Equivalence of Uniform Key Agreement and Composition Insecurity

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Abstract

It is well known that proving the security of a key agreement protocol (even in a special case where the protocol transcript looks random to an outside observer) implies the existence of one-way functions and therefore is at least as difficult as proving $P \neq NP$. Another (seemingly unrelated) statement in cryptography is the existence of two or more non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions that do not become adaptively secure under sequential or parallel composition. Pietrzak (Eurocrypt’06) showed that at least one of these two seemingly unrelated statements is true. Pietrzak’s result was significant since it showed a surprising connection between the worlds of public-key (i.e., “cryptomania”) and private-key cryptography (i.e., “minicrypt”).

In this work, we further examine the relationship between the security of compositions of non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions and other public key systems.

First, for the parallel composition case, we prove that the above duality is far stronger: at least one of these two statements must also be false. In other words, we show their equivalence. More specifically, we show that if there exists any uniform-transcript key agreement (UTKA) protocol, then parallel composition does not imply adaptive security. This implication holds based on virtually all known key agreement protocols and can also be based on general complexity assumptions such as the existence of dense trapdoor permutations.

Second, we prove the impossibility of adaptive security from sequential compositions assuming the existence of public key encryption scheme which is uniform and rerandomizable under both ciphertexts and public keys. It remains open if this stronger black-box assumption is also necessary.

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*This revision includes a retraction of theorems 4 and 5 and a new theorem 9. See the acknowledgments at the end of this paper for details. The original abstract appeared in CRYPTO 2010.

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1 Introduction

One of the central questions in cryptography is the question of composition, which very broadly is the study of various ways to compose several basic primitives in a way that amplifies the hardness of the composed object. Naturally, this central question has received a lot of attention in various settings and we continue the study of this question here. More specifically, we investigate a question of whether a composition of pseudo-random functions, to be defined shortly, constitutes stronger security by utilizing the security of the component functions. We consider two very natural types of conventional compositions: a parallel composition with respect to Exclusive-Or (XOR) operation denoted by $\oplus$ and a sequential composition. Briefly, on input $x$ in the domain of $F$ and $G$, the parallel XOR-composition of two functions $F$ and $G$ is defined as $F(x) \oplus G(x)$. The sequential composition of $F$ and $G$ is defined as $G(F(x))$ (or $F(G(x))$).

Seemingly unrelated to the notion of security amplification via composition, there is the question of designing Key Agreement protocol. Recall that Key Agreement (KA) is a protocol that enables two parties to generate a secret string (also called key) by communicating with each other over an insecure channel in the presence of a eavesdropping adversary. Uniform-transcript key agreement (UTKA) is a strengthened version of key agreement in which messages between two parties are indistinguishable from uniform distribution by all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries.

The reason why key agreement seems unrelated to the security of composition is that key agreement belongs to the world of public-key cryptography (also known as "cryptomania") whereas the security of composed pseudo-random functions rather belongs to the world of private-key cryptography (also known as "minicrypt"). For further discussion on cryptomania and minicrypt, see [Imp95].

Now, let us recall briefly recall the definition of Pseudo-Random Functions (PRF) [GGM86]. There are two notions of security of PRF: adaptive security and non-adaptive security. Intuitively, a (pseudo-random) function is said to be non-adaptively secure if the function is indistinguishable from a random function against all PPT adversaries that evaluate the function on inputs chosen independently of the function outputs, that is, chosen prior to PPT adversary learning any of the outputs. Adaptive security is a far stronger notion of security than non-adaptive security: a PRF is said to be adaptively secure if the function remains indistinguishable from random function against all PPT adversaries preparing the current query based on the outputs of the function on all previous queries. Clearly, adaptive security implies non-adaptive security.

We show that the equivalence between the impossibility of achieving adaptive security by composing general non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions and the existence of uniform transcript key-agreement protocol. We note that our impossibility result holds not only for the case in which the non-adaptively-secure component functions are drawn from the different function families (also known as the general composition) but also for the case where the component functions are drawn from the same function family (also known as self-composition).

1.1 Related Work

There has been extensive research on relationship between the security of component functions and the security of their parallel or sequential composition. In the information theoretic context, Vaudenay [Vau03] proved that if $F$ is a pseudo-random permutation with security $\epsilon$ against any distinguisher making $q$ (non-)adaptive queries, then the sequential composition of $k$ $F$’s has improved security $2^{q-1}\epsilon^k$ against a (non-)adaptive distinguisher. $F$ only needs to be a function instead of a permutation for the same security in parallel composition. Luby and Rackoff [LR86] show the similar security amplification result in the computational context.

In the information theoretic setting, Maurer and Pietrzak [MP04] proved that composition of
non-adaptive secure functions amplifies its security $\epsilon$ to security $2\epsilon(1+\ln(\epsilon^{-1}))$ against an adaptive distinguisher. In 2007, Maurer et al. improved this bound to $2\epsilon$ [MPR07].

Myers [Mye04] showed that the existence of oracles relative to which there are non-adaptively secure permutations, but where the composition of such permutations fails to achieve adaptive security. Recently, Pietrzak [Pie05] showed that the composition of non-adaptively secure functions does not imply adaptive security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Pietrzak’s more recent work [Pie06] showed that if sequential composition does not imply adaptive security, then there exists a key agreement protocol. Moreover, it turns out that Pietrzak’s construction in [Pie06] implies a slightly stronger result: that his key agreement protocol satisfies the property of uniform-transcript. Thus, we can restate the Pietrzak’s result as follows:

**Theorem 1** ([Pie06]). If sequential composition of pseudo-random functions is not adaptively secure, then there exists a UTKA.

### 1.2 Results in [CLO10], Erratum, and New Observations

[CLO10] Our work [CLO10] further explored the relation between various cryptographic primitives and the impossibility of constructing adaptively secure PRFs by parallel and sequential compositions of non-adaptively secure PRFs. In particular, we claimed in [CLO10] that the existence of UTKA implies the impossibility of obtaining an adaptively secure PRF from parallel/sequential compositions of non-adaptively secure PRFs.

While our parallel theorems stand, the sequential composition theorem has a flaw. Specifically, in April 2024, Yusai Wu pointed out to us via email that our Theorems 4 and 5 (for sequential composition) contain errors. We, therefore, retract theorems 4 and 5 and Corollary 8.

Instead, (as a new material), we provide a new Theorem 9, which requires a stronger (but block-box) assumption.

**Theorem 2.** If there exists a dense trapdoor permutation family (which in turns implies a 2-pass UTKA), then parallel compositions of non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions do not imply a pseudo-random function with adaptive security.

**Theorem 3.** If there exists a UTKA, then parallel compositions of non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions do not imply a pseudo-random function with adaptive security.

**Theorem 4.** [Retracted] If there exists a dense trapdoor permutation family (which in turns implies a 2-pass UTKA), then sequential compositions of non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions do not imply a pseudo-random function with adaptive security.

**Theorem 5.** [Retracted] If there exists a UTKA, then sequential compositions of non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions do not imply a pseudo-random function with adaptive security.

**Theorem 6.** If parallel composition composition of pseudo-random functions is not adaptively secure, then there exists a UTKA.

**Corollary 7.** Parallel composition of pseudo-random functions does not imply adaptively secure PRFs if and only if there exists a UTKA.

**Corollary 8.** [Retracted] Sequential composition of pseudo-random functions does not imply adaptively secure PRFs if and only if there exists a UTKA.
As new observations, we show that non-adaptively secure PRFs of which a sequential composition is adaptively insecure can be constructed with stronger assumptions than dense trapdoor permutations and UTKAs. Specifically, assuming the existence of CPA-secure public key encryption with enhanced properties of uniform (dense) and rerandomizable ciphertexts and public keys, we construct non-adaptively secure PRFs $F$ and $G$ such that their sequential composition $G(F(x))$ is adaptively insecure.

**Theorem 9. [New]** If there exists an enhanced public key encryption with rerandomizable ciphertexts and public keys both indistinguishable from random, then sequential compositions of non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions do not imply a pseudo-random function with adaptive security.

This generic black-box assumption sets up sufficient black-box properties (upper-bound) for sequential composition insecurity, which is stronger than the existence of dense-trapdoor permutation (and in turns UTKAs). Roughly, this enhanced public key encryption, denoted by $PKE$, contains a tuple of algorithms ($Gen, Enc, Dec, RRC, RRP$). $Gen(n, r)$ on input $n$ and random $r$ outputs a pair of $n$-bit public and secret keys. $Enc_{pk}(m; r)$ on input message $m$ and random $r$ outputs a ciphertext $c$ that looks indistinguishable from uniform random. $Dec_{sk}(c)$ on input ciphertext $c$ outputs message $m$. Additionally, $RRP(pk; r)$ on input $pk$ and random $r$ outputs randomized public key (e.g., rerandomization material) $pk'$ where $pk'$ (possibly longer than $pk$) is indistinguishable from random and used to rerandomize ciphertexts encrypted under public key $pk$. Finally, $RRC(c; pk'; r)$ on input ciphertext $c$, randomness $r$, and rerandomized public key $pk'$ outputs rerandomized ciphertext $c'$ indistinguishable from random. See Definition 13 in Section 4 for the further details.

**Difference between Sequential and Parallel composition.** With Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 on sequential composition retracted, but parallel composition remaining correct, there appears to be a difference in our understanding of sequential vs. parallel composition insecurity. Specifically, we provide new sufficient conditions for sequential composition insecurity. In contrast, the impossibility of achieving adaptively secure parallel composition remains equivalent to UTKAs, which is implied by DTPs [CLO10]. Therefore, sequential composition insecurity requires (to the best of our knowledge) doubly enhanced rerandomizable PKE. An important remaining open question is whether this additional block-box assumption is necessary for the impossibility of sequential composition.

We emphasize that Theorem 2, 3, 6, and 9 hold regardless of whether PRFs being composed are taken from a single function family (called self-composition) or from two distinct function families (called general-composition). In particular, we show that the impossibility of secure general-compositions further implies the impossibility of secure self-compositions. The precise connection between the impossibility of adaptively secure composition and a UTKA protocol were not known prior to our work. We summarize these previously known results and our contributions in Figure 1.

**Paper Organization** In Section 2, we provide relevant cryptographic notions and definitions commonly used in the rest of the paper. In Section 3.2, we show the equivalence between parallel composition insecurity and UTKA which is originally presented in [CLO10]. In Section 4, we show that strongly enhanced rerandomizable PKE implies sequential composition insecurity with the introduction of the definition of such a PKE. Finally, in Section 5, we provide the implications on self-composition insecurity as in [CLO10].
Figure 1: The Illustrative Summary of Relations between Composition Insecurity and Other Cryptographic Assumptions: Solid boxes indicate black-box primitives and dotted boxes indicate non-black-box primitives. The dotted line were known prior to [CLO10]. The solid lines represents the implications claimed in [CLO10] and this revised work. The red lines represents the retracted claims in [CLO10]. The blue line represents an updated black-box implication to sequential composition insecurity relying on a black-box public key encryption with properties: (1) rerandomizable pseudorandom ciphertexts and (2) rerandomizable public-key and ciphertext.

2 Preliminaries

We let \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) be a security parameter. An algorithm is considered efficient if its computation can be carried out by a PPT machine whose running time is expected polynomial in the input length. We use the notation \( x \triangleq \{0,1\}^n \) when string \( x \) is uniformly drawn from \( \{0,1\}^n \). For further discussion on the following definitions and notions, see [Gol01].

Definition 1 (Negligible and Overwhelming). A function \( \epsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R} \) is negligible if for every \( c > 0 \) there exists an \( N_c \) such that for all \( n > N_c \), \( \epsilon(n) \leq \frac{1}{n^c} \). On the other hand, \( 1 - \epsilon \) is said to be overwhelming in \( n \).

Definition 2 (Non-negligible). A function \( \delta : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R} \) is non-negligible if for every \( c > 0 \) there exists infinitely many \( n \) such that \( \delta(n) \geq \frac{1}{n^c} \).

Definition 3 (Noticeable). A function \( \mu : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R} \) is noticeable if for every \( c > 0 \) there exists an \( N_c \) such that for all \( n > N_c \), \( \mu(n) \geq \frac{1}{n^c} \).

Definition 4 (Polynomial Indistinguishability). Two probability ensembles \( X = \{X_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) and \( Y = \{Y_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) are polynomially indistinguishable if for every Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm (distinguisher) \( A \), there exists a negligible function \( \epsilon \) such that: for all random coin tosses \( r \) and \( r' \) of \( A \),

\[
|\Pr[A_r(X_n) = 1] - \Pr[A_{r'}(Y_n) = 1]| \leq \epsilon(n).
\]

Definition 5 (Pseudo-Random Function (Permutation)). Given a randomly chosen key \( k \in K \) for a key space \( K \), an efficiently computable keyed function \( F_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n \) is called
pseudo-random function (PRF), if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (distinguisher) \( A \), given access to the function \( F_k \) and a uniform random function \( U : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \) and for all \( n \), there exists a negligible function \( \epsilon(n) \) such that: for all random coin tosses \( r \) and \( r' \) of \( A \),

\[
|\Pr[A_{r}^{F_k}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[A_{r'}^{U}(1^n) = 1]| \leq \epsilon(n).
\]

In addition, if \( F \) is one-to-one and onto for all \( k \), then we call \( F_k \) a pseudo-random permutation (PRP).

**Definition 6** (Distinguishing Advantage). Given a polynomial-time distinguisher \( A(q,t) \), which runs in time \( t \) and makes at most \( q \) queries to the oracle \( O \) (i.e., a pseudo-random function \( F \)) or random function \( R \), we define the advantage of \( A(q,t) \) as: for all random coin tosses \( r \) and \( r' \) of \( A \),

\[
\text{Adv}^{O}_{A}(q,t) = \max_{A} \left| \Pr[A_{r}^{O}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[A_{r'}^{R}(1^n) = 1] \right|.
\]

A distinguisher is a non-adaptive distinguisher if it makes all the queries before it receives the output. Otherwise, we call it an adaptive distinguisher.

**Definition 7** (Non-Adaptive Versus Adaptive Security). A pseudo-random function \( f \) is non-adaptively secure if, for all polynomial-time non-adaptive distinguisher \( A(q,t) \), there exists a negligible function \( \epsilon \) such that \( \text{Adv}^{O}_{A}(q,t) \leq \epsilon \). On the contrary, we say a pseudo-random function \( f \) is adaptively secure if, for all polynomial-time adaptive distinguisher \( A(q,t) \), there exists a negligible function \( \epsilon \) such that \( \text{Adv}^{O}_{A}(q,t) \leq \epsilon \).

**Definition 8** (Parallel and Sequential Composition). The parallel XOR-composition of two functions \( F \) and \( G \), denoted as \( F \oplus G \), is the operation that composes the output value of \( F \) and \( G \) over the bit-wise Exclusive-Or (XOR) operation. The sequential composition of \( F \) and \( G \), denoted as \( F \circ G \), is the operation that applies two functions sequentially, i.e., \( F \circ G(\cdot) = G(F(\cdot)) \).

Informally, a dense trapdoor permutation family is a trapdoor permutation family with a polynomially dense public description of permutation so that a public description is indistinguishable from uniform random [SP92, Hai04].

**Definition 9** (Dense Trapdoor One-Way Permutation (DTP)). The algorithm triplet \( (\text{Gen}, f_k, f_k^{-1}) \) is a family of dense trapdoor permutations if the following hold:

- \( \text{Gen}(1^n) \) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm such that on input \( 1^n \), it outputs a pair of two strings \( k \in \{0,1\}^n \) and \( t_k \), where \( |t_k| \leq p(n) \).
- Given \( k \), algorithm \( f_k : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \) is a polynomial-time computable permutation.
- Given \( t_k \), algorithm \( f_k^{-1} \) is a polynomial-time computable inverse permutation of \( f_k \). That is, \( f_k^{-1}(f_k(x)) = x \) is efficiently computable for all \( x \in \{0,1\}^n \).
- For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm \( A \), the following holds for any \( (k,t_k), x \in \{0,1\}^n \), for all random coin toss \( r \) of \( A \),

\[
\Pr[A_{r}^{f_k}(k,x) = f_k^{-1}(f_k(x))] \leq \epsilon(n)
\]

where \( \epsilon(n) \) is a negligible function in \( n \).
• For all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $A$, there exists a negligible function $\epsilon$ such that, given access to function $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ or uniform function $U$ as oracle: for all random coin tosses $r$ and $r'$ of $A$,

$$\left| \Pr[A_{\text{Gen}}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[A_U(1^n) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon(n).$$

**Definition 10** (Hard-Core Predicate). A polynomial-time computable function family $B : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$ is a hard-core predicate of one-way function $f$ if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $A$ and for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, there exists a negligible function $\epsilon$ such that

$$\Pr[A(f(x)) = B(x, r)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(n).$$

Goldreich and Levin [GL89] devised a hardcore predicate $B(x, r)$ from any one-way function $f$ defined to be $b = \bigoplus_i x_i r_i$, identically $b = \langle x, r \rangle$, the inner product of two vectors.

**Definition 11** (Bit Agreement (BA)). Informally, a bit agreement is a protocol in which two parties, Alice and Bob, secretly agree on a bit at the end. Formally, upon the security parameter $n$ as a common input, Alice and Bob output a bit $b_A$ and $b_B$, respectively. Then, the protocol is said to have the correlation $\epsilon(n)$ if for all $n$,

$$\Pr[b_A = b_B] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon(n)}{2}.$$  

And the protocol is also said to be $\delta(n)$-secure if, for all $n$ and for any PPT adversary Eve, given the security parameter $n$ and the entire transcript (denoted by Trans) between Alice and Bob,

$$\Pr[b' \leftarrow \text{Eve(Trans, } 1^n) : b' = b_A] \leq 1 - \frac{\delta(n)}{2}.$$  

If Alice and Bob exchange $k$ messages during the execution of the bit agreement protocol, it is called a $k$-pass bit agreement. Note that Alice and Bob output the same bit with overwhelming probability, and Eve can compute the bit $b_A$ with only negligible advantage over merely guessing it, as $\epsilon$ and $\delta$ are overwhelming.

A key agreement protocol is one where two parties, Alice and Bob, given $n$ as a common input, secretly agree on a key in $\{0, 1\}^n$ at the end of execution. The key agreement is known to be achieved by polynomially many parallel or sequential executions of the bit agreement protocol if the protocol has a noticeable $\epsilon$ and an overwhelming $\delta$ [Hol05]. Notice that the parallel repetitions of bit agreements achieve the $n$-bit key agreement without increasing the round complexity. See [Hol05] and [Hol06] for further details. By one round, we mean a unit process wherein Alice receives, computes and sends a message to Bob, and then Bob receives, computes and sends a message to Alice. Thus, a $\gamma$-round key agreement ($\gamma$-KA) implies a $2\gamma$-pass key agreement. A $\gamma$-round uniform-transcript key agreement ($\gamma$-UTKA) is a $\gamma$-KA whose transcripts are indistinguishable from uniform distribution.

**Definition 12** ($\gamma$-round Enhanced Uniform-Transcript Key Agreement $\Phi$ ($\gamma$-UTKA)). For $\gamma \geq 1$, a $\gamma$-round key agreement (exchange) protocol $\Phi$ consists of two sub-protocols, Alice ($A$) and Bob ($B$), denoted as $\Phi = (A, B)$. Let $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_i$ be the $i$th round messages of $A$ and $B$ respectively. Let $\text{Tran}_i^A$ be the transcript of all the messages up to the $i$th round from $A$ as $\text{Tran}_i^A = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_i)$ and $\text{Tran}_i^B =
\((\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_t)\). Then, \(A\) consists of a family of message-generating algorithms \(A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_{\gamma + 1}\) defined as follows. For \(A\)'s random value \(r_A \in \{0, 1\}^n:\)

\[
A_1 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n \text{ is defined as } A_1(r_A) \rightarrow \alpha_1,
\]
\[
A_i : \{0, 1\}^n \times (\{0, 1\}^n)^{i-1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n \text{ is defined as } A_i(r_A, \text{Tran}^A_i) \rightarrow \alpha_i \text{ for } 2 \leq i \leq \gamma
\]
\[
A_{\gamma + 1} : \{0, 1\}^n \times (\{0, 1\}^n)^\gamma \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n \text{ is defined as } A_{\gamma + 1}(r_A, \text{Tran}^A_\gamma) \rightarrow s_A.
\]

The definition of \(B\) is identical to the definition of \(A\) except that all \(A\)'s and \(\alpha\)'s are replaced with \(B\)'s and \(\beta\)'s. Finally, \(\Phi = (A, B)\) satisfies the following conditions:

1. For any \(A \in \text{PPT}\), given \(\text{Trans}\), \(A\) cannot efficiently distinguish the exchanged \(n\)-bit key \(s_A\) from random. Formally, for all random coin tosses \(\tau\) and \(\tau'\) of \(A\) and random inputs \(r_A\) and \(r_B\) of \(A\) and \(B\),

\[
\Pr[\text{Trans} \leftarrow (A_{r_A}, B_{r_B}); s_A \leftarrow A_{\gamma + 1}(r_A, \text{Trans}^A); A_r(\text{Trans}, s_A) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Trans} \leftarrow (A_{r_A}, B_{r_B}); \alpha_r^{\text{rand}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n : A_r(\text{Trans}, \alpha) = 1] \leq \mu(n)
\]

for some negligible function \(\mu(n)\).

2. At the end of execution of \(\Phi\), \(A\) and \(B\) agree on a secret \(s\). Formally, let \(\tau(n)\) be a negligible function in \(n\), then,

\[
\Pr[s_A \leftarrow A_{\gamma + 1}(r_A, \text{Trans}^A); s_B \leftarrow B_{\gamma + 1}(r_B, \text{Trans}^B); s_A = s_B] \geq 1 - \tau(n).
\]

3. For the \(\gamma\)-round key agreement \(\Phi\) to be a \(\gamma\)-round uniform-transcript key agreement, denoted as \(\Phi_u\), the additional condition below is satisfied. For any PPT adversary \(A\),

\[
\left| \Pr[A_r(\text{Trans}) = 1] - \Pr[R_\gamma^{\text{rand}} \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^\gamma : A_r(R_\gamma) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon(n),
\]

where \(\epsilon(n)\) is a negligible function in \(n\). \(B\) satisfies the same requirement. That is, no PPT adversary \(A\) distinguishes the messages of \(A\) and \(B\) from uniform distribution.

3 Parallel Composition Impossibility’s Equivalence to UTKAs

3.1 Composition Insecurity vs. Dense Trapdoor Permutation

For gentle introduction to our main result, we first present a special case of our main result as an example – The existence of dense trapdoor permutation (DTP) implies the impossibility of achieving the adaptive security by composing (in a black-box way) non-adaptively secure pseudorandom functions. The main idea behind showing this, is that a family of DTPs is well-known to provide a 2-pass (1-round) uniform-transcript key agreement.

A 2-pass key agreement can be achieved by \(n\) parallel repetitions of an underlying 2-pass bit agreement without increasing its round complexity, which we describe as follows. Suppose that we are given a family of DTPs, \((\text{Gen}(\cdot), f, f^{-1})\). Without loss of generality, Alice first chooses a pair of one-way permutation \(f_k\) and its inverse permutation \(f_k^{-1}\) by computing a public encryption information \(k\) and its private corresponding trapdoor information \(t_k\) using \(\text{Gen}(\cdot)\). Note that \(k\) is computationally indistinguishable from a random string of the same length by the property of DTPs. Alice sends the public key \(k\) to Bob. Upon \(k\) from Alice, Bob chooses two strings \(x\) and
r. Bob encrypts x with f_k, so let y = f_k(x). Bob sends y and r to Alice and computes the secret bit b = \langle x, y \rangle. With y and r, Alice obtains x by inverting y as x = f_k^{-1}(y). Then, Alice achieves the bit agreement by computing b = \langle x, r \rangle. Notice that all the messages exchanged between Alice and Bob are either a uniformly random string of length n (i.e., y and r) or pseudo-random strings indistinguishable from uniform (i.e., k). Thus, the above bit agreement is a uniform-transcript bit agreement. Hence, the n parallel repetitions of the 2-pass bit agreement achieve a 2-pass n-bit key agreement described in Protocol 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(k, t_k) ← Gen(n)</td>
<td>k</td>
<td>x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n ← $ {0, 1}^n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_n ← $ {0, 1}^n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>y_i ← f_k(x_i) for all i ≤ n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x_i ← f_k^{-1}(y_i) for all i ≤ n</td>
<td>y_1, \ldots, y_n, r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_n</td>
<td>b_i ← \langle x_i, r_i \rangle for all i ≤ n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b_i ← \langle x_i, r_i \rangle for all i ≤ n</td>
<td>shared key sk ← b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shared key sk ← b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n</td>
<td>shared key sk ← b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Protocol 1: 2-pass key agreement based on a DTP (Folklore)

3.2 Parallel Composition Impossibility from Dense Trapdoor Permutation

We construct two counter-example pseudo-random functions F and G which are secure against any PPT adversary non-adaptively. Then, we prove that their parallel composition is not secure against a particular sequence of four adaptive queries.

3.2.1 Intuitions of Parallel Composition of F and G

We provide the high-level overview and intuition of our construction of pseudo-random functions F and G based on DTP, and show how to break the adaptive security of their parallel composition. The main technique of our constructions of counter-example functions is to design the functions to detect the adaptive query throughout the input and output behavior. In particular, F and G emulate a 2-pass key agreement protocol (described in Protocol 1) via adaptive inputs and outputs. Once F and G internally obtain a shared key, they generate outputs which hide a special relation with respect to the shared key. As we input these specially generated outputs to the parallel composition again, F and G retrieve the previously shared key and verify the special relation with respect to the shared key. Hence, function F and G are convinced that the queries must be indeed adaptively generated, and reveal their private keys through their outputs, which break their security.

Our counter-example functions F and G are both defined over \((\{0, 1\}^n)^{2n+3}\). F and G hide the secret keys k_F and k_G respectively. P denotes an adaptively secure pseudo-random permutation. Let (Gen(\cdot), f, f^{-1}) be a family of DTPs. r_{ij} and s_{ij} denote the i\textsuperscript{th} pseudo-random string generated by F and G using their secret keys on j\textsuperscript{th} input respectively. In addition, Enc_k(x) is defined to be a pseudo-random private-key encryption of x with respect to key k. Hence, we have x = Dec_k(Enc_k(x)).

1We remark that the same randomness r can be used for all of n parallel repetitions of bit agreement instead of using different r’s for each of bit agreements. However, this will complicate our exposition later on, so we will use different r’s. Clearly this does not affect the security of resulting key agreement protocol.
We first define $F$ and $G$ on the first fixed adaptive query $Q_1 = (0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$:

- $F$ generates $2n + 3$ pseudo-random strings $r^*, r_{21}, r_{31}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)1}$ computed by $P_{k_F}(Q_1)$.

- $G$ on input $Q_1$ uses its secret key to first compute sufficiently long pseudo-random string which is then used to compute DTP pair $(k, t_k)$: a pair of a DTP key $k$ and its private trapdoor $t_k$ by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ of DTP. $G$ generates $2n + 2$ pseudo-random strings $s_{21}, s_{31}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)1}$ by $P_{k_G}(Q_1)$, then it outputs $(k, s_{21}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)1})$.

We describe the outputs of $F$ and $G$ and their parallel composition outputs below:

$$Q_1 \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} F \rightarrow (r^*, r_{21}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)1}) \\ G \rightarrow (k, s_{21}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)1}) \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow (r^* \oplus k, r_{21} \oplus s_{21}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)1} \oplus s_{(2n+3)1})$$

The second adaptive query is of the form $Q_2 = (u, 0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$ where $u = r^* \oplus k$. We define $F$ and $G$ on $Q_2$ as follows.

- $F$ first simulates the first-round of computation (by internally executing $P_{k_F}$ on the fixed query $Q_1$) to obtain $r^*$, then computes $u \oplus r^*$ which is equal to $k$; Now, $F$ computes $2n + 3$ pseudo-random strings $x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n$ and $r_{(n+1)2}, r_{(n+2)2}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)2}$ by $P_{k_F}(Q_2)$. $F$ computes $y_i$ by $f_k(x_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$, then outputs $(y_1, \cdots, y_n, r_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)2})$.

- $G$ generates fresh pseudo-random strings $(s_{12}, s_{22}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)2})$ computed by $P_{k_G}(Q_2)$.

We describe what both $F$ and $G$ output individually and the output of their parallel composition:

$$Q_2 \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} F \rightarrow (y_1, \cdots, y_n, r_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)2}) \\ G \rightarrow (s_{12}, \cdots, s_{n2}, s_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)2}) \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow (y_1 \oplus s_{12}, \cdots, y_n \oplus s_{n2}, r_{(n+1)2} \oplus s_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)2} \oplus s_{(2n+3)2})$$

We define the third adaptive query $Q_3$ to consist of the selected coordinates in the previous outputs such that $Q_3 = (y_1 \oplus s_{12}, \cdots, y_n \oplus s_{n2}, r_{(n+1)2} \oplus s_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)2} \oplus s_{(2n+3)2}, k \oplus r^*, 0^n, 0^n)$. On $Q_3$, we define $F$ and $G$ as follows.

- $F$ regenerates all the pseudo-random strings in the second round, $x_1, \cdots, x_n, r_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)2}$ by $P_{k_F}(Q_2)$. Notice that $Q_2$ is $(k \oplus r^*, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$ where $F$ can obtain $k \oplus r^*$ from $Q_3$. $F$ can compute $b_i = (x_i, r_{(n+i)2})$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$ and retrieve a shared key $sk$ by letting $sk = b_1b_2 \cdots b_n$. Now, $F$ generates pseudo-random strings $r_{13}, r_{23}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)3}$ by $P_{k_F}(Q_3)$ and encrypts $r_{13}$ with the shared key as $\text{Enc}_{sk}(r_{13})$. Finally, $F$ outputs $(\text{Enc}_{sk}(r_{13}), r_{13}, r_{23}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)3})$.

- $G$ regenerates $s_{12}, s_{22}, \cdots, s_{(2n)2}$ by $P_{k_G}(Q_2)$. $G$ can obtain $y_1, \cdots, y_n, r_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, r_{(2n)2}$ as it cancels $s_{12}, s_{22}, \cdots, s_{(2n)2}$ out of the first $2n$ coordinates in $Q_3$. By using the inverse permutation $f_{t_k}^{-1}$ with respect to the trapdoor $t_k$, $G$ can obtain $x_i$ by computing $f_{t_k}^{-1}(y_i)$ for all $i$. Hence, $G$ can compute $b_i = (x_i, r_i)$ for all $i$ and retrieve the shared key $sk$ by letting $sk = b_1b_2 \cdots b_n$. Then, $G$ generates pseudo-random strings $s_{13}, s_{23}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)3}$ by $P_{k_G}(Q_3)$ and creates an encryption $\text{Enc}_{sk}(s_{13})$. Finally, $G$ outputs $(\text{Enc}_{sk}(s_{13}), s_{13}, s_{23}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)3})$.

Below we depict the individual outputs of $F$ and $G$ and the output of their parallel composition:

$$Q_3 \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} F \rightarrow (\text{Enc}_{sk}(r_{13}), r_{13}, r_{23}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)3}) \\ G \rightarrow (\text{Enc}_{sk}(s_{13}), s_{13}, s_{23}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)3}) \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow (\text{Enc}_{sk}(r_{13}) \oplus \text{Enc}_{sk}(s_{13}), r_{13} \oplus s_{13}, r_{23} \oplus s_{23}, \cdots, r_{(2n+2)3} \oplus s_{(2n+2)3})$$
Our fourth query $Q_4$ is a selective collection of the outputs in the previous round such that $Q_4 = \{y_1 \oplus s_{12}, \ldots, y_n \oplus s_{n2}, r_{(n+1)2} \oplus s_{(n+1)2}, \ldots, r_{(2n)2} \oplus s_{(2n)2}, k \oplus r^*, \Enc_{sk}(r) \oplus \Enc_{sk}(s), r \oplus s\}$. Notice that $F$ and $G$ can simulate all the computations of previous rounds upon $Q_4$. Hence, $F$ and $G$ can retrieve shared key $sk$. $F$ computes $\Enc_{sk}(r_{13})$ and $r_{13}$ by the simulation of computations on $Q_3$. Then, $F$ checks to see if equality $\Dec_{sk}(\Enc_{sk}(r_{13}) \oplus (\Enc_{sk}(r_{13}) \oplus \Enc_{sk}(s_{13}))) = r_{13} \oplus (r_{13} \oplus s_{13})$ holds where $(\Enc_{sk}(r_{13}) \oplus \Enc_{sk}(s_{13}))$ and $(r_{13} \oplus s_{13})$ are obtained from $Q_1$. Since the equality holds, $F$ deduces that the input query is indeed an adaptive query. Hence, $F$ outputs $(k_F, 0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)$ containing its secret key $k_F$. $G$ does the same and outputs $(0^n, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)$. The individual outputs of $F$ and $G$ and the output of the parallel composition are described below.

$$Q_4 \rightarrow \begin{cases} F \rightarrow (k_F, 0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \\ G \rightarrow (0^n, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \end{cases} \rightarrow (k_F, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)$$

### 3.2.2 Formal Construction of Non-Adaptively Secure Function $F$

We first provide the specifications of the underlying primitives used for the construction of $F$. We have $\hat{\pi} : K \times (\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3} \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3}$ where $K$ is the key space of $\hat{\pi}$. $\hat{\pi}_k$ denotes a PRP with respect to private key $k$ and $\hat{\pi}_k^{-1}$ is the inversion permutation to $\hat{\pi}_k$. We are also given PRP $\pi : K \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$. Notice that both $\hat{\pi}$ and $\pi$ have the same key space $K$. Without loss of generality, $K$ is $\{0,1\}^n$ throughout this paper. Finally, we are given a family of DTPs, $(Gen(\cdot, \cdot), f, f^{-1})$. We denote $f_k$ and $f_k^{-1}$ as a permutation and its inverse permutation defined over $\{0,1\}^n$ where $(k, t_k)$ is generated by $Gen(1^n, r)$ for randomness $r \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $|k| = n$ and $|t_k| = poly(n)$.

Built on the above underlying primitives, the counter-example function $F$ is defined to be from $(\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3}$ to $(\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3}$ and internally hides a secret $k_F$ in $K$, which is a private key applied to the underlying primitives in order to generate pseudo-random. Let $I = (u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{2n+3})$ be an input vector to $F$ where $u_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, 2n+3$. Similarly, $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{2n+3})$ denote an output vector. The formal construction of $F$ is given in Algorithm 1.

**Claim 3.1.** The function $F$ is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary $A(q, t)$, running in time $t$ and making at most $q$ non-adaptive queries, where $t$ and $q$ are any polynomials of security parameter $n$.

**Proof.** For clarity in the following proof, we denote $r_{ij}$ as the $i$th randomness at the $j$th query. To prove the non-adaptive security of $F$, we will show that

$$\text{Adv}^F_A(q, t) \leq \text{Adv}^f_A(q, t') + \text{Adv}^{\hat{\pi}}_A(q, t') + \text{Adv}^{\pi}_A(q, t') + \frac{q}{2^n} \quad (1)$$

where $t' = t + poly(n, q)$, accounting for the extra time costs resulting from our reduction.

Assume that non-adaptive adversary $A$ chooses $q$ queries as follows. The first query is $Q_1 = (u^*, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \in (\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3}$ and the rest of $q - 1$ queries are $Q_i = (u_{i1}, u_{i2}, \ldots, u_{i(2n)}, u^*, 0^n, 0^n)$ for $2 \leq i \leq q$, in which $u_{i1}, u_{i2}, \ldots, u_{i(2n)}$ are arbitrarily chosen for all $i$. Notice that in cases 1 and 2 of Algorithm 1, once we fix the first coordinate of $Q_1$ and the $(2n+1)$th coordinate of $Q_i$’s to be equally $u^*$, we actually fix the shared key $k'$ through all the $q$ queries, so that the first coordinate is an encryption of the second coordinate by $\pi_{Q_2}$ in the last $q - 1$ outputs. Hence, inverting the first $n$ coordinates of output on $Q_1$ will reveal the key $k'$, and consequently $A$ distinguishes $F$ from a uniform function $R$. Since any PPT adversary can invert $f_k$ only with at most negligible probability $\epsilon_{f_k}$, the probability of retrieving $k'$ is at most $(\epsilon_{f_k})^n$, constituting the first term on the right-hand side (RHS) of inequality (1).
Construction of $F$

1. If $I = (u_1 \neq 0^n, u_2 = 0^n, \cdots, u_{2n+3} = 0^n)$, then
   
   Output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where
   
   $(a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   
   $(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+3})$
   
   Let $y_i = f_{a_{i+1}}(x_i)$ for $\forall i = 1, 2, \cdots, n$
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow (y_1, y_2, \cdots, y_n, x_{n+1}, \cdots, x_{2n+3})$

2. If $I = (u_1 \neq 0^n, u_2 \neq 0^n, \cdots, u_{2n+1} \neq 0^n, u_{2n+2} = 0^n, u_{2n+3} = 0^n)$, then
   
   Output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where
   
   $(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(u_{2n+1}, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   
   Let $k_i = \langle x_i, x_{n+i} \rangle$ for $\forall i = 1, 2, \cdots, n$
   
   Let $k' = k_1 k_2 \cdots k_n$
   
   $(r_1, r_2, \cdots, r_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+3})$
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow (\pi_{k'}(r_1), r_1, \cdots, r_{2n+2})$

3. If $I = (u_1 \neq 0^n, u_2 \neq 0^n, \cdots, u_{2n+3} \neq 0^n)$, then
   
   Output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where
   
   $(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(u_{2n+1}, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   
   Let $k_i = \langle x_i, x_{n+i} \rangle$ for $\forall i = 1, 2, \cdots, n$
   
   Let $k' = k_1 k_2 \cdots k_n$
   
   $(r_1, r_2, \cdots, r_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+1}, 0^n, 0^n)$
   
   $\alpha \leftarrow \pi_{k'}(r_1)$

   (a) If $\pi_{k'}^{-1}(\alpha \oplus u_{2n+2}) = r_1 \oplus u_{2n+3}$,
       
       then $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow (k_{n+1}, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$

   (b) else $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+3})$

4. If $I$ is not of any previous cases, then
   
   Output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \vec{\pi}_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+3})$

Algorithm 1: The algorithm of function $F$
Assume that $\mathcal{A}$ makes $q$ queries in the form of $(u_1 \neq 0^n, u_2 \neq 0^n, \cdots , u_{2n+3} \neq 0^n)$, corresponding to case 3 and fixes the first $2n + 1$ coordinates of all the queries. So, $\mathcal{A}$ fixes $k', r_1$, and $\alpha$ in the condition $\pi_{k'}^{-1}(\alpha \oplus u_{2n+2}) = r_1 \oplus u_{2n+3}$. Now, $\mathcal{A}$ only needs to find a pair of $u_{2n+2}$ and $u_{2n+3}$ satisfying the condition so that $F$ reveals its secret key $k_F$. Since $\pi$ is a permutation, there exists unique $u_{2n+3}$ to each $u_{2n+2}$, which satisfies the condition. Hence,

$$\Pr[\pi_{k'}^{-1}(\alpha \oplus u_{2n+2}) = r_1 \oplus u_{2n+3} : u_{2n+2}, u_{2n+3} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n] \leq \frac{1}{2^n}.$$  

With $q$ queries, $\mathcal{A}$ successfully guesses $k_F$ with probability at most $q/2^n$; that is the second term on the RHS of the inequality.

Consider that $\mathcal{A}$ makes $q$ queries such that each input query falls into either case 3 or 4 of Algorithm 1. Since we already showed above that $F$ in the case 3 outputs only pseudo-random strings computed by $\tilde{\pi}_{k_F}$ with an overwhelming probability, we ignore the case that $F$ outputs the secret key $k_F$ on one of the $q$ queries. Then, $F$ simply outputs a vector of pseudo-random strings generated by PRP $\tilde{\pi}_{k_F}$ on each input query, which is indistinguishable from uniform randoms of $\{(0,1)^{2n+3}\}$. This constitutes $\text{Adv}_{F_A}(q, t')$ in inequality (1).

Consider the case in which $\mathcal{A}$ makes $q$ non-adaptive queries in which one of the queries is $(0^n, 0^n, \cdots , 0^n)$, so it evokes case 4 and the rest of queries evoke case 1 of Algorithm 1. Towards a contradiction, assume that $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes the outputs corresponding to the $q$ non-adaptive input queries described above. The output of case 4 is indistinguishable from uniform random by the security of PRP $\tilde{\pi}_{k_F}$. This implies that $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes the outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms. Notice that the first $n$ coordinates of an output of case 1 are strings generated in the following way. $\tilde{\pi}_{k_F}$ on an input query first generates pseudo-random strings and then a trapdoor permutation $f_{u_1 \oplus a_1}$ re-encrypts these pseudo-random strings where $u_1 \oplus a_1$ is known since $\mathcal{A}$ can obtain $a_1$ from the output of $F$ on $(0^n, 0^n, \cdots , 0^n)$. The rest of coordinates (all coordinates except for the first $n$ coordinates) are strings generated only by $\tilde{\pi}_{k_F}$ on an input query. We recall the description of the output of case 1 on input query $(u_1, u_2, \cdots , u_{2n+3})$ as follows:

$$\left( f_{u_1 \oplus a_1}(r_1), \cdots , f_{u_1 \oplus a_1}(r_n), r_{n+1}, \cdots , r_{2n+3} \right)$$

where $(r_1, r_2, \cdots , r_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \cdots , u_{2n+3})$. Since $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes these outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms, either of the following cases must be true. First, $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms by distinguishing the first $n$ coordinates of the outputs from uniform randoms. Then, $\mathcal{A}$ can also distinguish outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms as follows. Upon outputs of case 4, $\mathcal{A}$ applies $f_{u_1 \oplus a_1}$ to the first $n$ coordinates of each output and ignores the rest of coordinates of each output. This forces the distribution of the outputs of case 4 to be identical to the distributions of the outputs of case 1 that $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes from uniform randoms. Therefore, $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms. This leads to a contradiction to the non-adaptive security of $F$ in case 4 already proven above. Then, it must be true that $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes outputs of case 1 from uniform randoms by distinguishing the rest of coordinates of outputs from uniform randoms. However, this also enables $\mathcal{A}$ to distinguish outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms by ignoring the first $n$ coordinates of each output. Hence, another contradiction arises to the non-adaptive security of $F$ in case 4. Since we encounter contradictions in both cases, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ making $q$ non-adaptive queries of case 1 is also upper-bounded by $\text{Adv}_{F_A}(q, t')$ in inequality (1).

Finally, consider that $\mathcal{A}$ makes $q$ queries of case 2 in Algorithm 1. Towards a contradiction, assume that $\mathcal{A}$ distinguishes thses outputs from uniform randoms. Notice that the distribution of
the last \(2n+1\) coordinates in output vectors (all the elements except for the first two elements) is equivalent to the distribution of the last \(2n+1\) coordinates of an output of case 4. This is due to that both distributions are generated by \(\tilde{\pi}_k\) on input queries. We already showed above that if \(A\) distinguishes outputs of case 2 from uniform randoms by distinguishing the last \(2n+1\) coordinates from uniform randoms, \(A\) can also distinguish outputs of case 4 from uniform randoms, which leads to a contradiction. This implies that \(A\) distinguishes outputs of case 2 from uniform random by distinguishing the first \(2\) coordinates from uniform randoms. Hence, distinguishing the outputs of case 2 from uniform randoms over \(\{(0,1)^n\}^{2n+3}\) is equivalent to distinguishing

\[
(\pi_k(r_1), r_1), (\pi_k(r_2), r_2), \ldots, (\pi_k(r_q), r_q)
\]

(2)

where \(k, r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_q\) are uniformly random, from

\[
(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), \ldots, (a_q, b_q)
\]

(3)

where \(a_i, b_i\) for all \(i = 1, \ldots, q\) are uniformly random.

Let \(A\) distinguish (2) from (3) with a non-negligible probability \(\xi\). We define the \(i\)th hybrid distribution \(H_i\) as

\[
H_i = (\pi_k(r_1), r_1), \ldots, (\pi_k(r_i), r_i), (a_{i+1}, b_{i+1}), \ldots, (a_q, b_q)
\]

where \(k, r_i, a_i, b_i\) for all \(i = 1, \ldots, q\) are uniformly random. Since \(|H_0 - H_q| \geq \xi/q\), there exists \(i\) such that \(|H_i - H_{i+1}| \geq \xi/q\). Then, we can construct a distinguisher \(D'\) by using \(A\) such that \(D'\) distinguishes \(\pi\) from a random function \(R : \{0,1\}^{n} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n}\) with non-negligible probability as follows. Upon an unknown distribution \((\alpha, \beta) \in \{(0,1)^n\}^2\), \(D'\) generates the \(i\)th hybrid distribution as

\[
(\pi_k(t_1), t_1), \ldots, (\pi_k(t_{i-1}), t_{i-1}), (\alpha, \beta), (a_{i+1}, b_{i+1}), \ldots, (a_q, b_q)
\]

where \(t_1, \ldots, t_q, a_{i+1}, b_{i+1}, \ldots, a_q, b_q\) are uniformly random. Then, \(D'\) queries the \(i\)th hybrid distribution to \(A\). Since \(A\) distinguishes the \(i\)th hybrid distribution with non-negligible probability \(\xi/q\), \(D'\) distinguishes \(\pi\) from \(R\) with non-negligible probability \(\xi/q\), which contradicts the indistinguishability of \(\pi\). This contributes to \(\text{Adv}_{\pi}(q, t')\) in inequality (1).

\[\square\]

### 3.2.3 Formal Construction of Non-Adaptively Secure Function \(G\)

The function \(G\) is also defined from \((\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3}\) to \((\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3}\) with a secret \(k_G\) in \(K\). The notations and standard specifications of underlying primitives remain identical to those for the construction of \(F\) in the previous section. The formal construction of \(G\) is presented in Algorithm 2.

**Claim 3.2.** The function \(G\) is secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary \(A(q, t)\), running in time \(t\) and making at most \(q\) non-adaptive queries, where \(t\) and \(q\) are any polynomials of security parameter \(n\).

**Proof.** To prove the non-adaptive security of \(G\), we will also show that

\[
\text{Adv}_{A}(q, t) \leq \text{Adv}_{A}(q, t') + \text{Adv}_{\tilde{\pi}}(q, t') + \text{Adv}_{\pi}(q, t') + \frac{q}{2^n} + \text{Adv}_{A}(q, t')
\]

(4)

where \(t' = t + poly(n, q)\) as defined in Claim 3.1 and \(\text{Gen}\) is a key generation algorithm for a family of DTPs. Since all the cases of \(G\) are identical except that the output of \(G\) in case (1) is a public key \(k\) for trapdoor permutation \(f\), the first four terms on the RHS of (4) are identical to those in Lemma 3.1. Since the key \(k\) is indistinguishable from uniform random over \(\{0,1\}^n\) by the property of \(\text{Gen}\), any PPT adversary \(A\) distinguishes the key \(k\) from uniform random over \(\{1,0\}^n\) with only negligible advantage. Hence, the indistinguishability of dense keys constitutes \(\text{Adv}_{\text{Gen}}(q, t')\) in inequality (4).

\[\square\]
1. If $I = (u_1 = 0^n, u_2 = 0^n, \cdots, u_{2n+3} = 0^n)$, then
   output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where
   $(s_1, s_2, \cdots, s_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   $(k, t_k) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n, s_1)$
   $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow (k, s_2, \cdots s_{2n+3})$

2. If $I = (u_1 \neq 0^n, u_2 \neq 0^n, \cdots, u_{2n+1} \neq 0^n, u_{2n+2} = 0^n, u_{2n+3} = 0^n)$, then
   output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where
   $(a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   $(k, t_k) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n, a_1)$
   $(b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(u_{2n+1}, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   Let $x'_i = f_{t_k}^{-1}(u_i \oplus b_i)$ for $i = 1, 2, \cdots, n$
   Let $k_j = (x'_i, (u_{n+j} \oplus b_{n+j}))$ for $j = 1, 2, \cdots, n$
   Let $k' = k_1 k_2 \cdots k_n$
   $(s_1, s_2, \cdots, s_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+3})$
   $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow (\pi_{k'}(s_1), s_1, \cdots, s_{2n+2})$

3. If $I = (u_1 \neq 0^n, u_2 \neq 0^n, \cdots, u_{2n+3} \neq 0^n)$, then
   output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where
   $(a_1, a_2, \cdots, a_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   $(k, t_k) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n, a_1)$
   $(b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(u_{2n+1}, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   Let $x'_i = f_{t_k}^{-1}(u_i \oplus b_i)$ for $i = 1, 2, \cdots, n$
   Let $k_j = (x'_i, (u_{n+j} \oplus b_{n+j}))$ for $j = 1, 2, \cdots, n$
   Let $k' = k_1 k_2 \cdots k_n$
   $(c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+1}, 0^n, 0^n)$
   $\beta \leftarrow \pi_{k'}(c_1)$
   (a) If $\pi_{k'}^{-1}(\beta \oplus u_{2n+2}) = c_2 \oplus u_{2n+3}$, then $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow (0^n, k_G, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$
   (b) Otherwise, $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+3})$

4. If $I$ is not of any previous cases, then
   output $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3})$ where $(v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_{2n+3}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(u_1, u_2, \cdots, u_{2n+3})$

**Algorithm 2:** The algorithm of function $G$
3.2.4 Adaptive Insecurity of Parallel Composition of F and G

In this paper, a pseudo-random function is said to be breakable by \( q \) adaptive queries if there is a PPT adversary \( A \) such that \( A \) distinguishes the pseudo-random function from a uniform random function by asking \( q \) adaptive queries to the pseudo-random function.

**Claim 3.3.** The parallel composition function \( F \oplus G \) is breakable by four adaptive queries.

**Proof.** To show the claim, we present a particular sequence of four adaptive queries in which the parallel composition \( F \oplus G \) reveals all the secret keys of \( F \) and \( G \), such as \( k_F \) and \( k_G \). Let \( r_{ij} \) (or \( s_{ij} \)) denote the \( i \)th randomness of \( F \) (or \( G \)) upon the \( j \)th adaptive query \( Q_j \). Then, our first query \( Q_1 \) to \( F \oplus G(\cdot) \) is \( Q_1 = (0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \in (\{0,1\}^n)^{2n+3} \). Since the input always (with probability 1) evokes case 4 of Algorithm 1, we have
\[
F(0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) = \bar{\pi}_{k_F}(0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) = (r_{11}, r_{21}, \ldots, r_{(2n+3)1}).
\]

In \( G \), since the input falls into case 1 of Algorithm 2, \( G \) computes \((s_{11}, s_{21}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)1})\) by \( \bar{\pi}_{k_G}(0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) \) and then obtains \((k, k)\) by executing \( \text{Gen}(1^n, s_{11}) \). Finally, \( G \) outputs \((k, s_{21}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)1})\). Thus, the output of \( F \oplus G(0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) \) is
\[
(r_{11}, r_{21}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)1}) \oplus (k, s_{21}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)1}) = (r_{11} \oplus k, r_{21} \oplus s_{21}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)1} \oplus s_{(2n+3)1}).
\]

Obtaining the above output, we define our second adaptive query \( Q_2 \) to be:
\[
Q_2 = (r_{11} \oplus k, 0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) \in (\{0,1\}^{2n+3}).
\]

Note that \( Q_2 \) fails to evoke case 1 of Algorithm 1 when \( r_{11} \oplus k = 0^n \). That is, if \( r_{11} = k \), then the second adaptive query cannot succeed to lead \( F \) and \( G \) into the proper case. The probability that \( r_{11} = k \) is \( 1/2^n \) which is negligible in \( n \). Therefore, \( Q_2 \) successfully evokes case 1 of Algorithm 1 with probability \( 1 - 1/2^n \).

Upon \( Q_2 \) which evokes case 1 of Algorithm 1, \( F \) internally simulates the computations of itself on \( Q_1 \) to obtain \( r_{11} \) by executing \( \bar{\pi}_{k_F}(0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) = \bar{\pi}_{k_F}(Q_1) = (r_{11}, r_{22}, \cdots, r_{(2n+3)1}) \). Now, \( F \) can retrieve the public key \( k \) from \( Q_2 \) by computing \( r_{11} \oplus k \oplus r_{11} = k \). Obtaining \( k \), \( F \) computes \( y_{i2} = f_k(x_{i2}) \) for \( i = 1, 2, \cdots, n \) where \( F \) computes fresh pseudo-random strings as \( \bar{\pi}_{k_F}(Q_2) = (x_{12}, x_{22}, \cdots, x_{(2n+3)2}) \). Finally, \( F \) outputs \((y_{12}, \cdots, y_{n2}, x_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, x_{(2n+3)2})\).

In \( G \), the input \( Q_2 \) is case 4 of Algorithm 2. Hence, \( G \) outputs fresh pseudo-randoms as follows.
\[
G(r_{11} \oplus k, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) = \bar{\pi}_{k_G}(r_{11} \oplus k, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) = (s_{12}, s_{22}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)2}) \tag{5}
\]

Thus, we have
\[
(F \oplus G)(Q_2) = (y_{12}, \cdots, y_{n2}, x_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, x_{(2n+3)2}) \oplus (s_{12}, s_{22}, \cdots, s_{(2n+3)2})
\]
\[
= (y_{12} \oplus s_{12}, \cdots, y_{n2} \oplus s_{n2}, x_{(n+1)2} \oplus s_{(n+1)2}, \cdots, x_{(2n+3)2} \oplus s_{(2n+3)2}).
\]

We define our third adaptive query \( Q_3 \in (\{0,1\}^{2n+3} \) to be
\[
Q_3 = (y_{12} \oplus s_{12}, \cdots, x_{(2n)2} \oplus s_{(2n)2}, r_{11} \oplus k, 0^n, 0^n).
\]

Assuming that \( Q_2 \) succeeds to evoke case 1 of Algorithm 1 and case 4 of Algorithm 2 (Recall that \( Q_1 \) always succeeds.), the third adaptive query \( Q_3 \) succeeds to evoke case 2 of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 only when none of the first \( 2n + 1 \) coordinates of \( Q_3 \) is \( 0^n \). Since the \( (2n + 1) \)th coordinate (i.e., \( r_{11} \oplus k \)) is taken from \( Q_2 \), the \( (2n + 1) \)th coordinate is guaranteed not to be \( 0^n \).
Hence, for $Q_3$ to be a valid adaptive query, it must be the case that $y_{12} \neq s_{12}, \ldots, x_{(2n)2} \neq s_{(2n)2}$. In other words, $Q_3$ fails if at least one of equalities $y_{12} = s_{12}, \ldots, x_{(2n)2} = s_{(2n)2}$ occurs. Each of the equalities occurs with probability $1/2^n$ so that the total failing probability of $Q_3$ is $2n/2^n$ which is negligible in $n$. Thus, $Q_3$ succeeds to evoke case 2 of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 with probability $1 - 2n/2^n$.

Then $F$ upon $Q_3$ computes,

$$\tilde{\pi}_{kF}(u_{2n+1}, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) = \tilde{\pi}_{kF}(r_{11} \oplus k, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) = \tilde{\pi}_{kF}(Q_2) = (x_{12}, x_{22}, \ldots, x_{(2n+3)2}).$$

Then, $F$ computes $n$ hard-core bits by computing

$$k_i = \langle x_{i2}, x_{(n+i)2} \rangle \quad \text{for } \forall i = 1, 2, \ldots, n. \quad (6)$$

So, $F$ obtains a shared key $k' = k_1k_2 \cdots k_n$. Finally, $F$ computes fresh pseudo-random as

$$\tilde{\pi}_{kF}(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{2n+3}) = (r_{13}, r_{23}, \ldots, r_{(2n+3)3}),$$

and outputs $(\pi_{k'}(r_{13}), r_{13}, \ldots, r_{(2n+2)3})$.

As $Q_3$ evokes case 2 of Algorithm 2, $G$ retrieves $(k, t_k)$ by computing $Gen(1^n, s_{11})$ where $(s_{11}, s_{21}, \ldots, s_{(2n+3)1}) = \tilde{\pi}_{kG}(Q_1)$. Then, $G$ proceeds to compute the followings:

$$G(u_{2n+1}, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) = G(r_{11} \oplus k, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)$$

$$= (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{2n+3})$$

$$= (s_{12}, s_{22}, \ldots, s_{(2n+3)2}) \text{ by (5).}$$

Using the trapdoor $t_k$, $G$ computes

$$x_i = f_{t_k}^{-1}(u_i \oplus a_1) = f_{t_k}^{-1}(y_{i2} \oplus s_{i2} \oplus s_{i2}) = f_{t_k}^{-1}(y_{i2}) = x_{i2} \text{ for } \forall i = 1, 2, \ldots, n.$$

Then, $G$ can compute for $\forall j = 1, 2, \ldots, n$

$$k_j = \langle x_j, (u_{n+j} \oplus a_{n+j}) \rangle$$

$$= \langle x_{j2}, (x_{(n+j)2} \oplus s_{(n+j)2}) \rangle$$

$$= \langle x_{j2}, x_{(n+j)2} \rangle.$$

$G$ constructs a shared key $k'$ by letting $k' = k_1k_2 \cdots k_n$. Notice that $x_{j2}$ and $x_{(n+j)2}$ are respectively equivalent to $x_{i2}$ and $x_{(n+i)2}$ in $F$'s computation at (6). Thus, $G$'s $k' = F$'s $k'$. Finally, $G$ computes fresh pseudo-randoms as

$$\tilde{\pi}_{kG}(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{2n+3}) = (s_{13}, s_{23}, \ldots, s_{(2n+3)3}),$$

and outputs $(\pi_{k'}(s_{13}), s_{13}, \ldots, s_{(2n+2)3})$. Therefore, the output of $F \oplus G$ on the third input is

$$(\pi_{k'}(r_{13}) \oplus \pi_{k'}(s_{13}), r_{13} \oplus s_{13}, \ldots, r_{(2n+3)3} \oplus s_{(2n+3)3}).$$

Our final adaptive input $Q_4$ to $F \oplus G$ is

$$Q_4 = (y_{12} \oplus s_{12}, \ldots, y_{n2} \oplus s_{n2}, x_{(n+1)2} \oplus s_{(n+1)2}, \ldots, x_{(2n)2} \oplus s_{(2n)2}, r_{11} \oplus s_{11}, \pi_{k'}(r_{13}) \oplus \pi_{k'}(s_{13}), r_{13} \oplus s_{13}).$$
none of the coordinates of \( Q_1 \) is \( 0^n \). Notice that the first \( 2n + 1 \) coordinates are taken from \( Q_3 \) (i.e., the first \( 2n \) coordinates) and \( Q_2 \) (i.e., the \( (2n + 1) \)th coordinate). Hence, none of the first \( 2n + 1 \) coordinates are guaranteed to be \( 0^n \) as we conditioned that \( Q_2 \) and \( Q_3 \) are successful adaptive queries. \( Q_4 \) fails if \( \pi_{k'}(r_{13}) = \pi_{k'}(s_{13}) \) or \( r_{13} = s_{13} \) in which each of the cases occurs with probability \( 1/2^n \). Therefore, \( Q_4 \) succeeds to evoke case 3 of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 with probability \( 1 - 2^{-2n} \).

On \( Q_4 \), which evokes case 3 of Algorithm 1, \( F \) retrieves the same shared key \( k' \) as in (6) since \( F \) only requires \( u_{2n+1} \) to be \( r_{11} \oplus k \) as in the previous round. Obtaining \( k' \), \( F \) simulate the computations of the third round. In particular, \( F \) computes

\[
\tilde{\pi}_{k'}(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{2n+1}, 0^n, 0^n) = \tilde{\pi}_{k'}(Q_3) = (r_{13}, r_{23}, \ldots, r_{(2n+3)3}).
\]

Since \( \alpha = \pi_{k'}(r_{13}) \),

\[
\pi_{k'}^{-1}(\alpha \oplus u_{2n+2}) = \pi_{k'}^{-1}(\pi_{k'}(r_{13}) \oplus \pi_{k'}(r_{13}) \oplus \pi_{k'}(s_{13}))
\]

\[= \pi_{k'}^{-1}(\pi_{k'}(s_{13}))
\]

\[= s_{13}
\]

\[= r_{13} \oplus r_{13} \oplus s_{13}
\]

\[= r_{13} \oplus u_{2n+3}.
\]

Therefore, \( F \) outputs \((k_F, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)\).

\( Q_4 \) evokes in case 3 of Algorithm 2. Again, \( G \) starts the fourth round computation by retrieving \((k, t_k)\) as it computes \( \text{Gen}(1^n \oplus s_{11}) \) where \((s_{11}, s_{21}, \ldots, s_{(2n+3)1}) = \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(Q_1) \). Then, similarly to \( F \), \( G \) also computes the shared key \( k' \) by using the first \( 2n \) elements of \( Q_4 \), which are equivalent to the first \( 2n \) coordinates of \( Q_3 \). Thus, \( G \) retrieves the shared key \( k' \). Then, \( G \) proceeds to check if the equality in case 3(a) holds as follows:

\[
\tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{2n+1}, 0^n, 0^n) = \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(Q_3) = (b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_{2n+3}) = (s_{13}, s_{23}, \ldots, s_{(2n+3)3}).
\]

Since \( \beta = \pi_{k'}(s_{13}) = \pi_{k'}(b_1) \),

\[
\pi_{k'}^{-1}(\beta \oplus u_{2n+2}) = \pi_{k'}^{-1}(\pi_{k'}(s_{13}) \oplus \pi_{k'}(r_{13}) \oplus \pi_{k'}(s_{13}))
\]

\[= \pi_{k'}^{-1}(\pi_{k'}(r_{13}))
\]

\[= r_{13}
\]

\[= s_{13} \oplus r_{13} \oplus r_{13}
\]

\[= b_{13} \oplus u_{2n+3}.
\]

Consequently, \( G \) outputs \((0^n, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)\). Therefore, the output of \( F \oplus G \) on \( Q_4 \) is

\[
(k_F, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \oplus (0^n, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) = (k_F, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n),
\]

which reveals all of the secret keys of \( F \) and \( G \).

By Claim 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, we immediately obtains the following theorem.

**Theorem 10.** Suppose that a dense trapdoor permutation exists. Then, there exist non-adaptively secure functions \( F \) and \( G \) whose parallel composition \( F \oplus G \) is breakable by four adaptive queries.
### 3.3 Parallel Composition Impossibility from UTKA

#### 3.3.1 Intuitions of Adaptively Insecure Parallel Composition of F and G under UTKA

A \( \gamma \)-round uniform-transcript key agreement protocol (\( \gamma \)-UTKA), denoted by \( \Phi^\gamma_u = (A, B) \), is a uniform-transcript key agreement protocol consisting of two sub-protocols \( A \) and \( B \), in which Alice (using \( A \)) and Bob (using \( B \)) exchange \( 2\gamma \) messages to each other (\( \gamma \) messages from each party) in order to share a secret key \( sk \).

We first provide the intuitive description of the parallel version of \( \gamma \)-UTKA in Protocol 2, which we will use to construct counter-example functions. Notice that Alice and Bob are symmetric to each other in Protocol 2. In particular, Bob’s first message is completely independent of Alice’s first message and is only dependent on his own private randomness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( r_A \leftarrow $ {0,1}^n )</td>
<td>( \alpha_1 \leftarrow A_1(r_A) )</td>
<td>( r_B \leftarrow $ {0,1}^n )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha_1 \rightarrow )</td>
<td>( \beta_1 \leftarrow B_1(r_B) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_2 \leftarrow A_2(r_A, \beta_1) )</td>
<td>( \beta_2 \leftarrow B_2(r_B, \alpha_1) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta_2 \leftarrow )</td>
<td>( \beta_2 \leftarrow )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha_\gamma \leftarrow A_\gamma(r_A, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{\gamma-1}) )</td>
<td>( \beta_\gamma \leftarrow B_\gamma(r_B,\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{\gamma-1}) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \beta_\gamma \rightarrow )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secret key ( sk \leftarrow A_{\gamma+1}(r_A, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{\gamma}) )</td>
<td>secret key ( sk \leftarrow B_{\gamma+1}(r_B, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{\gamma}) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Protocol 2: Parallel \( \gamma \)-UTKA**

Now, we provide a high-level overview of our pseudo-random functions \( F \) and \( G \) from \( \gamma \)-UTKA and describe how to break the adaptive security of their parallel composition. For underlying primitives, we have a black-box access to \( \Phi^\gamma_u = (A, B) \), \( \gamma \)-UTKA described in Protocol 2. \( \alpha_i \) and \( \beta_i \) denote the \( i \)th message computed by \( A \) and \( B \) respectively. We are give a pseudo-random private-key encryption scheme (\( Enc, Dec \)) such that \( Dec_k(Enc_k(x)) = x \). Finally, let \( P \) be any given adaptively secure PRP.

Intuitively, \( F \) utilizes \( A \) as its subroutine as well as \( G \) utilizes \( B \) as its subroutine in order for them to share a secret key via input and outputs. Then, \( F \) and \( G \) create a specially related pseudo-random strings with respect to the shared secret key. As we input the specially related pseudo-random strings to the parallel composition, the functions retrieve the shared key, verify the special relation hidden in the input query, and reveal their secret keys in their outputs. \( F \) and \( G \) internally contain secret keys \( k_F \) and \( k_G \). \( F \) and \( G \) are defined over \( (\{0,1\}^n)^{\gamma+2} \).

\(^2\)The main reason for using this parallel version of \( \gamma \)-UTKA is that it is easier to emulate the key agreement protocol in the context of parallel composition of our proposed counter-example pseudo-random functions \( F \) and \( G \). Also, it provides us with a tighter bound on the number of adaptive queries required to break the adaptive security of the parallel composition. It is possible to construct the counter-example functions to show the same composition insecurity result by using \( \gamma - UTKA \) in which Bob’s first message is dependent on Alice’s first message. However, it requires more adaptive queries to break the parallel composition of such functions.
First, we define \( F \) and \( G \) upon the first adaptive (fixed) query \( Q_1 = (0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \) as:

- \( F \) generates \( \gamma + 2 \) pseudo-random strings \( r_F, r_{21}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)1} \) by \( P_{k_F}(Q_1) \). \( F \) creates Alice’s first message \( \alpha_1 \) by \( A_1(r_F) \) and then outputs \( (\alpha_1, r_{21}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)1}) \).
- \( G \) does the same as it generates \( s_G, s_{21}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)1} \) by \( P_{k_F}(Q_1) \), and then computes Bob’s first message \( \beta_1 \) by \( B_1(s_G) \), and outputs \( (\beta_1, s_{21}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)1}) \).

Below we depict the individual outputs of \( F \) and \( G \) on \( Q_1 \) and their parallel composition:

\[
\begin{align*}
Q_1 & \rightarrow \left[ \begin{array}{l}
F \rightarrow (\alpha_1, r_{21}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)1}) \\
G \rightarrow (\beta_1, s_{21}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)1})
\end{array} \right] \\
\rightarrow (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, r_{21} \oplus s_{21}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)1} \oplus s_{(\gamma+2)1})
\end{align*}
\]

Inductively, for \( 2 \leq i \leq \gamma \), we define \( F \) and \( G \) to process the \( i \)-th adaptive query \( Q_i = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_{i-1} \oplus \beta_{i-1}, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \) as follows.

- \( F \) first regenerates \( r_F \) and \( \alpha_1 \) by simulating the first-round computation. That is, \( F \) first computes \( P_{k_F}(Q_1) \) to obtain \( r_F \) and then executes \( A(r_F) \). Then, \( F \) processes the following \textit{chain of computations} in the direction of left-to-right and top-to-bottom with \( r_F, \alpha_1 \) and \( Q_1 \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\beta_1 & \leftarrow (\alpha_1 \oplus u_1) \\
\beta_2 & \leftarrow (\alpha_2 \oplus u_2) \\
\vdots & \\
\beta_{i-1} & \leftarrow (\alpha_{i-1} \oplus u_{i-1}) \\
\alpha_i & \leftarrow A_i(r_F, \beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_{i-1})
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, \( F \) outputs \( (\alpha_i, r_{2i}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)i}) \) where \( r_{2i}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)i} \) are fresh pseudo-random strings generated by \( P_{k_F}(Q_i) \).

- \( G \) is symmetrically defined. That is, we have the description \( G \) on \( Q_i \) by replacing all of \( F \), \( r \), \( A \), and \( \alpha \) in the above description with \( G \), \( s \), \( B \), and \( \beta \). Hence, \( G \) outputs \( (\beta_i, s_{2i}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)i}) \) where \( s_{2i}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)i} \) are generated by \( P_{k_G}(Q_i) \).

On \( Q_i \) for \( 2 \leq i \leq \gamma \), we demonstrate the individual outputs of \( F \) and \( G \) and the output of their parallel composition below.

\[
\begin{align*}
Q_i & \rightarrow \left[ \begin{array}{l}
F \rightarrow (\alpha_i, r_{2i}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)i}) \\
G \rightarrow (\beta_i, s_{2i}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)i})
\end{array} \right] \\
\rightarrow (\alpha_i \oplus \beta_i, r_{2i} \oplus s_{2i}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)i} \oplus s_{(\gamma+2)i})
\end{align*}
\]

Hence, we obtain \( \alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma \) by feeding the parallel composition of \( F \) and \( G \) with \( Q_\gamma \) to be \( (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma, 0^n, 0^n) \).

The \( (\gamma + 1) \)-th adaptive query is defined to be \( Q_{\gamma+1} = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma, 0^n, 0^n) \). Then, we define our functions \( F \) and \( G \) on \( Q_{\gamma+1} \) as follows.

- \( F \) first regenerates \( r_F \) and \( \alpha_1 \) by simulating the first-round computation as before. Then, \( F \) performs the chain of computations described above, and so obtains \( \beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_\gamma \). Hence, \( F \) can generate a shared key \( sk \) by \( A_{\gamma+1}(r_F, \beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_\gamma) \). \( F \) generates pseudo-random strings \( r_{1(\gamma+1)}, r_{2(\gamma+1)}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1)} \) by \( P_{k_F}(Q_{\gamma+1}) \). \( F \) creates an (pseudo-random) encryption \( Enc_{sk}(r_{1(\gamma+1)}) \). Finally, \( F \) outputs \( (Enc_{sk}(r_{1(\gamma+1)}), r_{1(\gamma+1)}, r_{3(\gamma+1)}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1)}) \).
- \( G \) is symmetrically defined. So, \( G \) outputs \( (Enc_{sk}(s_{1(\gamma+1)}), s_{1(\gamma+1)}, s_{3(\gamma+1)}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1)}) \).
The following describes the each output of $F$ and $G$, and that of parallel composition on $Q_{\gamma+1}$.

$$Q_{\gamma+1} \rightarrow \begin{cases} F \rightarrow (\text{Enc}_k(r_1(\gamma+1)), r_1(\gamma+1), r_3(\gamma+1), \cdots, r(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1)) \\ G \rightarrow (\text{Enc}_s(k_1(\gamma+1)), s_1(\gamma+1), s_3(\gamma+1), \cdots, s(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1)) \end{cases}$$

$$\rightarrow (\text{Enc}_s(r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus \text{Enc}_s(s_1(\gamma+1)), r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus s_1(\gamma+1), r_3(\gamma+1) \oplus s_3(\gamma+1), \cdots, r(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1) \oplus s(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1))$$

The final $(\gamma+2)$th adaptive query is defined to be $Q_{\gamma+2} = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \cdots, \alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma, \text{Enc}_s(r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus \text{Enc}_s(s_1(\gamma+1)), r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus s_1(\gamma+1))$ which is the combination of all the outputs of the parallel composition on the previous adaptive queries. Then, $F$ and $G$ are defined on $Q_{\gamma+2}$ as follows.

- $F$ executes the chain of computations to retrieve $\beta_1, \beta_2, \cdots, \beta_\gamma$, then computes a shared key $sk$ by $A_{\gamma+1}(r_F, \beta_1, \beta_2, \cdots, \beta_\gamma)$. Since $Q_{\gamma+1} = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \cdots, \alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma, 0^n, 0^n)$, $F$ can obtain $\text{Enc}_sk(r_1(\gamma+1))$ and $r_1(\gamma+1)$ generated by the internal simulation of $Q(\gamma+1)$. $F$ checks to see if equality $\text{Dec}_sk(\text{Enc}_sk(r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus (\text{Enc}_sk(r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus \text{Enc}_sk(s_1(\gamma+1)))) = r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus (r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus s_1(\gamma+1))$ holds where $(\text{Enc}_sk(r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus \text{Enc}_sk(s_1(\gamma+1)))$ and $(r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus s_1(\gamma+1))$ are obtained from $Q_{\gamma+2}$. As the equality holds, $F$ is convinced that $Q_{\gamma+2}$ is indeed an adaptively generated query. Hence, $F$ outputs $(k_F, 0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$.

- $G$ is symmetrically defined. Hence, $G$ similarly outputs $(0^n, k_G, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$.

Below we provide the overall picture of the individual computations of $F$ and $G$ and the output of their parallel composition.

$$Q_{\gamma+2} \rightarrow \begin{cases} F \rightarrow (k_F, 0^n, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) \\ G \rightarrow (0^n, k_G, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n) \end{cases} \rightarrow (k_F, k_G, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$$

### 3.3.2 Formal Construction of Non-Adaptively Secure Functions $F$ and $G$

The underlying primitives used for the construction of $F$ and $G$ are two PRPs, $\pi : K \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\gamma : K \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, where $K$ is key space $\{0, 1\}^n$. Also, we are given a black-box access to the parallel version of $\gamma$-UTKA denoted by $\Phi_u = (A, B)$ described in Section 3.3.1.

We formally define our non-adaptively secure pseudo-random function $F$ to map from $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Furthermore, $F$ internally possesses a secret key $k_F \in K$. The formal definition of function $F$ is provided in Algorithm 3.

The construction of $G$ is symmetric to $F$. That is, replacing $F$, $A$, $r$, and $(k_F, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$ in Algorithm 3 with $G$, $B$, $s$, and $(0^n, k_G, 0^n, \cdots, 0^n)$ respectively will provide us with the formal construction of $G$.

**Claim 3.4.** The functions $F$ and $G$ are secure against any non-adaptive PPT adversary $A(q, t)$, running in time $t$ and making at most $q$ non-adaptive queries, where $t$ and $q$ are any polynomials of security parameter $n$.

**Proof.** By hybrid argument, we reduce the security of function $F$ to the indistinguishability of the underlying PRPs and the $\gamma$-UTKA. Let $A$ be a PPT adversary making $q$ queries and running for time $t$. Notice that $F$ and $G$ are structurally identical to one another. Hence, it suffices to show that $F$ is non-adaptively secure. To prove the claim, we will show the following inequality.

$$\text{Adv}_{\hat{A}}^F(q, t) \leq \text{Adv}_{\hat{A}}^\pi(q, t') + \text{Adv}_{\hat{A}}^\pi(q, t') + \text{Adv}_{\hat{A}}^A + \frac{q}{2^n}.$$ 

First, assume that to obtain the secret key $k_F$, $A$ makes $q$ queries of the form in $(u_1 \neq 0^n, \cdots, u_{q+2} \neq 0^n)$ evoking case 2 of Algorithm 3. Then, let $A$ fix the first $\gamma$ queries to be the same through the $q$
Construction of $F$

1. If $I = (u_1 = 0^n, u_2 = 0^n, \ldots, u_{\gamma+2} = 0^n)$, then
   
   Output $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2})$ where
   
   $(r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow \pi_{k_F}(0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)$
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow (A_1(r_1), r_2, \ldots, r_{\gamma+2})$

2. If $I = (u_1 \neq 0^n, \ldots, u_i \neq 0^n, u_{i+1} = 0^n, \ldots, u_{\gamma+2} = 0^n)$, then
   
   Output $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2})$ where
   
   $(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow \pi_{k_F}(0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)$
   
   $(r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow \pi_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{\gamma+2})$
   
   $\alpha_1 \leftarrow A_1(a_1)$
   
   For $j = 1$ to $\gamma$
   
   $\beta_j \leftarrow \alpha_j \oplus u_j$
   
   $\alpha_{j+1} \leftarrow A_{j+1}(a_1, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_j)$
   
   END For
   
   $sk_F \leftarrow \alpha_{j+1}$

   (a) If $i < \gamma$, then
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow (\alpha_{i+1}, r_2, \ldots, r_{\gamma+2})$

   (b) Else If $i = \gamma$, then
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow (\pi_{sk_F}(r_1), r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{\gamma+1})$

   (c) Else If $i = \gamma + 2$, then
   
   $(b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow F(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_\gamma, 0^n, 0^n)$
   
   i. If $\pi_{sk_F}^{-1}(b_1 \oplus u_{\gamma+1}) = b_2 \oplus u_{\gamma+2}$, then
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow (k_F, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)$
   
   ii. else $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow (r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{\gamma+2})$
   
   (d) Else $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow (r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_{\gamma+2})$

3. If the input is not any of above cases, then
   
   $(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_{\gamma+2}) \leftarrow \tilde{\pi}_{k_F}(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_{\gamma+2})$

Algorithm 3: The algorithm of function $F$
queries. This implies that $sk_F, b_1, b_2$ are fixed in the condition $\pi_{sk_F}^{-1}(b_1 \oplus u_{\gamma+1}) = b_2 \oplus u_{\gamma+2}$ in the case 2(c) of Algorithm 3. This only helps the adversary $A$ by allowing it to choose $u_{\gamma+1}$ and $u_{\gamma+2}$ to satisfy the condition. Since $\pi$ is a permutation, there uniquely exists $u_{\gamma+1}$ for each $u_{\gamma+2}$, which satisfies the condition. Hence,

$$\Pr[\pi_{sk}^{-1}(\alpha \oplus u_{\gamma+1}) = r_1 \oplus u_{\gamma+2} : u_{\gamma+1}, u_{\gamma+2} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n] \leq \frac{1}{2^n}. \quad (7)$$

Since $A$ makes $q$ queries, the probability of successfully finding a pair of such $u_{\gamma+1}$ and $u_{\gamma+2}$ is $q/2^n$, which constitutes the final term of the inequality (7).

Consider that $A$ makes queries that fall into case 2(c), 2(d), and 3 of Algorithm 3. As we showed above, $q$ non-adaptive queries can satisfy the condition in 2(c) with only negligible probability. Thus, assume that all the queries made here do not satisfy the condition. Hence, $F$ outputs, upon $q$ queries,

$$(r_{11}, r_{21}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)1}), (r_{12}, r_{22}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)2}), \cdots, (r_{1q}, r_{2q}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)q}), \quad (8)$$

where $r_{ij}$ is the $i$th coordinate of the $j$th query for $1 \leq i \leq \gamma + 2$ and $1 \leq j \leq q$.

Proceeding by hybrid argument, assume that $A$ distinguishes (8) from uniform distributions with a non-negligible probability $\xi$,

$$(r^*_{11}, r^*_{21}, \cdots, r^*_{(\gamma+2)1}), (r^*_{12}, r^*_{22}, \cdots, r^*_{(\gamma+2)2}), \cdots, (r^*_{1q}, r^*_{2q}, \cdots, r^*_{(\gamma+2)q}), \quad (9)$$

where $(r^*_{11}, r^*_{21}, \cdots, r^*_{(\gamma+2)1}) \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ for $1 \leq i \leq q$.

Let $H_i$ be the hybrid distribution as

$$H_i = h_1, \cdots, h_i, h^*_i+1, \cdots, h^*_q$$

for $h_i = (r_{1i}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)i})$ from (8) and $h^*_j = (r^*_{1j}, \cdots, r^*_{(\gamma+2)j})$ from (9).

Since $H_q - H_0 \geq \xi$, there exists $i$ such that $|H_j - H_{j-1}| \geq \frac{\xi}{q}$. Consider the $i$th hybrid,

$$H_i(x) = h_1, h_2, \cdots, h_{i-1}, x, h^*_i+1, \cdots, h^*_q.$$ 

Then we can build a PPT distinguisher $D$ using $A$ as a sub-routine. With an unknown distribution $u$ from $\{0,1\}^{\gamma+2}$, $D$ constructs and queries $H_i(u)$ to $A$. Since $A$ distinguishes $F$ from a uniform random function with the probability $\xi$, $D$ will distinguish $\pi$ from a uniform random function with the probability $\xi/q$, which is non-negligible.

Consider that $A$ makes $q$ queries in the form of $Q_i = (u_{1i} \neq 0^n, u_{2i} \neq 0^n, \cdots, u_{ni} \neq 0^n, 0^n, 0^n)$, that provokes case 2(b) of $F$ in Algorithm 3. Then, the corresponding outputs can be written as,

$$(\pi_{k_1}(r_{11}), r_{11}, r_{31}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)1}), (\pi_{k_2}(r_{12}), r_{12}, r_{32}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)2}), \cdots, (\pi_{k_q}(r_{1q}), r_{1q}, r_{3q}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)q})$$

where $(r_{1i}, r_{2i}, \cdots, r_{(\gamma+2)i}) \leftarrow \pi_{k_j}(Q_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq q$ and $k_i$ is computed by $A_{\gamma+1}(r, Trans^A)$ for unknown $r$. Distiguishing the above distribution from uniform random implies that one of the following two cases must be true. First, the adversary $A$ distinguishes the last $\gamma + 1$ coordinates (all coordinates except for the first coordinate) of the outputs from uniform random. Second, the first two coordinates from uniform random. Assume that the first case is true. Then, $A$ can distinguish all the output of $F$ upon queries of case 2(c)ii, 2(d) or 3 by simply ignoring the second coordinate of the outputs. This is clearly a contradiction to the non-adaptive security of $F$ in those cases proven above. Assume that the second case holds. Distinguishing the first two coordinates of the outputs from uniform random is equivalent to distinguishing,

$$(\pi(r_1), r_1), (\pi(r_2), r_2), \cdots, (\pi(r_q), r_q). \quad (10)$$

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where \( r_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq q \), from the uniform distribution,
\[
(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), \ldots, (a_q, b_q),
\] (11)
where \( a_i \) and \( b_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq q \).

Suppose that \( \mathcal{A} \) distinguishes (10) from (11) with a non-negligible probability \( \xi \). Define a hybrid distribution \( H_i \) as
\[
H_i = (\pi(r_1), r_1), \ldots, (\pi(r_i), r_i), (\pi(r_{i+1}), b_{i+1}), \ldots, (\pi(r_q), b_q),
\] (12)
where \( r_i \) and \( b_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq q \).

Since \( \mathcal{A} \) distinguishes (10) from (11) with probability \( \xi \), \( |H_0 - H_q| \geq \xi \), there exists \( i \) s.t. \( |H_i - H_{i+1}| \geq \frac{\xi}{q} \). Hence, let \( H_i(x) \) for \( x \in \{0,1\}^n \) be
\[
H_i(x) = (\pi(r_1), r_1), \ldots, (\pi(r_{i-1}), r_{i-1}), x, (\pi(r_{i+1}), b_{i+1}), \ldots, (\pi(r_q), b_q).
\]
Upon an unknown distribution \( (\alpha, \beta) \in \{0,1\}^n \), we can build a distinguisher \( \mathcal{D} \), which determines whether \( (\alpha, \beta) \) comes from (10) or from (11) with a non-negligible probability \( \xi \) as \( \mathcal{D} \) queries \( H_i((\alpha, \beta)) \) to \( \mathcal{A} \). Therefore, \( \mathcal{D} \) distinguishes \( \pi \) from a uniform random function with a non-negligible probability.

Consider that \( \mathcal{A} \) makes \( q \) queries in the form of \( (u_1 \neq 0^n, \ldots, u_i \neq 0^n, u_{i+1} = 0^n, \ldots, u_{\gamma+2} = 0^n) \) for \( i < \gamma \). That is, all the \( q \) queries fall into case 1 or 2(a) of Algorithm 3. By replacing \( \pi \) in the above hybrid argument with \( A \), we can also show that if \( \mathcal{A} \) breaks the indistinguishability of \( F \), then we can construct a PPT distinguisher \( \mathcal{D} \), which breaks the indistinguishability of messages. \( \square \)

3.3.3 Adaptive Insecurity of Parallel Composition of \( F \) and \( G \)

Claim 3.5. The parallel composition \( F \oplus G \) is breakable by \( \gamma + 2 \) adaptive queries.

Proof. Let \( r_{ij} \) denote the \( i \)-th randomness upon the \( j \)-th input. To initiate the key agreement, our first special input is \( (0^n, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \). Then, \( F \) gets into case 1 of Algorithm 3 and computes its first message \( \alpha_1 \) and outputs \( (\alpha_1, r_{21}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)1}) \). So does \( G \). Hence, the output of the parallel composition on the first input query is
\[
(\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, r_{21} \oplus s_{21}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)1} \oplus s_{(\gamma+2)1}).
\]
Our second adaptive query is \( Q_2 = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \), where \( \alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1 \) comes from the output of the parallel composition on \( Q_1 \). \( Q_2 \) evokes the case 2 of Algorithm 3 unless \( \alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1 = 0^n \). The only case that \( \alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1 = 0^n \) is \( \alpha_1 = \beta_1 \) which occurs with negligible probability. By the computations of “For” loop of case 2, \( F \) obtains \( \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_{\gamma+1} \) as follows.

| \( \alpha_1 \leftarrow A_1(a_1) \) | Before entering For loop | \( \alpha_2 \leftarrow A_2(a_1, \beta_1) \) | \( j = 1 \) |
| \( \beta_1 \leftarrow \alpha_1 \oplus u_1 = \alpha_1 \oplus (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1) \) |  |
| \( \beta_2 \leftarrow \alpha_2 \oplus u_2 = \alpha_2 \oplus 0^n \) | \( \alpha_3 \leftarrow A_3(a_1, \beta_1, \alpha_2) \) | \( j = 2 \) |
| \( \beta_3 \leftarrow \alpha_3 \oplus u_3 = \alpha_3 \oplus 0^n \) | \( \alpha_4 \leftarrow A_4(a_1, \beta_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) \) | \( j = 3 \) |
| \( \vdots \) | \( \vdots \) | \( \vdots \) |
| \( \beta_\gamma \leftarrow \alpha_\gamma \oplus u_\gamma = \alpha_\gamma \oplus 0^n \) | \( \alpha_{\gamma+1} \leftarrow A_{\gamma+1}(a_1, \beta_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_\gamma) \) | \( j = \gamma \) |

Since the first coordinate is the only non-zero coordinate, \( Q_2 \) evokes case (a) of case 2 after the For loop. Hence, function \( F \) outputs \( (\alpha_1, r_{22}, r_{32}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)2}) \) where \( (r_{12}, r_{22}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)2}) \) is generated by \( \tilde{\pi}_{k_F}(Q_2) \). \( G \) undertakes the identical course of computation, so it outputs \( (\beta_2, s_{22}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)2}) \).
For loop as follows.

\[ Q_i = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_{i-1} \oplus \beta_{i-1}, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n) \]  

where \( \alpha_i \oplus \beta_i \) is obtained from the output of \( F \) on \( Q_i \). Then, the output of the parallel composition on \( Q_i \) is

\[ (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_i \oplus \beta_i, r_{(i+1)i} \oplus s_{(i+1)i}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)i} \oplus s_{(\gamma+2)i}) \]

where \( (r_{1i}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)i}) \) is generated by \( \tilde{\pi}_{k_F}(Q_i) \) and \( (s_{1i}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+2)i}) \) is generated by \( \tilde{\pi}_{k_G}(Q_i) \).

Hence, the \( \gamma \)th adaptive query (the final case of the above inductive cases) is \( Q_{\gamma} = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_{\gamma-1} \oplus \beta_{\gamma-1}, 0^n, 0^n) \) by (13), and the corresponding output is \( (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_{\gamma} \oplus \beta_{\gamma}, r_{(\gamma+1)i} \oplus s_{(\gamma+1)i}, r_{(\gamma+2)i} \oplus s_{(\gamma+2)i}) \) by (14).

Now, we define our \((\gamma + 1)\)th adaptive query as \( Q_{\gamma+1} = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_{\gamma} \oplus \beta_{\gamma}, 0^n, 0^n) \) which evokes case 2. Again, \( F \) retrieves \( a_1 \) by computing \( \pi_{k_F}(Q_1) \). \( F \) performs the computations of For loop as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha_1 & \leftarrow A_1(a_1) & \text{Before entering For loop} \\
\beta_1 & \leftarrow \alpha_1 \oplus u_1 = \alpha_1 \oplus (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1) & \alpha_2 \leftarrow A_2(a_1, \beta_1) & j = 1 \\
\beta_2 & \leftarrow \alpha_2 \oplus u_2 = \alpha_2 \oplus (\alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2) & \alpha_3 \leftarrow A_3(a_1, \beta_1, \beta_2) & j = 2 \\
\beta_3 & \leftarrow \alpha_3 \oplus u_3 = \alpha_3 \oplus (\alpha_3 \oplus \beta_3) & \alpha_4 \leftarrow A_4(a_1, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3) & j = 3 \\
& \vdots & & \vdots \\
\beta_\gamma & \leftarrow \alpha_\gamma \oplus u_\gamma = \alpha_\gamma \oplus (\alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma) & \alpha_{\gamma+1} \leftarrow A_{\gamma+1}(a_1, \beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_\gamma) & j = \gamma
\end{align*}
\]

Since \( Q_{\gamma+1} \)'s first \( \gamma \) coordinates are adaptively generated from the previous adaptive queries and non-zero with overwhelming probability, \( \alpha_{\gamma+1} \) is a properly computed shared key, \( sk_F \) and \( Q_{\gamma+1} \) evokes case 2(b). Thus, \( F \) outputs \( (\pi_{sk_F}(r_{1(\gamma+1)}), r_{1(\gamma+1)}, r_{2(\gamma+1)}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+1)(\gamma+1)}) \) where \( (r_{1(\gamma+1)}, r_{2(\gamma+1)}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+2)(\gamma+1)}) \) is generated from \( \tilde{\pi}_{k_F}(Q_{\gamma+1}) \). On \( Q_{\gamma+1} \), \( G \) also performs the identical course of computations, so it outputs \( (\pi_{sk_G}(s_{1(\gamma+1)}), s_{1(\gamma+1)}, s_{2(\gamma+1)}, \ldots, s_{(\gamma+1)(\gamma+1)}) \). Hence, the output of the parallel composition on \( Q_{\gamma+1} \) is

\[
(\pi_{sk_F}(r_{1(\gamma+1)}) \oplus \pi_{sk_G}(s_{1(\gamma+1)}), r_{1(\gamma+1)} \oplus s_{1(\gamma+1)}, r_{2(\gamma+1)} \oplus s_{2(\gamma+1)}, \ldots, r_{(\gamma+1)(\gamma+1)} \oplus s_{(\gamma+1)(\gamma+1)})
\]

The final \((\gamma + 2)\)th adaptive query is defined as

\[
Q_{\gamma+2} = (\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma, r_{(\gamma+1)i} \oplus \pi_{sk_F}(s_{1(\gamma+1)}), r_{(\gamma+1)i} \oplus s_{1(\gamma+1)})
\]

On \( Q_{\gamma+2} \), \( F \) obtains the shared key \( sk_F \) by simulating the previous round computation with the first \( \gamma \) coordinates of \( Q_{\gamma+2} \). \( Q_{\gamma+2} \) evokes case 2(c) of Algorithm 3 as the final two coordinates of \( Q_{\gamma+2} \) are non-zero with overwhelming probability. Now \( F \) computes \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \) by simulating the output of the previous round of itself such that \( (b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_2) \) is the output from \( F(\alpha_1 \oplus \beta_1, \alpha_2 \oplus \beta_2, \ldots, \alpha_\gamma \oplus \beta_\gamma, 0^n, 0^n) = F(Q_{\gamma+1}) \). Therefore,

\[
b_1 = \pi_{k_{sk_F}}(r_{1(\gamma+1)})
\]

\[
b_2 = r_{1(\gamma+1)}.
\]
Then, \( F \) verifies that equality \( \pi_{sk_F}^{-1}(b_1 \oplus u_{\gamma+1}) = b_2 \oplus u_{\gamma+2} \) holds as

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_{sk_F}^{-1}(b_1 \oplus u_{\gamma+1}) &= \pi_{sk_F}^{-1}(\pi_{sk_F}(r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus \pi_{sk_F}(r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus \pi_{sk_{G}}(s_1(\gamma+1))) \\
&= \pi_{sk_F}^{-1}(\pi_{sk_{G}}(s_1(\gamma+1))) \\
&= s_1(\gamma+1) \\
&= (r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus r_1(\gamma+1)) \oplus s_1(\gamma+1) \\
&= r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus (r_1(\gamma+1) \oplus s_1(\gamma+1)) \\
&= b_2 \oplus u_{\gamma+2}
\end{align*}
\]

by (16) and (15)

Therefore, \( F \) outputs \((k_F, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)\). Similarly, \( G \) performs the same course of computation as does \( F \), so it outputs \((0^n, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)\). Therefore, the final output of the parallel composition is \((k_F, k_G, 0^n, \ldots, 0^n)\) which reveals all the secret keys of \( F \) and \( G \).

Now, by having proved Claim 3.4 and 3.5, we obtain the following theorem of the impossibility of adaptively secure parallel composition under the existence of \( \gamma \)-UTKA.

**Theorem 11.** If \( \gamma \)-UTKA \( \Phi_u = (A, B) \) exists, then there exist non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions \( F \) and \( G \) such that their parallel composition over XOR is \((\gamma+2)\)-adaptive query breakable.

### 3.4 Constructing UTKA from the Adaptive Insecurity of \( F \oplus G \)

In this section, we prove the reverse direction: the adaptively insecure parallel composition implies a UTKA protocol. This is directly inspired by the technique originally presented by [Pie06] which showed the same statement with the insecure sequential composition. That is, for \( k \geq 2 \), if the parallel composition of two \( k \) adaptively secure functions is not \( k \)-adaptively secure, then a \((2k-1)\)-pass key agreement exists. For clarity, we rather present a special case where \( k = 2 \). Following the technique of [Pie06], we construct a \((2k-1)\)-pass uniform-transcript bit agreement (UTBA) with \( \epsilon \)-correlation and \( \delta \)-security where \( \epsilon \) is non-negligible and \( \delta \) is overwhelming. It is known that \( n \) parallel repetitions of bit agreement with \( \epsilon \)-correlation and \( \delta \)-security achieves a \( n \)-bit key agreement without increasing the round complexity when \( \epsilon \) is noticeable and \( \delta \) is overwhelming [Hol05]. With non-negligible \( \epsilon \), a bit agreement still realizes a key agreement which achieves correctness for (infinitely many) \( n \) such that for any \( c, \epsilon \geq 1/n^c \).

We provide the description of a \((2k-1)\)-pass UTBA from two adaptively pseudo-random functions whose parallel composition is not \( k \)-adaptively secure when \( k = 2 \) in Protocol 3.

The \( 3 \)-pass UTBA in Protocol 3 can be easily extended to the \((2k-1)\)-pass UTBA for arbitrary \( k \) and general adaptive distinguisher \( D \). We describe the above protocol and the extension in detail in the proof of following theorem.

**Theorem 12.** Let \( F \) and \( G \) be \((k-1)\)-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions. If the parallel composition \( F \oplus G \) is not \( k \)-adaptively secure, then a \((2k-1)\)-pass UTKA exists for \( k \geq 2 \).

**Proof.** We present the special case where \( k = 2 \). Then, we explain how to generalize the technique for arbitrary \( k \). Let \( F \) and \( G \) be non-adaptively \((2\text{-adaptively})\) secure pseudo-random functions from \( K \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \) where \( K \) is the key space of \( F \) and \( G \). Without loss of generality, we let \( K \) be \( \{0,1\}^n \). Also, let \( \text{Gen}_F \) and \( \text{Gen}_G \) be the key generation algorithms from \( \{1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}^l \) defined as \( \text{Gen}_F(1^l) \rightarrow x \) for \( x \in \{0,1\}^l \). In this proof, \( l = n \) since \( K = \{0,1\}^n \).

In Protocol 3, \( D \) is a \( 2 \)-adaptive distinguisher distinguishing \( F \oplus G \) from a (uniform) random function \( R^n : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \). Without loss of generality, \( D \), upon an input \((y_1, y_2)\) for \( y_1, y_2 \in \{0,1\}^n \).
An extract from a document discussing bit agreement protocols. The text describes a protocol for achieving uniform transcript bit agreement based on a 2-adaptive distinguisher $D$.

### Protocol Bit-Agreement($1^n$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$b_A \leftarrow {0, 1}^n$</td>
<td>$k_A \leftarrow \text{Gen}_F(1^n)$</td>
<td>$k_B \leftarrow \text{Gen}_G(1^n)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n)$</td>
<td>$x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If $b_A = 0$,
- then $z_1 \leftarrow F_{k_A}(x_1)$
- else $z_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$

$x_2 \leftarrow D(y_1)$

If $b_A = 0$,
- then $z_2 \leftarrow F_{k_A}(x_2)$
- else $z_2 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$

$b_B \leftarrow D(y_1, y_2)$

### Protocol 3: 3-pass uniform-transcript bit agreement based on 2-adaptive distinguisher $D$

The protocol Bit-Agreement($1^n$) in Protocol 3 has correlation $\epsilon(n)$ and is secure with probability $\delta(n)$ where $\epsilon$ is non-negligible and $\delta$ is overwhelming given the security parameter $n$. Furthermore, we want to prove that Bit-Agreement($1^n$) satisfies the property of uniform-transcript. Therefore, $n$ parallel repetitions of Bit-Agreement($1^n$) will achieve the n-bit

**Claim 3.6 (Non-negligible Correctness).** The protocol Bit-Agreement($1^n$) has $\epsilon$-correlation (hence correctness) with non-negligible $\epsilon$.

**Proof.** Let $b_1, b_2$, and $b_3$ be bits defined as in the following three cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>case 1</th>
<th>case 2</th>
<th>case 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$b_1 \leftarrow D(y_1, y_2)$ where,</td>
<td>$b_2 \leftarrow D(y_1, y_2)$ where,</td>
<td>$b_3 \leftarrow D(y_1, y_2)$ where,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_1 \leftarrow \text{Gen}_F(1^n)$</td>
<td>$x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n)$</td>
<td>$y_1 \leftarrow {0, 1}^n$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_2 \leftarrow \text{Gen}_G(1^n)$</td>
<td>$y_1 \leftarrow R^n(x_1)$</td>
<td>$y_2 \leftarrow {0, 1}^n$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n)$</td>
<td>$x_2 \leftarrow D(y_1)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_1 \leftarrow F_{k_1}(x_1) \oplus G_{k_2}(x_1)$</td>
<td>$y_2 \leftarrow R^n(x_2)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_2 \leftarrow D(y_1)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_2 \leftarrow F_{k_1}(x_2) \oplus G_{k_2}(x_2)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$D$ is a 2-adaptive distinguisher for $F \oplus G$. This implies that there exists a non-negligible function $\epsilon(n)$ for $n$ such that

$$|Pr[b_1 = 1] - Pr[b_2 = 1]| \geq \epsilon(n).$$

(18)

Since $R^n$ is a uniformly random function from $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$, for any $x_1$ and $x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^n$, the distribution of $y_1 \leftarrow R^n(x_1)$ and $y_2 \leftarrow R^n(x_2)$ is equivalent to the uniform random of length $n$. In other words, the distribution of $b_2$ and $b_3$ are equivalent to one another:

$$|Pr[b_2 = 1] - Pr[b_3 = 1]| = 0.$$

(19)

Consider one more case described as follows.
\[\begin{align*}
\text{Let } & b_4 \leftarrow D(y_1, y_2) \text{ where,} \\
& k_1 \leftarrow \text{Gen}_C(1^n) \\
& x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n) \\
& z_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n \\
& y_1 \leftarrow z_1 \oplus G_{k_1}(x_1) \\
& x_2 \leftarrow D(1^n) \\
& z_2 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n \\
& y_2 \leftarrow z_2 \oplus G_{k_1}(x_2)
\end{align*}\]

For any \( x \) and key \( k \) in \( \{0, 1\}^n \), the distribution of \( y \) is uniform if \( z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n \) and \( y \leftarrow z \oplus G_k(x) \). Thus, the distribution of \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \) are uniform, which implies that the distribution of \( b_4 \) and \( b_3 \) are equal to each other. Hence, by (19),

\[|Pr[b_2 = 1] - Pr[b_3 = 1]| = |Pr[b_2 = 1] - Pr[b_4 = 1]| = 0. \tag{20}\]

Finally, we have

\[
Pr[b_A = b_B] = Pr[b_A = 1] \cdot Pr[b_B = 1 : b_A = 1] + Pr[b_A = 0] \cdot Pr[b_B = 0 : b_A = 0] \\
= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 - Pr[b_1 = 1]) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot Pr[b_4 = 1] \\
= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 + (Pr[b_4 = 1] - Pr[b_1 = 1])) \\
\leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 + \epsilon(n)) \quad \text{by (18) and (20)} \\
= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon(n)}{2}.
\]

Therefore, the protocol Bit-Agreement(1^n) has non-negligible correlation in \( \epsilon(n) \). \( \square \)

**Claim 3.7** (Security with overwhelming probability \( \delta \)). The protocol Bit-Agreement(1^n) has \( \delta \)-security with overwhelming \( \delta \).

**Proof.** We want to show that there exists an overwhelming function \( \delta(n) \) such that for all efficient distinguishers \( D \in \text{PPT} \) and \( D \)'s own randomness \( r \),

\[Pr[D_r(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A : b_A = b_B] \leq 1 - \frac{\delta(n)}{2}.\]

Since

\[Pr[D_r(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A] = Pr[D_r(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A : b_A = b_B] + Pr[D_r(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A : b_A \neq b_B],\]

we have

\[Pr[D_r(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A : b_A = b_B] \leq Pr[D_r(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A].\]

Hence, it suffices to show that there exists an overwhelming \( \delta(n) \) such that

\[Pr[D_r(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A] \leq 1 - \frac{\delta(n)}{2}.\]

Consider the following five cases, which define the distributions of the transcript triplet \((z_1, y_1, z_2)\).
Therefore, we want to show the following inequality for any PPT adversary (distinguisher) \( A \) that
\[
\delta \epsilon \nabla \text{inequality,}
\]
formly random,
\[
F \text{security of (Uniform-transcript)}
\]
Claim 3.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>case 1</th>
<th>case 2</th>
<th>case 3</th>
<th>case 4</th>
<th>case 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( k_1 \leftarrow \text{Gen}_F(1^n) )</td>
<td>( k_1 \leftarrow \text{Gen}_F(1^n) )</td>
<td>( x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n) )</td>
<td>( x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n) )</td>
<td>( k_2 \leftarrow \text{Gen}_G(1^n) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( k_2 \leftarrow \text{Gen}_G(1^n) )</td>
<td>( z_1 \leftarrow R^n(x_1) )</td>
<td>( x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n) )</td>
<td>( x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( x_1 \leftarrow D(1^n) )</td>
<td>( y_1 \leftarrow z_1 \oplus R^n(x_1) )</td>
<td>( z_1 \leftarrow {0,1}^n )</td>
<td>( z_1 \leftarrow {0,1}^n )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( z_1 \leftarrow F_{k_1}(x_1) )</td>
<td>( z_1 \leftarrow F_{k_1}(x_1) )</td>
<td>( y_1 \leftarrow z_1 \oplus R^n(x_1) )</td>
<td>( y_1 \leftarrow z_1 \oplus G_{k_2}(x_1) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_1 \leftarrow z_1 \oplus G_{k_2}(x_1) )</td>
<td>( y_1 \leftarrow z_1 \oplus R^n(x_1) )</td>
<td>( x_2 \leftarrow D(y_1) )</td>
<td>( x_2 \leftarrow D(y_1) )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( x_2 \leftarrow D(y_1) )</td>
<td>( x_2 \leftarrow D(y_1) )</td>
<td>( z_2 \leftarrow {0,1}^n )</td>
<td>( z_2 \leftarrow {0,1}^n )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( z_2 \leftarrow F_{k_1}(x_2) )</td>
<td>( z_2 \leftarrow F_{k_1}(x_2) )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We define \((z_1, y_1, z_2)_i\) to be the transcript triplet from the \( i \)th case. Then, \( \epsilon_{ij} \) is defined as
\[
|\Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2)_i \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2)_j \rightarrow 1]| = \epsilon_{ij}.
\]

By the non-adaptive security of \( G \), \( \epsilon_{12} \) is negligible. Also, \( \epsilon_{23} \) is negligible due to the non-adaptive security of \( F \). As we have seen in the proof of Claim 3.6, case 3 is equivalent to case 4. Hence, \( \epsilon_{34} = 0 \). The non-adaptive security of \( G \) implies that \( \epsilon_{45} \) is negligible. Then we have, by triangle inequality,
\[
|\Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2)_5 \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2)_1 \rightarrow 1]| \leq \sum_{i=1}^{4} \epsilon_{i(i+1)}
\]
\[
= \epsilon_{12} + \epsilon_{23} + \epsilon_{34} + \epsilon_{45} = \epsilon_{12} + \epsilon_{23} + \epsilon_{45} \defeq \epsilon.
\] (21)

Since \( \epsilon_{12}, \epsilon_{23}, \) and \( \epsilon_{45} \) are negligible, \( \epsilon \) is negligible in \( n \). We define \( \delta \) to be \( 1 - \epsilon \). It is easy to see that \( \delta \) is overwhelming in \( n \) since \( \epsilon \) is negligible. Finally, we complete the proof of claim 4.2 as
\[
\Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow b_A] = \Pr[b_A = 0] \cdot \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow 0 : b_A = 0] + \Pr[b_A = 1] \cdot \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow 1 : b_A = 1]
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow 0 : b_A = 0] + \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow 1 : b_A = 1])
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 - \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow 1 : b_A = 0] + \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2) \rightarrow 1 : b_A = 1])
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 + (\Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2)_5 \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[D(z_1, y_1, z_2)_1 \rightarrow 1]))
\]
\[
\leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 + \epsilon) \quad \text{by (21)}
\]
\[
= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 + (1 - \delta))
\]
\[
= 1 - \frac{\delta(n)}{2}.
\]

Claim 3.8 (Uniform-transcript). The protocol Bit-Agreement(1\(^n\)) is a uniform-transcript bit agreement.

Proof. Notice that the value of \( y_1 \) is related to the value of \( z_1 \) in the protocol, and as long as \( z_1 \) is uniformly random, \( y_1 \) is also uniformly random. Let \( R \) denote a uniformly random vector in \((\{0,1\}^n)^i\). Therefore, we want to show the following inequality for any PPT adversary (distinguisher) \( A \).

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\[
\Pr_{b_A \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(0,1)} [A_r(z_1, y_1 z_2) = 1] - \Pr_{b_A \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(0,1)} [A_r(R_3) = 1 : R_3 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}([0,1]^3)] \leq \epsilon(n)
\]

Then we define two games in which adversary \( A \) distinguishes a transcript from uniform random. Game \( G_0 \) is for an adversary to distinguish \((z_1, y_1, z_2)\) from \( R_3 \) while \( b_A = 0 \), and game \( G_1 \) is for an adversary to distinguish \((z_1, y_1, z_2)\) from \( R_3 \) while \( b_A = 1 \). We denote the advantage of adversary \( A \) in \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \) as \( \text{Adv}_{G_0} \) and \( \text{Adv}_{G_1} \), respectively. Winning \( G_0 \) (or \( G_1 \)) means that one distinguishes \((z_1, y_1, z_2)\) from \( R_3 \) with a non-negligible advantage in \( G_0 \) (or \( G_1 \)). Finally, suppose that there exists a PPT adversary \( A \) that wins either of the games.

In game \( G_1 \), since both \( z_1 \) and \( z_2 \) are randomly chosen from \( \{0,1\}^n \), distinguishing \((z_1, y_1, z_2)\) from \( R_3 \) is equivalent to distinguishing \((r_1, G(r_2), r_3)\) from \( R_3 \). Hence, if \( A \) wins \( G_1 \), it also distinguishes \( \mathcal{G} \) from uniform random functions with non-negligible advantage. This is clearly impossible by the non-adaptive security of \( \mathcal{G} \).

Assume that \( A \) wins game \( G_0 \) by distinguishing, with non-negligible probability,

\[
\text{Dist}(0) : (z_1, y_1, z_2) = (F(r), F(r) \oplus G(r), F(D(F(r) \oplus G(r))) \oplus D(G(F(r) \oplus G(r))))
\]

from a uniform random triplet \( R_3 \) for \( r \leftarrow \mathcal{S}([0,1]^n) \). Consider the following distributions.

\[
\text{Dist}(1) : (F(r_1), r_2, F(D(F(r_1)))) \oplus G(D(F(r_1))))
\]

for \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}([0,1]^n) \).

\[
\text{Dist}(2) : (r_1, r_2, F(D(r_1 \oplus r_2)) \oplus G(D(r_1 \oplus r_2)))
\]

for \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}([0,1]^n) \).

\[
\text{Dist}(3) : (r_1, r_2, r_3 \oplus r_4) = (r_1, r_2, r_5) = R_3
\]

where \( r_5 = r_3 \oplus r_4 \) for \( r_1, r_2, r_3 \) and \( r_4 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}([0,1]^n) \).

Since \( A \) distinguishes \( \text{Dist}(0) \) from \( \text{Dist}(3) \) with non-negligible advantage, \( A \) distinguishes \( \text{Dist}(i) \) from \( \text{Dist}(j) \) for \( i \neq j \) with non-negligible probability. This is clearly a contradiction since the above distributions only negligibly deviate from each other by the non-adaptive security of both \( \mathcal{F} \) and \( \mathcal{G} \).

Therefore, the advantage of \( A \) to distinguish the transcript from \( R_3 \) is \( \text{Adv}_{G_0}/2 + \text{Adv}_{G_1}/2 \) which is negligible since both \( \text{Adv}_{G_0} \) and \( \text{Adv}_{G_1} \) are negligible. This directly validates the inequality (22).

With Claims 3.6 and 3.7, we showed that the protocol Bit-Agreement(1^n) has non-negligible correlation \( \epsilon \) and is secure with overwhelming probability \( \delta \). Also, we show the indistinguishability of messages from randoms with Claim 3.8. Thus, the bit agreement protocol is a uniform-transcript bit agreement. We eventually show that the \((k - 1)\)-adaptively secure parallel composition implies the existence of the \((2k - 1)\)-pass uniform-transcript key agreement for the case \( k = 2 \) with respect to a 2-adaptive distinguisher. We will generalize the same technique to the arbitrary \( k \).

We just showed that the \((k - 1)\)-adaptively secure parallel composition implies the \((2k - 1)\)-pass uniform-transcript bit agreement for the case \( k = 2 \). However, notice that the 2-adaptive distinguisher \( D \), which we use to build Bit-Agreement(1^n), is not a general 2-adaptive distinguisher since \( D \) makes two adaptive queries. However, it is easy to see that we can construct the same 3-pass bit agreement protocol based on a general 2-adaptive distinguisher denoted by \( D_q \), where \( q \) is the any polynomial size of blocks queried by the distinguisher. Then, we build the same 3-pass
Protocol Bit-Agreement$(1^n)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Transcript</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$b_A \leftarrow \mathcal{S}{0,1}^n$</td>
<td>$k_B \leftarrow \text{Gen}_C(1^n)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_A \leftarrow \text{Gen}_F(1^n)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FOR $i = 1$ to $k - 1$ DO

$X_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}^k_q(Y_1, Y_2, \cdots, Y_{i-1})$

If $b_A = 0$,

- then $Z_i \leftarrow F_{k_A}(X_i)$

else $Z_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(\{0,1\}^n)^q$

\[ Z_i \]

\[ Y_i \leftarrow Y_i \oplus G_{k_B}(X_i) \]

ENDFOR

$X_k \leftarrow \mathcal{D}^k_q(Y_1, Y_2, \cdots, Y_{k-1})$

If $b_A = 0$,

- then $Z_k \leftarrow F_{k_A}(X_k)$

else $Z_k \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(\{0,1\}^n)^q$

\[ Z_k \]

\[ Y_k \leftarrow Y_k \oplus G_{k_B}(X_k) \]

\[ b_B \leftarrow \mathcal{D}^k_q(Y_1, Y_2, \cdots, Y_k) \]

Protocol 4: $(2k - 1)$-pass uniform-transcript bit agreement based on a general $k$-adaptive distinguisher

uniform-transcript bit-agreement by replacing $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z_1, z_2$ with $X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2, Z_1, Z_2$ in the Bit-Agreement$(1^n)$, where $X_i, Y_i, Z_i$ are $q$-tuples. That is, $x_i = (x_{1i}, x_{2i}, \cdots, x_{qi})$ for $i$.

Now we are ready to generalize the construction of Bit-Agreement$(1^n)$ to the arbitrary $k \geq 2$. Denote $\mathcal{D}^k_q$ as a $k$-adaptive distinguisher with the query block of size $q$. Then, $X_i, Y_i, Z_i$ are defined by $q$-tuples for all $i$ as before. We provide the construction in Protocol 3. Obviously, we can extend the arguments of Claim 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 to the $(2k - 1)$-pass uniform transcript bit-agreement. To prove that the above bit agreement is secure with overwhelming probability, only the number of intermediate cases between the distributions of transcripts is increased according to the increased number of rounds. This completes the proof of Theorem 12.

Theorem 11 and 12 immediately substantiate the equivalence between the existence of UTKA and the above impossibility result as formally stated below.

**Theorem 13.** The parallel composition of two pseudo-random functions does not imply adaptive security if and only if the uniform-transcript key agreement exists.

### 4 Sequential Composition Impossibility from Enhanced PKE

Assuming the existence of a strong CPA-secure public key encryption with properties of uniform (dense) and rerandomizable ciphertexts and public keys, we construct counterexample function $F$ and $G$. This generic assumption sets up sufficient black-box properties (upper-bound) for sequential composition insecurity, which is stronger than dense-trapdoor permutations (and in turns UTKAs). We first provide the definition of strong CPA-secure public key encryption with the aforementioned properties.
Definition 13 (Doubly-Rerandomizable Unenhanced Public Key Encryption). A rerandomizable public key encryption scheme denoted by PKE consists of four algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec, RRC, RRP) defined with the following properties. For \( \kappa \) be a security parameter, we have:

1. On input randomness \( r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\kappa \), key generation function \( \text{Gen}(n,r) \) outputs a pair of encryption and decryption keys \((sk, pk)\) such that \( pk \) is of \( n \)-bit and polynomially indistinguishable from a random \( n \)-bit string.

2. On input message \( m \in \{0,1\}^n \) and randomness \( r' \in \kappa \), \( \text{Enc}_{pk}(r',m) \) outputs a length-\( \ell_c \) ciphertext \( c_m \) for \( \ell_c = \text{poly}(\kappa,n) \), which is polynomially indistinguishable from a \( \ell_c \)-bit random string and Chosen-Plaintext-Attack (CPA)-secure against any PPT adversary.

3. On randomness \( r \in \{0,1\}^\kappa \) and public key \( pk \), \( \text{RRP}(pk,r) \) outputs a \( n' \)-bit rerandomization key \( rk \) for \( n' = \text{poly}(\kappa,n) \) such that \( rk \) is polynomially indistinguishable from random \( n' \)-bit string. In particular, the following holds. Let \( c \) and \( rk \) be generated as for public key \( pk \), \( \text{Enc}_{pk}(r,m) \to c \) and \( \text{RRP}(pk,r') \to rk \) and let \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \) be random strings of length \( \ell \) and \( n' \) respectively. Then, for any polynomial time adversary \( A \), we have

\[
|\mathbb{P}[A(c, rk) = 1] - \mathbb{P}[A(r_1, r_2) = 1]| \leq \epsilon(n).
\]

where the probabilities are taken over the coins of adversary \( A \).

4. On randomness \( r \in \{0,1\}^\kappa \), ciphertext \( c \) and rerandomization key \( rk \), \( \text{RRC}_{rk}(r,c) \) outputs rerandomized ciphertext \( c' \) where \( c' \) is polynomially indistinguishable from random for all PPT adversaries without correct decryption key \( sk \).

5. Let \((pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(n,r)\). Let \( c_m \) be a ciphertext encrypted under \( pk \) or a ciphertext under \( pk \) which is rerandomized with \( rk \) such that \( rk \leftarrow \text{RRP}(pk, r) \) for randomness \( r \). Then, \( \text{Dec}_{sk'}(c_m) \) outputs \( n' \)-bit message \( m' \) as follows: If \( sk' = sk \), then \( m' = m \). Otherwise, the distribution of \( m' \) is polynomially indistinguishable from random \( n \)-bit strings.

Looking ahead, we construct counterexample PRFs \( F \) and \( G \), following the blueprint for functions in the previous sections. That is, functions \( F \) and \( G \) interact with each other implicitly playing a challenge-response game where an input is verified to contain a response consistent with a challenge, both functions outputs their secret information for their PRF computations. In the parallel composition cases of previous sections, the functions can carry out such challenge-response games though executing a UTKA of which messages are pseudo-random even in the view of a participating party. Here, we use GGM-style tree PRF as a challenge-response game for functions to verify that inputs are adaptively computed. Below, we first describe the GGM-style tree PRF and provide the high-level overview of functions \( F \) and \( G \).

GGM-style tree PRF We use GGM-style tree PRF defined as follows. For a \( n \)-bit secret seed \( s_0 \) and \( L \)-bit string \( p = p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_L \), \( \text{GM}(s_0,p) \to s_L \) is defined as follows: For each \( i \in \{0,1,\ldots,L-1\} \), compute \( \text{PRG}(s_i) \to s_{i+1.0}||s_{i+1.1} \) and set \( s_{i+1} = s_{i+1.0+p_{i+1}} \). So, \( s_0 \) defines a seed, and bits of \( p \) determines selections of left or right output substrings. A crucial security property is that when a seed is not known, the distribution of \((p, s_L)\) is indistinguishable from random.
Construction of $F$

$F$ has internally a PRF key $k_F$ and a special string $\alpha$, both of $\kappa$-bits for security parameter $\kappa$. On query $Q \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ for sufficiently large $\ell$, $F$ does the followings.

1. If $Q = 0^\ell$, then
   (a) Compute $\text{PRF}_{k_F}(Q) \rightarrow r \in \{0,1\}^\ell$.
   (b) Compute $\text{Gen}_{\text{pke}}(\kappa, r_{[1,\kappa]}) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$.
   (c) Output $(pk, r_{[\kappa+1,\ell]}^\ell)$.

2. Otherwise ($Q \neq 0^\ell$),
   (a) Parse the first $\ell_c$ bits into $c_1$.
   (b) Compute $\text{PRF}_{k_F}(0^\ell) \rightarrow r' \in \{0,1\}^\ell$.
   (c) Compute $\text{Gen}(\kappa, r'_{[1,\kappa]}) \rightarrow (pk, sk)$.
   (d) Compute $\text{Dec}_{sk}(c_1) \rightarrow m_1 \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$.
   (e) If $m_1 = \alpha$, then set the next $\kappa$ bits be $q_1$ and output $(q_1, k_F, \alpha, 0^{\ell-3\kappa})$.
   (f) Else, do the followings:
      i. Compute $\text{PRF}_{k_F}(Q) \rightarrow r \in \{0,1\}^\ell$.
      ii. Parse the first $\ell_c^2/\kappa$ bits into $c_1$ and the next $\ell_c$ bits into $c_2$, and $\ell_c$ bits into $c_3$.
      iii. Compute $\text{Dec}_{sk}(c_i) \rightarrow m_i$ for each $i = 1, 2, 3$.
      iv. Compute $\text{GGM}(m_3, r_{[1,\kappa]}) \rightarrow y$.
      v. Compute $\text{RRC}(m_1; m_2; r_{[\kappa+1,2\kappa]}) \rightarrow m_1'$.
      vi. Compute $\text{Enc}_{pk}(\alpha, r_{[2\kappa+1,3\kappa]}) \rightarrow c_F$
      vii. Output $(m_1', r_{[1,\kappa]}; y, c_F, r_{[\ell-2(\kappa+\ell_c),\ell]})$.

Algorithm 4: The algorithm of function $F$

High-level Overview  Intuitively, functions $F$ and $G$ interact with each other as follows: $G$ sends a pseudorandom challenge based on GGM tree PRF to $F$ and $F$ responds to the GGM tree PRF challenge. Once $G$ verifies the correctness of challenge response, $G$ outputs secret values. The challenge-response interaction is designed to depend on all previous interaction so that the output is pseudorandom in the view of non-adaptive distinguishers without adaptive queries.

In further details, $F$ sends a public key $pk_F$ of dense public encryption system on a specific (e.g., all zeros) input. On the output of $F$, function $G$ computes fresh PRF values which in turns are used to generate a random path $p$ from its secret PRG seed $s_0$ (root) and compute the $n$-th level PRF value $s_n$. The distributions of $p$ and $s_n$ are pseudorandom without knowing $s_0$. $G$ outputs three encryptions of the followings under $F$’s public key $pk_F$: (1) an encryption of $p$ under $G$’s dense public key $pk_G$, (2) $s_n$, and (3) rerandomized public key $pk_G$. On non-zero inputs containing these encryptions, function $F$ computes fresh PRF values and then decrypts all three encryptions using $sk_F$ resulting in an encryption of $p$ under $G$’s public key $pk_G$, $s_n$, and $pk_G$. With a fresh random path $p'$, it computes the $2n$-th level GGM PRF value $s_{2n}$ starting from $s_n$. Also $F$ rerandomizes the encryption of $p$ with fresh randomness and finally outputs a string containing $p'$, $s_{2n}$, rerandomized encryption of $p$. On $F$’s outputs, function $G$ decrypts to obtain $p$ using its secret key and verifies
that $p', s_{2n}$ are consistent with $p$ and $s_0$. Once verified, $G$ outputs fixed values including its secret keys and seeds.

**Non-adaptively Secure PRF $F$** We first provide the formal description of non-adaptively secure PRF $F$ in Algorithm 4. Function $F$ internally has a PRF key $k_F$ to generate fresh pseudorandom strings on inputs, and a special string $\alpha$. Intuitively, $F$ plays a GGM-challenge respondent where challenges expectedly encrypted under its own public key are supposedly included in input queries. In the following, we use slightly different notations. Function $F$ is defined on $\ell$-bit input to output $\ell$-bit string $r$ where $r_i$ is the $i$-th bit and $r_{[i,j]}$ denotes the substring of $r$ from the $i$-bit to the $j$-bit (e.g., $r_{[i,j]} = r_ir_{i+1}, \cdots, r_j$).

**Claim 4.1.** Function $F$ describe in Algorithm 4 is a non-adaptively secure PRF.

**Proof.** The output on the first query type is trivially pseudo-random. The output for the second case where the input satisfies the condition at Step 2e only occurs with negligible probability in $\kappa$ since without knowing $pk$ at Step 2e, $m_1$'s distribution is pseudorandom. For the third case, $F$ uses its secret key (computed from the zero-input) to decrypt first three ciphertexts. Since non-adaptive adversary $A$ cannot obtain $pk$, the plaintexts from decryptions with $sk$ at Step 2(f)iii are distributed indistinguishable from random and unpredictable to $A$. Therefore, without knowing $m_3$, the distribution of GGM response $r_{[1,\kappa]}$ and $y$ computed in Step 2(f)iv are indistinguishable from uniform random. In addition, rerandomization with fresh pseudo-randomness in Step 2(f)v is taken with ciphertexts $m_1$ and rerandomization key $m_2$ which are both unpredictable to $A$ and are not consistent with each other with overwhelming probability. Therefore, the output $m'_1$ of the rerandomization is indistinguishable from random to non-adaptive adversary $A$.

**Non-adaptively Secure PRF $G$** We provide the formal description of non-adaptively secure PRF $G$ in Algorithm 5. Function $G$ internally has a PRF key $k_G$ to generate fresh pseudorandom strings on input queries, a secret GGM tree PRF seed $s_0$, and a strong PKE key pair $(pk_G, sk_G)$. Function $G$ is designed to produce random GGM challenges using fresh pseudorandomness computed on input queries.

**Claim 4.2.** Function $G$ describe in Algorithm 5 is a non-adaptively secure PRF.

**Proof.** $G$ always outputs pseudorandom values from PRF evaluations on input queries except when it determines that a query is adaptively created. Specifically, $G$ on query $Q$ computes GGM tree PRF values on its secret seed $s_0^Q$ and see if the computed GGM leaf PRF value is included in $Q$ (e.g., equality checking at Step 7). Since non-adaptive adversary $A$ cannot predict values decrypted under $sk_G$ in Step 4 and does not know secret seed $s_0$, satisfying the condition at Step 7 occurs only with negligible probability. For the output of the other case, outputs contains random GGM tree challenge of which distribution is pseudorandom to $A$ without knowing root seed $s_0$. Hence, as $c_1$, $c_2$, and $c_3$ are all encrypted with fresh randomness and the distributions of messages are indistinguishable from uniform, outputs for the second case are indistinguishable from random to non-adaptive adversaries.

**Adaptive Insecurity of Sequential Composition $G(F)$** The sequential composition of $G(F)$ is breakable by 3 adaptive queries. In the following, we omit the randomness used for encryptions in order to focus on the plaintext contents. The first query is a zero string $0^\ell$. Then, $F$ outputs $(pk, r_{[i+1,\ell]})$ on which $G$ in turns outputs $(c_1, c_2, c_3, \cdots)$ such that $c_1 = Enc_{q_1}(Enc_{pk_G}(i))$, $c_2 = Enc_{q_1}(pk'_G)$, and $c_3 = Enc_{q_1}(s_n)$. 

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Construction of G

Function G internally has a PRF key \( k_G \) and GGM tree PRG seed \( s_0 \), and a strong PKE key pair \((pk_G, sk_G)\). On query \( Q = \{0,1\}^\ell \) for sufficiently large \( \ell \), G does the followings.

1. Parse the first \( \kappa \) as \( s \).
2. If \( s = s_0 \), then parse the next \( \kappa \) bit as \( k_F \) output \((k_F, k_G, pk_G, sk_G, 0^{\ell-4\kappa})\).
3. Parse the first \( \ell_c \) bits as \( c \), the next \( \kappa \) bits as \( j \) and the next \( \kappa \) bits as \( y \).
4. Decrypt as \( \text{Dec}_{sk_G}(c) \rightarrow i \).
5. Compute \( \text{GGM}(s_0, i) \rightarrow s_n \).
6. Compute \( \text{GGM}(s_n, j) \rightarrow s_{2n} \).
7. If \( S_{2n} = y \),
   \(a\) Parse the next \( \ell \) bits as \( c^* \).
   \(b\) G outputs \((c^*, s_0, 0^{\ell-\ell_c-\kappa})\).
8. Otherwise, do the followings:
   \(a\) Compute \( \text{PRF}_{k_G} \rightarrow r \in \{0,1\}^\ell \).
   \(b\) Parse the first \( \kappa \) bits as \( q_1 \).
   \(c\) Set \( r_{[1,\kappa]} \) as \( i \).
   \(d\) Compute \( \text{GGM}(s_0, r_{[\kappa+1,2\kappa]} ) \rightarrow s_n \).
   \(e\) Compute \( \text{RRP}(pk_G; r_{[2\kappa+1,3\kappa]} ) \rightarrow r_{k_G} \).
   \(f\) Compute \( \text{Enc}_{q_1}(\text{Enc}_{pk_G}(i; r_{[3\kappa+1,4\kappa]} ); r_{[4\kappa+1,5\kappa]} ) \rightarrow c_1 \).
   \(g\) Compute \( \text{Enc}_{q_1}(pk_G; r_{[5\kappa+1,6\kappa]} ) \rightarrow c_2 \).
   \(h\) Compute \( \text{Enc}_{q_1}(s_n; r_{[6\kappa+1,7\kappa]} ) \rightarrow c_3 \).
   \(i\) Output \((c_1, c_2, c_3, r_{[\ell-\ell_c/\kappa-2\ell_c,\ell]} ) \).

Algorithm 5: The algorithm of function G
The second query is \((c_1, c_2, c_3, \cdots)\), the output of the first query to \(G(F)\). On the query, \(F\) outputs \((m'_1, j, y, c_F, \cdots)\) such that \(m'_1\) is a rerandomization of \(\text{Enc}_{pk_G}(i)\). Then, \(G\) on \(F\)'s output decrypts \(m'_1\) to obtain \(i\). Then, it computes GGM tree PRF value \(s_\kappa\) using its root seed \(s_0\) and \(i\) and in turns compute GGM tree PRF value \(s_{2\kappa}\) and finally verifies that \(s_{2\kappa} = y\). Upon the verification, \(G\) outputs \((c_F, s_0, \cdots)\).

The final query to \(G(F)\) is \((c_F, s_0, \cdots)\), the output on the second query. \(F\) decrypts \(c_F\) using its secret key \(sk\) and finds that the output message is equal to \(\alpha\). Then, \(F\) simply outputs \((s_0, k_F, \alpha, \cdots)\). \(G\) then finds the first \(\kappa\) bit is equal to \(s_0\) and reveals all secret values of function \(F\) and \(G\) by outputting \((k_F, k_G, pk_G, sk_G, \cdots)\).

Hence, we have the following theorem of sequential composition impossibility.

**Theorem 14.** If there exists a doubly rerandomizable enhanced PKE described in Definition 13, then sequential compositions of two non-adaptively secure PRFs do not imply a adaptively secure PRF.

## 5 Impossibility of Adaptively Secure Self-Composition

Self-composition is a composition of two or more copies of a single function. For instance, we call \(F(F(\cdot))\) the sequential self-composition of function \(F\), and \(F \oplus F\) the parallel self-composition of function \(F\). Note that several copies of identical \(F\)'s must contain independent secret seeds. That is, each copy of \(F\)'s must be allowed to be independently drawn from its function family.

So far, we present several relations between the insecurity of composition and other public protocols such as UTKA protocols (equivalence in the parallel composition case) and strongly enhanced PKE (sufficient condition of composition impossibility in the sequential composition case). In fact, when we mention the insecurity of composition in previous sections, the main argument is rather that, given a non-adaptively secure function, there might be another non-adaptively secure function such that their composition is adaptively insecure. We call this type of composition general-composition. Hence, we still have a lingering unanswered question of whether the self-composition of a non-adaptively secure function implies the unconditional adaptive security. We answered the question negatively as follows.

Suppose that we are given non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions \(F_k\) and \(G_{k'}\), without loss of generality, both defined over \(\{0,1\}^n\) such that their parallel (general-)composition \((F \oplus G)(\cdot)\) is adaptively insecure. Note that \(k\) and \(k'\) are independently chosen secret seeds for pseudo-random functions. That is, there exists a PPT adversary \(A\) with an adaptive adversarial strategy which succeeds in breaking the security of \((F \oplus G)(\cdot)\) with non-negligible probability \(\delta\). Now, we define a function family \(\mathcal{F}_{(b,s)} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\) on input string \(u\) by

\[
\mathcal{F}_{(b,s)}(u) = \begin{cases} 
F_s(u) & \text{if } b = 0 \\
G_s(u) & \text{if } b = 1
\end{cases}
\]

(*)

where \(b\) and \(s\) are private seeds.

It is easy to see that function \(\mathcal{F}(\cdot)\) is also non-adaptively secure due to the non-adaptive security of functions \(F\) and \(G\). This trivially leads to

\[
\text{Adv}_A^F \leq \text{Adv}_A^F + \text{Adv}_A^G.
\]

To break the adaptive security of \((F \oplus F)(\cdot)\), it suffices to draw two copies of functions from the family at random and then use the same adaptively adversarial strategy of \(A\) as follows: the
first bit of seeds of $F$ and $G$ differ in their first bit with probability $1/2$. Therefore, if we draw two independent $F$’s, then $F \oplus F$ is equivalent to $F \oplus G$ with probability $1/4$ which is adaptively insecure.

Informally, by the above construction of $F$ from any two non-adaptively secure functions $F$ and $G$ such that their parallel composition is not adaptively secure, we actually show that the adaptive insecurity of the parallel general-composition implies the adaptive insecurity of the parallel self-composition. We formally state this as follows.

**Theorem 15.** Suppose there are two non-adaptively secure functions $F$ and $G$ such that the parallel composition $(F \oplus G)(\cdot)$ is adaptively insecure. Then, there exists a non-adaptively secure function $F$ such that the parallel self-composition is adaptively insecure.

Combining the above theorem with the previous results of this paper in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 related to parallel composition insecurity from DTP and $\gamma$-UTKA, we obtain the following corollaries.

**Corollary 16.** If a family of dense trapdoor permutations exists, then the parallel self-composition of a non-adaptively secure function does not imply adaptive security.

**Corollary 17.** If a UTKA exists, then the parallel self-composition of a non-adaptively secure function does not imply adaptive security.

Similarly, the above construction of $F$ defined in ($\ast$) can be applied to non-adaptively secure pseudo-random functions $F$ and $G$ such that their sequential general-composition is adaptively insecure. In particular, $F$ is also non-adaptively secure while $F(F(\cdot))$ is equal to $G(F(\cdot))$ with probability $1/4$ when we draw two independent $F$’s from its function family. That is, $F$ is the same as ($\ast$) and we measure the probability to be equally $1/2$ that the outer function $F$ has the first bit of seed equal to 0 and the first bit of seed equal to 1. Thus, $F(F(\cdot))$ is also adaptively insecure. Consequently, we easily obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 18.** Suppose there are two non-adaptively secure functions $F$ and $G$ such that the sequential composition $G(F(\cdot))$ is adaptively insecure. Then, there exists a non-adaptively secure function $F$ such that the self-composition is adaptively insecure.

Again, combining the above theorem with the previous results in Sections 4 related to sequential composition insecurity from strongly enhanced PKE, we have the following corollary.

**Corollary 19.** If a family of strongly enhanced rerandomizable PKE exists, then the sequential self-composition of a non-adaptively secure function does not imply adaptive security.

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