam strike posed no risk to the shuttle.

To make sure that this sorry chain of events does not recur, NASA has reached agreements with outside agencies to take images during every shuttle flight and is seeking ways to encourage, or even insist upon, the presentation of dissenting viewpoints. Whether this will profoundly change the mind-set at NASA is uncertain. Virtually all analysts agree that reforming the culture of a large agency is far harder than fixing some flaws in its technology.




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