Constructing Non-Malleable Commitments: A Black-Box Approach

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Abstract

We propose the first black-box construction of non-malleable commitments according to the standard notion of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment. Our construction additionally only requires a constant number of rounds and is based only on (black-box use of) one-way functions. Prior to our work, no black-box construction of non-malleable commitments was known (except for relaxed notions of security) in any (polynomial) number of rounds based on any cryptographic assumption. This closes the wide gap existent between black-box and non-black-box constructions for the problem of non-malleable commitments. Our construction relies on (and can be seen as an instantiation of) the recent non-malleable commitment scheme of Goyal (STOC 2011).

We also show how to get black-box constructions for a host of other cryptographic primitives. We extend our construction to get constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitments, constant-round multi-party coin tossing (improving a recent result of Pass and Wee), and non-malleable statistically hiding commitments (satisfying the notion of non-malleability w.r.t. opening). All of the mentioned results make only a black-box use of one-way functions.

Our primary technical contribution is a novel way of implementing the proof of consistency typically required in the constructions of non-malleable commitments (and other related primitives). We do this by relying on ideas from the “zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation” paradigm of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2007). We extend in a novel way this “computation in the head” paradigm (which can be thought of as bringing powerful error-correcting codes into purely computational setting).

To construct a non-malleable commitment scheme, we apply our computation in the head techniques to the recent (constant-round) construction of Goyal. Along the way, we also present a simplification of the construction of Goyal where a part of the protocol is implemented in an information theoretic manner. Such a simplification is crucial for getting a black-box construction. This is done by making use of pairwise-independent hash functions and strong randomness extractors.

We show that our techniques have multiple applications, as elaborated in the paper. Hence, we believe our techniques might be useful in other settings in future.

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1 Introduction

The notion of non-malleable commitments was introduced in the seminal work of Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN91] and has been widely studied since then. Non-malleable commitments (and related primitives like non-malleable zero-knowledge) form the foundations of modern techniques for dealing with man-in-the-middle attacks in cryptographic protocols. Man-in-the-middle attacks could be of concern either if there is a single protocol execution with multiple parties (e.g., non-malleable commitments have been useful in constructing round-efficient multi-party computation protocols [Bar02, KOS03, Pas04, LP09, Wee10, Goy11]), or, when there are several executions. There has been a large body of literature on constructing protocols in the concurrent setting (c.f., the lines of works on getting concurrent security in the plain model [Pas03, PS04, BS05, MPR06, VV08, OPV08, OPV10, CLP10, CVZ11] and on getting universally composable protocols in various settings [CLOS02, BCNP04, Kat07, LPV09]). Many of these works use non-malleable protocols in some form as a crucial technical tool.

After the initial feasibility results by Dolev et. al., a fruitful line of research has focused on efficiency. Round complexity, a natural measure of efficiency has been studied in several works. Barak, in a breakthrough work [Bar02] gave the first constant-round construction of non-malleable commitments using the so called non-black-box simulation techniques [Bar01]. Since then, a number of works have investigated the round complexity of non-malleable protocols. There have been super-constant-round protocols based on one-way functions [LP09, Wee10]. Constant-round protocols using non-standard or sub-exponential hardness assumptions were proposed in [PPV08, PW10]. Constant-round protocols using non-black-box simulation techniques can be found in [Bar02, PR05a, PR05b, OPV09, CVZ10]. Very recently, constant-round constructions based only on one-way functions (OWF) (with black-box simulation techniques) were proposed independently by Goyal [Goy11] and Lin and Pass [LP11]. In all of these works, constructions according to the traditional security notion (of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment) make a non-black-box use of underlying cryptographic primitives.

While round complexity is an important measure of efficiency, a fundamental step in obtaining efficient protocols is to obtain a black-box construction (i.e., one where the underlying cryptographic primitives is used only as an oracle). Construction making use of the underlying primitive in a non-black-box way can typically only be seen as a feasibility result (regardless of the round complexity). To see the difference between black-box and non-black-box constructions, consider the following example (due to Ishai et. al. [IKLP06]).

Suppose that due to major advances in cryptanalytic techniques, all basic cryptographic primitives require a full second of computation on a fast CPU. Non-black-box techniques require parties to prove (e.g., in zero-knowledge), statements that involve the computation of the underlying primitives, say a one-way function. These zero-knowledge protocols, in turn, invoke cryptographic primitives for any gate of a circuit computing a one-way function. Since (by our assumption) a one-way function takes one second to compute, its circuit implementation contains trillions of gates, thereby requiring the protocol trillions of second to run. A black-box construction, on the other hand, would make the number of invocations of the primitive independent of the complexity of implementing the primitive.

Obtaining black-box constructions for various cryptographic primitives has been an active line of research in recent years (c.f., [IKLP06, PW09, Wee10]). However the state of art on constructing non-malleable commitments making a black-box use of cryptographic primitives is far from satisfactory. There have only been results according to new and relaxed notions of security [PW09, Wee10, Goy11] (see the end of this section for a more detailed discussion). To summarize, there is sharp contrast in what is known using non-black-box construction (constant-round protocols using only one-way functions) and black-box constructions (no construction known as per the traditional definition) for the problem of non-malleable commitments. This raises the following natural question:

Does there exist a black-box construction of non-malleable commitments following the traditional security notion [DDN91, PR05b, PR08a, LPV08] from any cryptographic assumption with any round complexity?
The main difficult in resolving the above question seems to be in developing a cut and choose technique having the appropriate coding theoretic properties [PW09, Wee10].

**Our results.** We resolve the above question in the affirmative by providing a black-box construction of non-malleable commitments. Our construction follows the traditional notion of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment [DDN91, PR05b, PR08a, LPV08]. Our construction is additionally optimal in terms of round complexity and cryptographic assumptions. That is, our construction uses only a constant number of rounds and is based only on (a black-box use of) one-way functions. This completely closes the wide gap between the state of knowledge between black-box and non-black-box constructions for non-malleable commitments. Our construction relies on (and can be seen as an instantiation of) the recent non-malleable commitment scheme of Goyal [Goy11]. Our key technical contribution relates to the construction of a commitment scheme which allows one to prove any arbitrary relation over the committed values in zero-knowledge in a black-box manner (which, in turn, we use in the commitment scheme of Goyal [Goy11]).

Once we obtain such a construction, black-box constructions for several other primitives can be obtained in a natural way. We generalize our construction to get concurrent non-malleable commitments. This construction is constant-round as well and is based on one-way functions. We obtain constant-round multi-party coin tossing (with a broadcast channel) based only on a black-box use of one-way functions. This is a direct improvement over the work of Pass and Wee [PW09] which provided such a construction only for the two-party case (indeed, for the case of two parties, one does not run into issues of man-in-the-middle attacks). We also provide a black-box construction of non-malleable statistically hiding commitments (satisfying the notion of non-malleable w.r.t. opening [PR05a, PR08b]). Our construction builds on a stand-alone statistically hiding commitment and converts it into a non-malleable statistically hiding commitment. This allows us to get a non-malleable statistically hiding commitment in constant rounds based on (a black-box use of) collision resistant hash functions. Furthermore, one can also have a construction based only on one-way functions in $O(n/\log(n))$-rounds. To our knowledge, this is the first black-box construction of non-malleable statistically hiding commitments.

Along the way we also give several corollaries of independent interest most notably a black-box non-malleability amplification preserving security against general (non-synchronizing) adversaries. This is an improvement over the analogous result of Wee [Wee10] which required non-black-box access to a one-way function.

**Technical Overview.** Traditionally, constructions of non-malleable commitment schemes have relied on executing a basic protocol block somehow several times and then proving consistency among all of them. The proof of consistency typically makes use of underlying cryptographic primitives in a non-black-box way. The question of constructing non-malleable commitments in a black-box way has been raised in a number of previous works [LP09, PW09, Wee10, Goy11]. The main difficulty encountered in previous works is in coming up with a cut-and-choose technique having the right properties to replace the zero-knowledge proof of consistency.

Our main technical construction of this work is a novel way of implementing the zero-knowledge proof of consistency that is typically required in non-malleable commitment protocols. Our technique is based on ideas from the “zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation” paradigm of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [IKOS09]. In this paradigm, we have a prover who runs a multi-party computation protocol “in his head” and proves the correctness of the result to the verifier. This form of computation in the head approach was proposed in [IKOS09] in the context of improving the communication complexity of zero-knowledge protocols. Our goal and the way we use these ideas are somewhat different. Our basic idea will be as follows.

1For statistically hiding commitments, the notion of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment is meaningless as the committed value is not well defined. To analyze security in such a setting, the standard notion of non-malleability is w.r.t. opening as studied for instance by Pass and Rosen [PR05a, PR08b].
Suppose one needs to commit to a set of strings $S = (s_1, \ldots, s_n)$ (and prove a statement about these strings later on). The committer starts to emulate $k$ virtual players “in his head”. Each player is given as input a share of $S$. Secret sharing is done using a verifiable secret sharing scheme (see, e.g., [CGMA85]). Let the view of the players so far be $\text{view}_0^0, \ldots, \text{view}_0^k$ respectively. The committer commits to these views using a regular computationally secure commitment scheme.

At a later point in the interaction, suppose the committer needs to perform some computation $f$ on the committed strings, reveal the result $f(S)$ to the verifier and prove its correctness. This can now be done as follows:

- The committer continues to emulate the $k$ virtual player in his head. The players will now compute the following functionality: the functionality will take the share of each player, reconstruct the set $S$ and output $f(S)$ to each player.
- The players jointly run a secure computation protocol (starting with the views already committed to) to compute this functionality. The secure computation protocol being used is information theoretically secure tolerating up to a constant fraction of corrupted parties such as BGW [BGW88].
- Let the new views of the players up to this point be $\text{view}_1^1, \ldots, \text{view}_k^1$. The committer now reveals $f(S)$ and commits to these new views.
- The receiver chooses a constant fraction of the players at random. The prover decommits to both the views for the selected players. This includes the initial views $\text{view}_0^0$ as well as the new views $\text{view}_1^1$.
- The receiver checks if the players behaved honestly during the entire computation and that their views are “consistent” with each other (see Section 2 for the precise notion of consistency). If this check is successful, “most” of the virtual players were correctly emulated by the committer. Hence the output of the computation must be correct (since the protocol anyway tolerates a constant fraction of corrupted players).
- The security of the committer is also preserved since revealing views for a constant fraction of players does not reveal anything about the set of strings $S$ that he started with (other than of course the output $f(S)$).

The key difference from [IKOS09] is that in our setting, the statement we are proving actually inherently involve a non-black-box use of the commitment scheme: “the evaluation of $f$ on the set of committed values results in $f(S)$”. The technique of [IKOS09] was later extended (with multiple commitments of views) by Ostrovsky [Ost11] for proving relations over committed values in a black-box fashion and, independently, by Goyal, Ishai and Sahai [GIS11] to get a black-box realization of the commit and prove functionality. However both extensions are insufficient to obtain our results.

Our technique can also be seen as a way of proving a secret but committed statement (in a way that does not involve the circuit of the commitment scheme in a non-black-box way).

We believe our technique to be of independent interest. The above technique might allow us to obtain black-box constructions by eliminating zero-knowledge proofs of consistency in other settings as well. Notice that we use a non-constant-round multi-party computation protocol such as BGW [BGW88] in our construction. Indeed, obtaining a constant-round information theoretically secure multi-party computation is currently a major open problem connected to the existence of short locally decodable codes [IK04]. However our final protocol is still constant-round since this computation needs to be only done “in the head” of the committer.

To construct non-malleable commitments in a black-box manner, our starting point is the recent constant-round protocol of Goyal [Goy11] (which makes use of one-way functions in a non-black-box manner). Goyal’s protocol has a zero-knowledge proof of consistency (on committed strings) which we implement using the above secure computation in the head approach. However we note that the protocol of Goyal, very informally, is still too “non-black-box” to admit a simple application of this idea. The protocol of Goyal uses a proof of complex statements involving the randomness with which a commitment is constructed. We present a simplification of the non-malleable commitment scheme of Goyal. Our simplification involves making a part of the protocol purely information theoretic using pairwise-independent hash functions and strong randomness extractors. This is done in a way such that
the proof of non-malleability (w.r.t. commitment) still goes through.

We are finally left with a protocol where the only computational part is an initial commitment to a set of random strings such that the consistency proof only needs to prove a statement above the committed strings. Our MPC in the head technique discussed about is powerful enough to handle such a scenario.

Related Works. Pass and Wee [PW09] gave a construction of non-malleable commitments in $O(\log(n))$ rounds (and in $O(n)$ rounds for concurrent non-malleable commitments) making a black-box use of one-way functions. Their construction is according to a relaxed security notion called non-malleability w.r.t. extraction (which they introduce). Wee [Wee10] gave a $O(\log^* (n))$ round construction following the same notion of security. A limited black-box constant-round construction was given by Goyal [Goy11] for an even weaker notion called non-malleability w.r.t. replacement. The construction of Goyal was restricted to providing security only against synchronizing adversaries\(^2\) (as opposed to general adversary). This makes it useful in stand-alone settings only. However in settings where there are more than one (uncoordinated) executions, the construction of Goyal does not provide any security. Both these weaker notions of security have been useful in constructing secure protocols for (stand-alone) multi-party computation in a black-box manner.

In both of these notions, the adversary can indeed correlate (in a limited way) the value it commits to in the right execution to the one in the left execution: in particular, if the value on left is 0, adversary may be able to commit to 0, while if the value on left is 1, adversary commits to $\bot$. Such a situation raises the possibility of selective abort attacks. Even in settings where these notions have been useful, the analysis is more complex than if one were using the standard notion of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment. Using the standard security notion allows us to construct commitment scheme which can be useful in a wider range of settings as well as obtain simpler and cleaner proofs of security.

2 Definitions and Tools

In our constructions, we will make use of Naor’s statistically binding commitment scheme [Nao91], statistically-binding extractable commitment schemes, secure multi-party computation with statistical security and perfect completeness, and, a verifiable secret sharing scheme with a deterministic reconstruction phase.

Basic notation. Throughout this paper, we let $\mathbb{N}$ denote the set of all natural numbers and $[m]$ be the set $\{1, 2, \ldots, m\}$ for any $m \in \mathbb{N}$. Unless stated otherwise, we denote by $k \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter and all quantities that are polynomial in $k$ will be denoted by $\text{poly}(k)$. For any $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we denote the length of $x$ (in bits) by $|x|$. Next, we recall the formal definitions of some tools and some facts from information theory that we use in our construction.

Pairwise-independent hash functions. We will make use of a family of pairwise-independent hash functions.

Definition 1 (Pairwise-independent hash functions) A family of functions $\mathcal{H} = \{h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m\}$ is said to be pairwise-independent [CW79, WC81] iff $\forall x \neq x' \in \{0, 1\}^n, \forall y, y' \in \{0, 1\}^m$,

$$\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[h(x) = y \land h(x') = y'] = 2^{-2m}.$$

Theorem 1 (Pairwise-independent hash functions from linear maps) Let $\mathbb{F}$ be a finite field. Then the family of functions $\mathcal{H} = \{h_{a,b} : \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}\}_{a,b \in \mathbb{F}}$ where $h_{a,b} = ax + b$ is pairwise independent.

\(^2\)Roughly, this means that the man-in-the-middle $\mathcal{M}$ sends the $i$-th round message on the right immediately after getting the $i$-th round message in the left interaction.
Seeded Randomness extractors. Assuming perfect randomness is usually a strong assumption, since physical sources of randomness might fail on some bits. It is therefore very useful to use a randomness extractor [NZ96, NT99] which is a deterministic polynomial-time function that transforms a weak source of randomness into an almost uniformly random distribution. We recall the formal definitions as follow.

**Definition 2 (Min-entropy)** Let \( X \) be a random variable. Then the min-entropy of \( X \) is
\[
H_\infty(X) = \min_x \left\{ \log \frac{1}{Pr[X = x]} \right\}.
\]

**Definition 3** For random variables \( X \) and \( Y \) taking values in \( \mathcal{U} \), their statistical difference is defined as
\[
\Delta(X, Y) = \max_{T \subseteq \mathcal{U}} |Pr[X \in T] - Pr[Y \in T]|.
\]
We say that \( X \) and \( Y \) are \( \epsilon \)-close if \( \Delta(X, Y) \leq \epsilon \).

**Definition 4 (Randomness extractor)** A function \( \text{Ext}(r, s) : \{0,1\}^{|r|} \times \{0,1\}^{|s|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) is said to be a randomness \((k, \epsilon)\)-extractor if for every distribution of \( r \) with min-entropy \( k \) and any uniformly distributed seed \( s \), the output of \( \text{Ext}(r, s) \) is \( \epsilon \)-close to the uniform distribution over \( \{0,1\}^m \).

**Definition 5 (Strong extractors)** An extractor \( \text{Ext}(r, s) : \{0,1\}^{|r|} \times \{0,1\}^{|s|} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) is a strong \((k, \epsilon)\)-extractor if for every distribution of \( r \) with min-entropy \( k \), it holds that \( \text{Ext}'(x, y) = (y, \text{Ext}(x, y)) \) is a standard \((k, \epsilon)\)-extractor.

**Theorem 2 (Leftover hash lemma)** if \( \mathcal{H} = \{ h : \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \} \) is a pairwise-independent family of hash functions where \( m = k - 2 \log(1/\epsilon) \), then \( \text{Ext}(x, h) = h(x) \) is a strong \((k, \epsilon)\)-extractor.

We will use \( \equiv \) to denote perfect indistinguishability, \( \equiv_s \) to denote statistical indistinguishability and \( \approx \) to denote computational indistinguishability. We denote by \((A, B)\) a pair of interactive Turing machines \( A \) and \( B \), and denote by \( (A, B) \) the random variable that represents the interaction between two interactive Turing machines \( A \) and \( B \). More precisely, we denote by \( \tau = (A(x), B(y)) \) the interactive execution of \((A, B)\) invoked with inputs \( x \) for \( A \), \( y \) for \( B \), and producing \( \tau \) as the transcript of the execution. We now give the formal definition of a commitment scheme.

**Commitment scheme.** A (bit) commitment scheme is a two-phase protocol between a sender \( \text{Com} \) and a receiver \( \text{Rec} \). In the former phase, called the commitment phase, \( \text{Com} \) commits to a secret bit \( b \) to \( \text{Rec} \). Let \( c \) be the transcript of the interaction. In the later phase, called the decommitment phase, \( \text{Com} \) reveals a bit \( b' \) and proves that it is the same as \( b \) that was hidden in the transcript \( c \) of the commitment phase. Typically, there are two security properties w.r.t. a commitment scheme. The binding property requires that after the commitment phase, a malicious sender cannot decommit \( c \) to two different values in the decommitment phase. The hiding property guarantees that a malicious receiver learns nothing about \( b \) in the commitment phase. A commitment scheme can be either Statistically Binding (but Computationally Hiding) or Statistically Hiding (but Computationally Binding).

**Definition 6 (Commitment Scheme)** A (bit) commitment scheme \( \text{CS} = (\text{Com}, \text{Rec}) \) is a two-phase protocol consists of a pair of PPT Turing machines \( \text{Com} \) and \( \text{Rec} \). In the commit phase, \( \text{Com} \) runs on a private input \( b \in \{0,1\} \) and a transcript \( c = (\text{Com}(b), \text{Rec}) \) is obtained after interacting with \( \text{Rec} \). In the decommitment phase, \( \text{Com} \) reveals a bit \( b' \) and \( \text{Rec} \) accepts the value committed to be \( b' \) if and only if \( \text{Com} \) can convince \( \text{Rec} \) that \( b' = b \). In a commitment scheme, the following security properties hold for any PPT adversary \( A \).
**Correctness:** if sender and receiver both follow the protocol, then for all \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), when the sender commits and opens to \( b \), Rec outputs \( b \).

**Hiding:** let \( \text{dist}^{A(z)}_{\text{CS}}(b) \) denote the random variable describing the output of a PPT adversary \( A \) running on auxiliary input \( z \), with a honest sender committing to a bit \( b \) by running \( \text{CS} \). It holds that for every PPT adversary \( A \) and auxiliary input \( z \), the probability ensembles \( \{\text{dist}^{A(z)}_{\text{CS}}(0)\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \) and \( \{\text{dist}^{A(z)}_{\text{CS}}(1)\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \) are computationally indistinguishable.

**Binding:** for every PPT adversary \( A \), and for all but a negligible probability over the coins of Rec, after the commitment phase, the probability that \( A \) can successfully open the commitment both as 0 and 1 is negligible.

Furthermore, a commitment scheme is statistically binding (resp. statistically hiding) if its binding (resp. hiding) property is secure against any unbounded adversary \( A \). We will often use schemes with non-interactive opening. That is, the sender opens a commitment by sending the randomness used in the commit phase. We now recall the existing commitment schemes that are relevant for our constructions.

**Statistically binding commitment scheme.** We will use Naor’s statistically binding commitment scheme \([\text{Nao}91]\) in our construction. Naor’s scheme only requires a black-box use of a pseudo-random generator (which can be based on the black-box use of any one-way function \([\text{HILL99}]\)), and we will use Naor’s commitment scheme in a black-box manner. We denote by \( \text{CS} = (\text{Com}, \text{Rec}) \), Naor’s commitment scheme executed by a sender Com and a receiver Rec with the following notation: \( c = \text{Com}_\sigma(b; \omega) \) denotes a commitment to a bit \( b \) computed using randomness \( \omega \), where \( \sigma \) is the first message generated by Rec to construct the commitment. To decommit and verify the commitment, Com sends \( (b, \omega) \) and Rec verifies that \( c = \text{Com}_\sigma(b; \omega) \). We stress that Naor’s commitment scheme can be used to commit to strings by iterating it for each bit of the string. Moreover, we will use it with non-interactive opening.

**Statistically hiding commitment scheme.** Another complementary notion of commitment schemes is statistically hiding but computationally binding. It is known how to construct a two-round statistically hiding commitment scheme from any family of collision-resistant hash functions \([\text{HM96}]\) or an \( O(n/ \log n) \)-round statistically hiding commitment from any one-way function \([\text{HR07}, \text{HNO}^+09]\). In this dual setting, the hiding property holds even against unbounded adversarial receivers for all but a negligible probability (i.e., statistical hiding), while the binding property is required to hold only for polynomially-bounded senders (i.e., computational binding). For two-round statistically hiding commitment scheme, we will use the same notation used above for two-round statistically binding commitment scheme.

**Extractable commitment schemes.** Informally, a commitment scheme is said to be extractable if there exists an efficient extractor that having black-box access to any efficient malicious sender \( \text{ExCom}^* \) that successfully performs the commitment phase, is able to efficiently extract the committed string. We first recall the formal definition from \([\text{PW09}]\) in the following.

**Definition 7 (Extractable Commitment Scheme)** A commitment scheme \( \text{ExCS} = (\text{ExCom}, \text{ExRec}) \) is an extractable commitment scheme if given an oracle access to any PPT malicious sender \( \text{ExCom}^* \), committing to a string, there exists an expected PPT extractor \( \text{Ext} \) that outputs a pair \((\tau, \sigma^*)\) such that the following properties hold:

- **Simulatability:** the simulated view \( \tau \) is identically distributed to the view of \( \text{ExCom}^* \) (when interacting with an honest \( \text{ExRec} \)) in the commitment phase.
**Extractability:** the probability that $\tau$ is accepting and $\sigma^*$ correspond to $\bot$ is negligible. Moreover the probability that ExCom* opens $\tau$ to a value different than $\sigma^*$ is negligible.

An extractable commitment scheme can be statistically binding (in such case also extractability must hold against an unbounded ExCom*) or statistically hiding. The construction of an extractable commitment in [PW09] follows the one proposed by Rosen in [Ros04], which is a non-concurrent version of the one originally proposed by Prabhakaran et al. in [PRS02], and formally defined as concurrent extractable commitment by Ong et al. in [MOSV06]. Since we do not require concurrent extractability, we will consider the non-concurrent (and round-efficient) version only. We also briefly recall the extractable commitment scheme by Ong et al. in [MOSV06]. Since we do not require concurrent extractability, we will consider the non-concurrent (and round-efficient) version only. We also briefly recall the extractable commitment scheme from [PW09] in the following.

One can construct an extractable commitment scheme $\text{ExCS} = (\text{ExCom}, \text{ExRec})$ with non-interactive opening from any commitment scheme $\text{CS} = (\text{Com}, \text{Rec})$ with non-interactive opening in a black-box manner as follows. Let ExCom be the sender, ExRec be the receiver, and $\text{Com}(\sigma; \omega)$ denote the commitment to a message $\sigma$ computed using randomness $\omega$. We will now show the steps of a statistically-binding extractable commitment scheme by assuming that if at any time the received message is inconsistent with the protocol specification then the honest player aborts (e.g., the receiver would output $\bot$).

**Commitment Phase:**
1. ExCom on input a message $\sigma$, generates $k$ random strings $\{r^0_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ of the same length as $\sigma$, and computes $\{r^1_i = \sigma \oplus r^0_i\}_{i \in [k]}$, therefore $\{\sigma = r^0_i \oplus r^1_i\}_{i \in [k]}$. Then ExCom uses $\text{CS}$ to commit to the $k$ pairs $\{(r^0_i, r^1_i)\}_{i \in [k]}$. That is, ExCom and ExRec produce $\{c^0_i = \langle \text{Com}(r^0_i, \omega^0_i), \text{Rec} \rangle, c^1_i = \langle \text{Com}(r^1_i, \omega^1_i), \text{Rec} \rangle\}_{i \in [k]}$.
2. ExRec responds to ExCom by sending a random $k$-bit challenge string $r' = (r'_1, \ldots, r'_k)$.
3. ExCom decommits $\{c^r_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ (i.e., non-interactively opens $k$ of previous commitments, one per pair).
4. ExRec verifies that commitments have been opened correctly.

**Decommitment Phase:**
1. ExCom sends $\sigma$ and non-interactively decommits the other $k$ commitments $\{c^r_i\}_{i \in [k]}$, where $r'_i = 1 - r'_i$.
2. ExRec checks that all $k$ pairs of random strings $\{r^0_i, r^1_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ satisfy $\sigma = r^0_i \oplus r^1_i$. If so, ExRec takes the value committed to be $\sigma$ and $\bot$ otherwise.

The proof of hiding and binding can be found in [PW09]. The extractor can simply run as a receiver, and if any of the $k$ commitments is not accepting, it outputs $\sigma^* = \bot$. Otherwise, it rewinds (Step 2) and changes the challenge until another $k$ well-formed decommitments are obtained. Then it verifies that for each decommitment, the XOR of all pairs corresponds to the same string. Then the extractor can extract a value from the responses of these two distinct challenges. The extractor by playing random challenges in each execution of Step 2 is perfectly simulating the behavior of the receiver and the analysis in [PW09] shows that its running time is polynomial. However, the extractor described above will produces over extraction, which means that the extractor can output a value different from $\bot$ when the transcript has no valid opening.

In our constructions, we will also need an extractable commitment scheme without over extraction, but tolerating extraction failure.

**Definition 8 (Weakly Extractable Commitment Scheme)** A weakly extractable commitment scheme $\text{WExCS} = (\text{WExCom}, \text{WExRec})$ is a commitment scheme such that given oracle access to any PPT malicious sender $\text{WExCom}^*$, committing to a string, there exists an expected PPT extractor $\text{Ext}$ that outputs a pair $(\tau, \sigma^*)$ such that the following properties hold:

**Simulatability:** the simulated view $\tau$ is identically distributed to the view of $\text{WExCom}^*$ (when interacting with an honest $\text{WExRec}$) in the commitment phase.
Commitment Phase: CS = (Com, Rec) is as follows:

Commitment Phase:
1. WExCom on input a message σ, generates a random strings r^0 of the same length as σ, and computes r^1 = σ ⊕ r^0. That is, WExCom sets σ = r^0 ⊕ r^1. Then WExCom uses CS to commit to a pair of values (r^0, r^1). That is, WExCom and WExRec produce c^0 = ⟨Com(r^0, ω^0), Rec⟩, c^1 = ⟨Com(r^1, ω^1), Rec⟩.
2. WExRec responses to WExCom by sending a random bit challenge string b.
3. WExCom decommits c^b (i.e., non-interactively opens one of previous commitments).
4. WExRec verifies that c^b has been opened correctly.

Decommitment Phase:
1. WExCom sends σ and non-interactively decommits the other commitment c^b, where b = 1 − b.
2. WExRec checks that σ = r^0 ⊕ r^1. If so, WExRec takes the value committed to be σ and ⊥ otherwise.

The proof of binding and hiding of WExCS are even simpler than the one given in [PW09]. Moreover, there is no issue of over-extraction, rather there is an issue of under-extraction. Since the malicious sender might refuse to open another commitment during rewinds, with probability 1/2, a cheating sender commits successfully but the extractor fails. We will show later that this weak notion of extractability suffices to prove the security of our main theorem.

Notice that in the two above constructions, when CS is the parallel version of Naor’s commitment scheme (i.e., a statistically binding string commitment scheme where the sender commits to pairs of strings which XOR corresponds to the string to be committed), then we obtain a constant-round extractable (resp. weakly extractable) statistically-binding string commitment scheme based on the black-box use of one-way functions. Similarly, a constant-round (weakly) extractable statistically-hiding commitment scheme from any family of collision-resistant hash functions can be obtained from the scheme of [HM96], and a O(n/ log n)-round (weakly) extractable statistically-hiding commitment from any one-way function can be obtained from the scheme of [HR07, HNO^+09].

Non-malleable commitment schemes. For the non-malleability of commitments, we follow the definition introduced by Pass and Rosen and by Lin et al. [PR05b, PR08a, LPV08]. Let M be the man-in-the-middle adversary running on auxiliary input z, and NMCS = (C, R) denote a non-malleable commitment scheme executed by a sender C and a receiver R. We briefly discuss two different types of non-malleability in the following.

Statistically binding non-malleable commitment schemes. We use the notion of non-malleability w.r.t. commitment from [DDN91] for statistically binding non-malleable commitment schemes. In this setting, the adversary M is said to succeed in the experiment if M can commit to a message σ* that is related to the message σ committed by the honest committer. Formally, let mim^M C (σ, z, tag) denote a random variable that describes the value σ that M commits to in the right execution and the view of M in the full experiment. In the simulated experiment, a simulator S directly interacts with R. Let sim^S C (z, tag) denote the random variable describing the value σ’ committed to by S and the output of S. Notice that both in mim^M C (σ, z, tag) and in sim^S C (z, tag) the values σ and σ’ are well defined since the commitment scheme is statistically binding.

We will consider tag-based commitments, where an additional string referred to as tag is received in input by both sender and receiver. The goal of M receiving a commitment of σ in an execution with tag tag, consists in committing to a related σ’ in an execution with a tag tag such that tag ≠ tag. Therefore
in \( \text{mim}_\text{NMCS}^M(\sigma, z, tag) \) we will assume that when the tag used in the right-hand execution is equal to the one used in left-hand execution, then the message committed in \( \text{mim}_\text{NMCS}^M(\sigma, z, tag) \) is always defined as \( \perp \).

It is well known that tag-based non-malleable commitments imply plain non-malleable commitments since one can use any signature scheme for this implication. Since it is known how to construct signature schemes by using a one-way function in a black-box manner, we have that the sole notion to care about in this work is that of tag-based non-malleable commitments.

**Definition 9 (Non-Malleable Commitments w.r.t Commitment)** A tag-based commitment scheme \( \text{NMCS} \) is said to be non-malleable if for every PPT man-in-the-middle adversary \( \mathcal{M} \), there exists a (expected) PPT simulator \( S \) such that the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:

\[
\{\text{mim}_\text{NMCS}^M(\sigma, z, tag)\}_{tag \in \{0,1\}^k, \sigma \in \{0,1\}^k, k \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \approx \{\text{sim}_\text{NMCS}^S(z, tag)\}_{tag \in \{0,1\}^k, k \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*}.
\]

Similarly, one can define the one-many (resp., many-many) variant of the above definition where the view of \( \mathcal{M} \) along with the tuple of values it commits to is required to be indistinguishable regardless of the value (resp., values) committed to in the left interaction (resp., interactions) by the honest sender. We refer the reader to [LPV08] for more details. We also define the notion of one-sided non-malleable commitment where we only consider interactions where the players of the left execution use a common value \( tag \) that is smaller than any value \( \tilde{tag} \) used in any right interaction\(^3\).

**Statistically hiding non-malleable commitment schemes.** In the statistically hiding case, the previous definition of non-malleability (w.r.t. commitment) does not make sense, because the committed value is not necessary well defined. To analyze the non-malleability in such a setting, the standard notion of non-malleability is w.r.t. opening and was studied by Di Crescenzo et al. [DIO98] and by Pass and Rosen [PR05a, PR08b]. Briefly, in the notion of non-malleability w.r.t. opening, the adversary is considered successful if after the commitment phase (where \( \mathcal{M} \) commits to a message \( \sigma \)), and after observing the decommitment to \( \sigma \) from a honest committer, \( \mathcal{M} \) can decommit a message \( \tilde{\sigma} \) that is related to \( \sigma \).

Let \( \text{mim}_\text{NMCS}^M(\sigma, z, tag) \) denote a random variable that describes the view of \( \mathcal{M} \) in the full experiment and the value that \( \mathcal{M} \) decommits to in the right execution when the sender commits and decommits to \( \sigma \). In the simulated experiment, a simulator \( S \) directly interacts with \( \mathcal{R} \), and will receive the value \( \sigma \) only after the commitment phase has been completed. Let \( \text{sim}_\text{NMCS}^S(\sigma, z, tag) \) denote the random variable describing the output of \( S \).

**Definition 10 (Non-Malleable Commitments w.r.t. Opening)** A tag-based commitment scheme \( \text{NMCS} \) is said to be non-malleable w.r.t. opening if for every PPT man-in-the-middle adversary \( \mathcal{M} \), there exists a (expected) PPT simulator \( S \) such that the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:

\[
\{\text{mim}_\text{NMCS}^M(\sigma, z, tag)\}_{tag \in \{0,1\}^k, \sigma \in \{0,1\}^k, k \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \approx \{\text{sim}_\text{NMCS}^S(\sigma, z, tag)\}_{tag \in \{0,1\}^k, \sigma \in \{0,1\}^k, k \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*}.
\]

**Statistically secure multi-party computation (MPC).** Informally, a secure multi-party computation (MPC) [BGW88, AL11] scheme allows \( n \) players to jointly and correctly compute an \( n \)-ary function based on their private inputs, even in the presence of \( t \) corrupted players. More precisely, let \( n \) be the number of players and \( t \) denotes the number of corrupted players. Under the assumption that there exists a synchronous network over secure point-to-point channels, in [BGW88] it is shown that for every \( n \)-ary

\(^3\)If there exists a right interaction with \( \tilde{tag} < tag \), the value \( b \) committed to in that right interaction is defined to be \( \perp \).
function \( f : (\{0,1\}^*) \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^*) \), there exists a \( t \)-secure MPC protocol \( \Pi_f \) that securely computes \( f \) in the semi-honest model for any \( t < n/2 \), and in the malicious model for any \( t < n/3 \), with perfect completeness and security. That is, given the private input \( w_i \) of player \( i \), after running the protocol \( \Pi_f \), each honest player \( i \) receives in output the \( i \)-th component of the result of the function \( f \) applied to the inputs of the players, as long as the adversary corrupts less than \( t \) players. In addition, nothing is learnt by the adversary from the execution of \( \Pi_f \) other than the output.

More formally, we denote by \( \mathcal{A} \) the real-world adversary running on auxiliary input \( z \), and by \( S \) the ideal-world adversary. We then denote by \( \text{REAL}_{\pi,\mathcal{A}(z),f}(\bar{x}) \) the random variable consisting of the output of \( \mathcal{A} \) controlling the corrupted parties in \( I \) and the outputs of the honest parties. Following a real execution of \( \pi \) where for any \( i \in [n] \), party \( P_i \) has input \( x_i \) and \( \bar{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \). We denote by \( \text{IDEAL}_{f,S(z),f}(\bar{x}) \) the analogous output of \( S \) and honest parties after an ideal execution with a trusted party computing \( f \).

**Definition 11** Let \( f : (\{0,1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^*)^n \) be an \( n \)-ary functionality and let \( \pi \) be a protocol. We say that \( \pi \) \((n,t)\)-statistically securely computes \( f \) if for every probabilistic adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) in the real model, there exists a probabilistic adversary \( S \) of comparable complexity\(^4 \) in the ideal model, such that for every \( I \subset [n] \) of cardinality at most \( t \), every \( \bar{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in (\{0,1\}^*)^n \) where \(|x_1| = \ldots = |x_n| \), and every \( z \in \{0,1\}^* \), it holds that: \( \{\text{IDEAL}_{f,S(z),f}(\bar{x})\} \equiv_s \{\text{REAL}_{\pi,\mathcal{A}(z),f}(\bar{x})\} \).

We will later use MPC protocols with perfect completeness and statistical security.

**Theorem 3 (BGW88)** Consider a synchronous network with pairwise private channels. Then, for every \( n \)-ary functionality \( f \), there exists a protocol \( \pi_f \) that \((n,t)\)-perfectly securely computes \( f \) in the presence of a static semi-honest adversary for any \( t < n/2 \), and there exists a protocol that \((n,t)\)-perfectly securely computes \( f \) in the presence of a static malicious adversary for any \( t < n/3 \).

We will refer to such a protocol \( \pi_f \) mentioned in the above theorem as an \((n,t)\)-perfectly secure MPC protocol for \( f \).

Notice that all the above communication requirements to run the MPC protocol will not result in communication requirements for our commitment scheme, since we will use virtual executions of MPC that will be run only locally by players.

**Consistency of views.** In an MPC protocol, the view of a player includes all messages received by that player during the execution of the protocol, the private inputs given to the player and the randomness used by the player. We further denote by \( \text{view}_i \) the view of player \( P_i \). For a honest player \( P_i \), the final output and all messages sent by that player can be inferred from \( \text{view}_i \) by running a virtual execution of the protocol. Next, we recall the following definition of view consistency adapted from [IKOS07].

**Definition 12 (View Consistency)** A \( \text{view}_i \) of an honest player during an MPC computation \( \pi \) contains input and randomness used in the computation, and all messages received/sent from/to the communication tapes. We have that a pair of views \( (\text{view}_i, \text{view}_j) \) are consistent with each other if, (a) both the players \( P_i \) and \( P_j \) individually computed each outgoing message honestly by using the random tapes, inputs and incoming messages specified in \( \text{view}_i \) and \( \text{view}_j \) respectively, and, (b) all output messages of \( P_i \) to \( P_j \) appearing in \( \text{view}_i \) are consistent with incoming messages of \( P_j \) received from \( P_i \) appearing in \( \text{view}_j \), and vice versa.

\(^4\)Comparable complexity means that \( S \) runs in time that is polynomial in the running time of \( \mathcal{A} \).
Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) functionality. Informally, a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme is a two-stage secret sharing protocol for implementing the following functionality. In the first stage, a special player referred to as dealer shares a secret among the other players referred to as shareholders in the presence of at most $t$ corrupted players. In the second stage, players reconstruct the secret shared by the dealer. The functionality ensures that when the dealer is honest, before the second stage begins, all corrupted players have no information about the secret. Moreover, when the dealer is dishonest, at the end of the share phase the honest players would have realized it through an accusation mechanism that disqualifies the dealer.

In contrast to Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme [Sha79], a VSS scheme can tolerate errors on malicious dealer and players on distributing inconsistent or incorrect shares, indeed the critical property is that even in case the dealer is dishonest but has not been disqualified, still the second stage always reconstruct the same bit among the honest players.

We will consider a VSS scheme implementing the above VSS functionality, as defined below.

**Definition 13 (VSS Scheme)** An $(n+1,t)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme consists of a pair of protocols $\text{VSS} = (\text{Share}, \text{Recon})$ that implement respectively the sharing and reconstruction phases as follows.

- **Share.** Player $P_{n+1}$ referred to as dealer runs on input a secret $s$ and randomness $r_{n+1}$, while any other player $P_i$, $1 \leq i \leq n$, runs on input a randomness $r_i$. During this phase players can send (both private and broadcast) messages in multiple rounds.

- **Recon.** Each shareholder sends its view $v_i$ of the sharing phase to each other player, and on input the views of all players (that can include bad or empty views) each player outputs a reconstruction of the secret $s$.

All computations performed by honest players are efficient. The computationally unbounded adversary can corrupt up to $t$ players that can deviate from the above procedures. The following security properties hold.

**Commitment:** if the dealer is dishonest then one of the following two cases happen: 1) during the sharing phase honest players disqualify the dealer, therefore they output a special value $\bot$ and will refuse to play the reconstruction phase; 2) during the sharing phase honest players do not disqualify the dealer, therefore such a phase determines a unique value $s^*$ that belongs to the set of possible legal values that does not include $\bot$, which will be reconstructed by the honest players during the reconstruction phase.

**Secrecy:** if the dealer is honest then the adversary obtains no information about the shared secret before running the protocol Recon.

**Correctness:** if the dealer is honest throughout the protocols then each honest player will output the shared secret $s$ at the end of protocol Recon.

Direct implementations of $(n+1, \lfloor n/3 \rfloor)$-perfectly secure VSS schemes can be found in [BGW88, CDD+99]. However since we are interested in a deterministic reconstruction procedure, we will use the scheme of [GIKR01] that implements an $(n+1, \lfloor n/4 \rfloor)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme. We will denote by $\Pi_{\text{VSSshare}}$ the execution of an $(n+1, \lfloor n/4 \rfloor)$-perfectly secure protocol that implements the Share stage of the above VSS functionality. We will denote by $\Pi_{\text{recon}}$ the corresponding protocol executed by shareholders to implement the deterministic Recon stage.

**Synchronized Multi-Party Coin Tossing Protocol.** One of the natural and basic applications of the secure multi-party computation is coin tossing, which allows parties to generate a common unbiased
random string. We assume that there exists a broadcast channel and the communication is synchronized but allowing a rushing adversary. That is, our protocol will proceed in rounds, and in each round, all messages exchanged by the players must be delivered before the next round begins. However, in each round, the adversary is allowed to see all the messages sent by honest players before deciding how the corrupted players should behave in current round. Also, the broadcast channel assures that all players heard the same message and that the message cannot be disavowed. Note that in this notion, one string is tossed in a multi-party protocol, which is different to the notions in [Lin01, PW09], where many (single bit) coins are tossed in parallel (i.e., multiple protocol pairs are executed simultaneous by two parties). In the two-party case, a constant-round parallel coin-tossing protocol was proposed by Lindell [Lin01]. In addition, the first constant-round non-malleable string-tossing protocol in the plain model is achieved by Barak [Bar02].

Let $Π_C$ be a synchronized multi-party coin tossing protocol, let $A$ denotes the real-world adversary running on auxiliary inputs $z$, and let $S$ be the ideal-world adversary. We then denote by $REAL_{Π_C,A}(z)(1^n)$ the random variable consisting of the output of $A$ and the outputs of all parties. We denote by $IDEAL_{f,S(z)}(1^n)$ the analogous output of $S$ and honest parties after an ideal execution with a trusted party computing the $n$-ary function $f : (1^k)^n \to \{0,1\}^k$, where each party has only the security parameter $k$ as its input and the output of $f$ is uniformly and independently chosen from $\{0,1\}^k$.

**Definition 14 (Synchronized Multi-Party Coin Tossing)** A synchronized multi-party protocol $Π_C$ implements an $n$-party coin tossing if for every PPT adversary $A$ in the real model, there exists a PPT adversary $S$ of comparable complexity in the ideal model, such that

$$REAL_{Π_C,A}(z)(1^k) \approx IDEAL_{f,S(z)}(1^k).$$

### 3 Construction of Non-Malleable Commitments

We now describe a simplified version of our protocol, which considers “short” tags with one-sided non-malleability. Moreover security is guaranteed against synchronized adversaries only. A synchronized adversary is a restricted adversary that plays the main-in-the-middle attack by playing exactly one message on the right execution after a message is received from the left execution, and playing exactly one message on the left execution after a message is received from the right execution. In our scheme we will use an extractable commitment scheme $\mathsf{ExCS}$ as already used in previous work [PW09]. Such a commitment scheme suffers of “over extraction”, which means that the extractor can output a value different than $\bot$ even when the committed message is not well formed (therefore the committed message is undefined and can not be opened anymore). In addition, we use the commitment scheme $\mathsf{WExCS}$ which instead suffers from “under extraction” as described in Section 2. We assume that each execution has a session identifier $tag \in [2n]$, where $n$ is the length of party identity in bits. Let $k$ be the security parameter and $\ell = \ell(k) = k \cdot tag$. The commitment scheme $\mathsf{NMCS} = (\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{R})$ between a committer $\mathcal{C}$ and a receiver $\mathcal{R}$ proceeds as follows to commit to a $k$-bit string $\sigma$. We assume that $\lambda = \lfloor k/4 \rfloor$. In the description below, we have included some intuition in italics.

**Commitment Phase.**

0. **Initial setup.** $\mathcal{R}$ picks $\lambda$ out of $k$ players (which will be later emulated by the committer) at random. That is, it randomly selects $\lambda$ distinct indices $\Lambda = \{r_1, \ldots, r_\lambda\}$ where $r_i \in [k]$ for any $i \in [\lambda]$. For each $r_i$, $\mathcal{R}$ sends an extractable commitment $c_i$ of $r_i$ using $\mathsf{ExCS}$.

1. **Primary slot.** Let $Π_{VSS\text{share}}$ be a protocol implementing the $\text{Share}$ phase of a $(k+1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme. We require the VSS protocol to have a deterministic reconstruction phase. The committer $\mathcal{C}$ is given a $k$-bit string $\sigma$ to commit.
1. **Commit:** $C$ first generates $\ell$ pairs of random strings $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ of length $4k$ each, and a $k$-bit random string $s$. Here the strings are such that the knowledge of both strings $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}$ for any pair will allow an extractor to extract the committed value. The string $s$ is meant to serve as a seed of a strong extractor used later on in the protocol. The purpose of the next two stages (1.2 and 1.3) is simply to produce a specialized commitment to the strings $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}, s$ and $\sigma$.

1.2. The committer $C$ now starts emulating $k + 1$ (virtual) players locally “in his head”. $C$ sets the input of $P_{k+1}$ (i.e., the Dealer) to the concatenation of $\sigma$, $s$, and $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$, while each other player has no input. Then $C$ runs $\Pi_{VSSshare}$ and each player $P_i$ obtains shares $w_i$ for any $i \in [k]$.

1.3. Let $view_1^1, \ldots, view_{k+1}^1$ be the views of the $k + 1$ players describing the execution of $\Pi_{VSSshare}$. $C$ uses $\text{WExCS}$ to send a commitment $V_i^1$ of $view_i^1$ to $R$, in parallel for any $i \in [k]$. At this stage, the committer is now committed to $\sigma, s$ and $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$.

1.4. **Challenge:** $R$ sends a random $\ell$-bit challenge string $ch = (c_{h1}, \ldots, c_{h\ell})$.

1.5. **Response:** $C$ sends $\{\alpha_i^{ch_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ to $R$. The goal of the extractor would be to rewind and learn a pair $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}$. To ensure non-malleability, this would be done without rewinding the (interleaved) left interaction.

2. **Verification message.** Let $H$ be a family of pairwise-independent hash functions with domain $\{0,1\}^{4k}$ and range $\{0,1\}^k$, and $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^{4k} \times \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^k$ be a strong randomness $(3k,2^{-k})$-extractor.

2.1. $R$ picks a function $h$ at random from $H$ and sends it to $C$.

2.2. $C$ sends $s, \{h(\alpha_i^0), h(\alpha_i^1), B_i = \sigma \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^0, s) \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^1, s)\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ to $R$.

Say that in the primary slot phase, the extractor rewinds the adversary and receives a value $\alpha_i^j$. This phase enables checking such a received value for correctness (and for subsequent recovery of the string $\sigma$). This phase is purely information theoretic but still provides for the right binding properties. The corresponding mechanism in the construction of Goyal was implemented using complex computations involving random tapes used to generate various commitments.

3. **Consistency proof.** Now the sender needs to prove the correctness of the values revealed in stage 1.5 and 2.2.

3.1. Let $\Pi_{ch}$ be a $(k,\lambda)$-perfectly secure MPC protocol such that given $ch$ as a public input and $w_i$ as the private input of $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$, at the end of the computation $\{\alpha_i^{ch_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ is received in output by $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$. $C$ runs internally $\Pi_{ch}$ and sends a commitment $V_i^2$ of the view $view_i^2$ of $P_i$ when executing $\Pi_{ch}$ using $\text{WExCS}$ in parallel for any $i \in [k]$ to $R$.

3.2. Let $\Pi_h$ be a $(k,\lambda)$-perfectly secure MPC protocol such that given a hash function $h$ as a public input and $w_i$ as the private input of $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$, at the end of the computation $(s, \{h(\alpha_i^0), h(\alpha_i^1)\}_{i \in [\ell]}, \{B_i = \sigma \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^0, s) \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^1, s)\}_{i \in [\ell]})$ is received in output by $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$. $C$ runs internally $\Pi_h$ and sends a commitment $V_i^3$ of the view $view_i^3$ of $P_i$ when executing $\Pi_h$ using $\text{WExCS}$ in parallel for any $i \in [k]$.

3.3. $R$ decommits $\{\alpha_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.

3.4. $C$ decommits $\{V_i^1, V_i^2, V_i^3\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ (i.e., it decommits the subset of views $\{view_i^1, view_i^2, view_i^3\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$).

3.5. For $j = 1, 2, 3$, $R$ verifies that all pairs of views in $\{view_i^j\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ are consistent (according to Definition 12) and that the dealer $P_{k+1}$ has not been disqualified by any player, otherwise $R$ aborts; moreover for $j = 1, 2$ and $i = 1, \ldots, \lambda$, $R$ checks that $view_i^j$ is a prefix of $view_i^{j+1}$, otherwise $R$ aborts.

**Decommittment Phase.**

1. $C$ decommits $\{V_i^1\}_{i \in [k]}$ as $\{view_i^1\}_{i \in [k]}$.  

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2. \(R\) checks that all commitments to the views are opened correctly in the previous step. If a commitment is opened incorrectly, \(R\) sets the corresponding revealed view to \(0^k\) (instead of just aborting).

3. Let \(\Pi_{\text{VSSrecon}}\) be a protocol implementing the \texttt{Recon} phase corresponding to the \((k+1, \lambda)\)-perfectly secure VSS \texttt{Share} phase (which includes the string \(\sigma\)) used in the commitment phase. \(R\) runs \(\Pi_{\text{VSSrecon}}\) using \(\text{view}^1_1, \ldots, \text{view}^1_{k+1}\) as input to reconstruct and output the first substring of the value that the majority of the players would output in the reconstruction. If there is no majority, then consider the committer to have aborted during the decommitment phase (and output \(\bot\)).

We stress that the receiver does not perform any additional checks. In particular, even if it detects that some of the views are not correctly constructed (and hence the committer behaved in a dishonest way), it still accepts the decommitment phase as long as a majority of the players agree on a value during reconstruction. This is crucial for getting security as per the non-malleability w.r.t. commitment notion.

### 3.1 Security Analysis

As one could expect, we borrow several ideas from the analysis of Goyal \cite{Goy11}\(^5\) with some crucial modifications. Indeed the protocol of \cite{Goy11} uses a zero-knowledge proof of consistency for (at least) two different crucial purposes: 1) in the proof of non-malleability, the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof guarantees that when the commitment phase is completed successfully, there exists a unique committed string not equal to \(\bot\); 2) in the proof of hiding the zero-knowledge property of the zero-knowledge proof guarantees that no information on the committed string is leaked.

Since our protocol does not use a zero-knowledge protocol, we prove the above two properties in a different way by relying on our techniques.

\textbf{Theorem 4} The commitment scheme \texttt{NMCS} is computationally hiding.

\textbf{Proof.} To prove the hiding property, we claim that any adversary \(A\) that breaks the hiding property of \texttt{NMCS} can be used to break the hiding property of \texttt{WExCS}. More precisely, let \(\text{dist}_\mathcal{C}(m)\) denote the random variable describing the output of the adversary in \texttt{NMCS} when \(C\) commits to \(m\), and let \(\text{dist}_{\text{WExCom}}(m)\) denote the random variable describing the output of the adversary in \texttt{WExCS} when \(\text{WExCom}\) commits \(m\).

We will show how to reduce an adversary \(A\) of \texttt{NMCS} to an adversary \(S\) of \texttt{WExCom}. More specifically, given the above adversaries \(A\) and \(S\), we show that if for some non-negligible function \(\nu\) there exists a PPT distinguisher \(D\) such that if \(\Pr_{b \leftarrow \{0,1\}} [D(\text{dist}_\mathcal{C}(m_b), m_0, m_1) = b] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \nu(k)\) for any pair of messages \(m_0\) and \(m_1\), then there exists a non-negligible function \(\nu'\) and a pair of messages \(m'_0, m'_1\) such that \(\Pr_{b \leftarrow \{0,1\}} [D(\text{dist}_{\text{WExCom}}(m'_b), m'_0, m'_1) = b] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \nu'(k)\).

To start with, let \(\text{dist}_i(m)\) (resp. \(\text{dist}^{(i)}_i(m)\)) denote the random variable describing the output of the adversary of \texttt{NMCS} when \(S\) commits \(m\) in experiment \(\mathcal{H}_i\) (resp. \(\mathcal{H}_i^{(i)}\)). Then, we consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments.

\textbf{Experiment} \(\mathcal{H}_0\). In this experiment, \(S\) runs \(C\). Clearly, \(\text{dist}_\mathcal{C}(m_0) \equiv \text{dist}_0(m_0)\).

\textbf{Experiment} \(\mathcal{H}_1\). In this experiment, \(S\) executes the protocol identically to \(\mathcal{H}_0\) except that it also runs the extractor of \texttt{ExCS} to retrieve all the indices \(r_i\) selected by \(A\), and it aborts if the extraction fails. After getting \(r_i\) for all \(i \in [k]\), \(S\) executes the rest of the protocol as in \(\mathcal{H}_0\). Since the only difference in the view of \(\mathcal{H}_0\) and \(\mathcal{H}_1\) consists in the aborts performed when the extraction fails, by the extractability of \texttt{ExCS} (indeed if \(A\) completes the commitment phase with non-negligible probability then the extractor of \texttt{ExCS} fails with negligible probability only), we have that \(\text{dist}_0(m_0) \approx \text{dist}_1(m_0)\).

\(^5\)Parts of the text in this section is borrowed verbatim from \cite{Goy11}.
**Experiment \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(i)} \) to \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(3(k-\lambda)+1)} \).** These experiments deviate from \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) in the following way. For all commitments of the views that will not be opened to \( \mathcal{A} \) (i.e., \( \{V^1_i, V^2_i, V^3_i\}_{i \in \Lambda} \)), \( \mathcal{S} \) will gradually replace the committed values (corresponding to views that are consistent with the computations) by commitments to random strings. Notice these changed commitments are never opened in the commitment phase, and since the only difference in the views of \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(i)} \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j+1)} \) for any \( j \in [3(k-\lambda)] \) is just one commitment, if there exists a distinguisher \( \mathcal{D} \) that can distinguish two views in two consecutive experiments, we can use it to construct an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) to break the hiding property of \( \mathsf{WExCS} \). Therefore, we have

\[
\text{dist}_1(m_0) = \text{dist}_2^{(i)}(m_0) \approx \cdots \approx \text{dist}_2^{(3(k-\lambda)+1)}(m_0).
\]

**Claim 1** If there exists a distinguisher \( \mathcal{D} \) that can distinguish two views in experiments \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j)} \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j+1)} \), for any \( j \in [3(k-\lambda)] \), then there exist an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) that breaks the hiding property of \( \mathsf{WExCS} \).

**Proof.** The proof of this claim relies on a hybrid argument and we provide a sketch as follows. Notice that the views of experiments \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j)} \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j+1)} \) are only different in one commitment. Now consider this pair of particular commitment \( c^{(j)} \) and \( c^{(j+1)} \) that correspond to a commitment of a consistent view in the former case and to a commitment of a random string in the latter case. If there exists a distinguisher \( \mathcal{D} \) to distinguish the views of experiments \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j)} \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j+1)} \), then one can use it to distinguish between \( c^{(j)} \) and \( c^{(j+1)} \). The reduction is standard and simply consists in taking a challenge commitment and embedding it in the experiment played with \( \mathcal{A} \). Since the output of \( \mathcal{A} \) can be used to distinguish between \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j)} \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(j+1)} \), it can directly be used to distinguish a commitment of a consistent view from a commitment of a random string.

**Experiment \( \mathcal{H}_3 \).** In this experiment, the simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) proceeds identically to \( \mathcal{H}_2^{(3(k-\lambda)+1)} \) with the following exception. Let \( \mathcal{S}_{VSS}, \mathcal{S}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{S}_h \) be the simulators of underlying MPC protocols \( \Pi_{VSS_{\text{share}}}, \Pi_{ch} \) and \( \Pi_h \). \( \mathcal{S}_{VSS}, \mathcal{S}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{S}_h \) will simulate the views of the multi-party computations considering players in \( \Lambda \) as malicious players (i.e., the query to the ideal functionality will be internally simulated by assuming all honest players play with shares of \( m_0 \)). Then for every player \( i \in \Lambda \), our simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) will commit the views being generated by \( \mathcal{S}_{VSS}, \mathcal{S}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{S}_h \). Notices that since \( \lambda \) is below the threshold for statistical security used by MPC protocols, we have that \( \mathcal{S}_{VSS}, \mathcal{S}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{S}_h \) can generate these views so that they are statistically indistinguishable from the views of \( \text{dist}_2^{3(k-\lambda)+1}(m_0) \). Therefore, we have

\[
\text{dist}_2^{3(k-\lambda)+1}(m_0) = \text{dist}_3(m_0).
\]

**Experiment \( \mathcal{H}_4 \).** In this experiment, the simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) proceeds identically to \( \mathcal{H}_3 \) with the following exception. Instead of assuming that all honest players play with shares of \( m_0 \), the simulator assumes that all honest players play with shares of \( m_1 \) when using \( \mathcal{S}_{VSS}, \mathcal{S}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{S}_h \). That is, for every player \( i \in \Lambda \), our simulator \( \mathcal{S} \) will commit the views being generated by \( \mathcal{S}_{VSS}, \mathcal{S}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{S}_h \). Moreover \( \mathcal{S} \) will replace \( m_0 \) by \( m_1 \) when computing the encryptions \( B_i \), therefore it will send \( \{B_i = m_1 \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(\alpha^0_i, s) \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(\alpha^1_i, s)\}_{i \in [\ell]} \). Again, since \( \lambda \) is below the threshold for statistical security used by MPC protocols, we have that \( \mathcal{S}_{VSS}, \mathcal{S}_{ch} \) and \( \mathcal{S}_h \), can generate these views so that they are perfectly indistinguishable to the views of \( \text{dist}_3(m_0) \). The only remaining difference between the two games consists therefore in the use of \( m_1 \) instead of \( m_0 \) when computing \( B_i \), for any \( i \in [\ell] \). Observe that both in \( \text{dist}_3(m_0) \) and in \( \text{dist}_4(m_1) \), the encryption of the string is performed by using both \( \mathsf{Ext}(\alpha^0_i, s) \) and \( \mathsf{Ext}(\alpha^1_i, s) \). One of these two values is actually known since both \( s \) and \( \alpha^i_{ch} \) are revealed for any \( i \in [\ell] \). Therefore, the capability to distinguish \( \text{dist}_3(m_0) \) from \( \text{dist}_4(m_1) \) reduces to distinguishing \((h(\alpha^i_{ch}), m_0 \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(\alpha^i_{ch}, s))\) for \( i \in [\ell] \) played in \( \text{dist}_3(m_0) \) from \((h(\alpha^i_{ch}), m_1 \oplus \mathsf{Ext}(\alpha^i_{ch}, s))\) for \( i \in [\ell] \) played in \( \text{dist}_4(m_1) \). Obviously the two games would be indistinguishable if classical one-time pad is applied by computing \( B_i = m_0 \oplus \alpha^i_{ch} \) (resp., \( B_i = m_1 \oplus \alpha^i_{ch} \)) where \( \alpha^i_{ch} \) is a random \( \ell \)-bit string and no \( h(\alpha^i_{ch}) \) is sent. However the fact that \( h(\alpha^i_{ch}) \) is sent breaks the use of classical one-time pad. Indeed, values \( h(\alpha^i_{ch}) \) decreases the entropy of

\footnote{This indeed will be crucial in the proof of non-malleability.}
\(\alpha_i^{ch_i}\). The use of \(H\) with that specified domain and range, and the selection of \(\alpha_i^{ch_i}\) as a 4k-bit string, guarantee that the min-entropy of \(\alpha_i^{ch_i}\) is still \(k\) when \(h(\alpha_i^{ch_i})\) is known. The strong randomness extractor therefore generates an almost uniform random \(k\)-bit string (the statistical difference with the uniform distribution is \(2^{-k}\)) from the \(k\) bits of min-entropy of \(\alpha_i^{ch_i}\), and thus we have that \(\text{dist}_3(m_0)\) and \(\text{dist}_4(m_1)\) are statistically indistinguishable.

Experiment \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(1)}\) to \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(3(k-\lambda)+1)}\). In these experiments we proceed identically to \(\mathcal{H}_4\), except that for all commitments that will not be opened to \(A\) (i.e., \(\{V_i^1, V_i^2, V_i^3\}_{i \notin \Lambda}\), \(S\) will gradually changes back the committed values from the random strings to views that are consistent with committed value \(m_1\). Therefore in these experiments there is a real-world execution that is mixed in part with a simulated execution. More precisely, in two consecutive experiments \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(j)}\) and \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(j+1)}\) for any \(j \in [3(k-\lambda)]\), \(S\) will executes the MPC protocols according to input \(m_1\). Then in \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(j)}\), \(S\) for a party \(i \notin \Lambda\) and some index \(j' \in [3]\), \(S\) computes \(V_i^{j'}\) as a commitment of a random string. Instead in \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(j+1)}\) \(S\) changes the commitments \(V_i^{j'}\) to a view \(\overline{\text{view}}_i^{j'}\) consistent with a run where the committed string is \(m_1\). By the same arguments used in experiment \(\mathcal{H}_2^{(j)}\), these changed commitments are never opened in the commitment phase, thus if there exists a distinguisher \(D\) that can distinguish \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(j)}\) from \(\mathcal{H}_5^{(j+1)}\) for some \(j \in [3(k-\lambda)]\), we can use it to construct an adversary \(A\) that breaks the hiding property of \(\text{WExCS}\). The reduction is almost identical to the one given in Claim 1. Therefore, we have \(\text{dist}_4(m_1) = \text{dist}_5^{(j)}(m_1) \approx \cdots \approx \text{dist}_5^{3(k-\lambda)+1}(m_1)\).

Experiment \(\mathcal{H}_6\). In this experiment, the simulator honestly executes the protocol by committing to the value \(m_1\) and outputs the corresponding views. The only difference between \(\mathcal{H}_6\) and \(\mathcal{H}_5^{3(k-\lambda)+1}\) is that the opened views in \(\mathcal{H}_5^{3(k-\lambda)+1}\) are simulated by the MPC simulators. However, notice that these simulated views are perfectly indistinguishable with respect to views of a real execution. Thus, \(\mathcal{H}_5^{3(k-\lambda)+1}(m_1) \equiv_\text{dist}_6(m_1) = \text{dist}_6(m_1)\).

Therefore, by applying the sequences of hybrid experiments shown above, we have \(\text{dist}_6(m_0) \approx \text{dist}_c(m_1)\), and if there exists an adversary that can distinguish \(\text{dist}_6(m_0)\) from \(\text{dist}_c(m_1)\), we can use it to break the hiding property of \(\text{WExCS}\).

**Theorem 5** The commitment scheme \(\text{NMCS}\) is statistically binding.

**Proof.** The statistical binding property follows in a straightforward manner from the statistical binding of \(\text{WExCS}\). Indeed the only step performed by the unbounded adversarial sender in the decommitment phase, consists in decommitting all the statistically binding commitments \(\{V_i^1, V_i^2, V_i^3\}_{i \in [k+1]}\) sent in the commitment phase through the extractable commitment scheme. The decommitted string is then derived from running the reconstruction phase of the VSS using these views. Then since the reconstruction is deterministic, regardless of how these views are constructed, there is a unique string which will be reconstructed. Therefore to violate the binding of our scheme one has to violate the statistical binding of the extractable commitment scheme.

**Theorem 6** The commitment scheme \(\text{NMCS}\) is a one-sided non-malleable commitment scheme with short tags secure against synchronized adversaries.

**Proof.** To prove the non-malleability of \(\text{NMCS}\), we show that there exists a black-box simulator \(S\) such that for any man-in-the-middle adversary \(M\), \(\text{dist}_1 = \{\text{mim}_M^{\text{NMCS}}(\sigma, z, \text{tag})\}_{\text{tag} \in [k], \sigma \in \{0,1\}^n, z \in \{0,1\}^*}\) and \(\text{dist}_2 = \{\text{sim}_S^{\text{NMCS}}(z, \text{tag})\}_{\text{tag} \in [k], z \in \{0,1\}^*}\) are computationally indistinguishable.

The simulator \(S\) is constructed as follows. \(S\) uses the adversary \(M\) as a subroutine and interacts with an external receiver \(R\); in the left interaction, \(S\) honestly commits to the string \(0^n\) to \(M\), while in the right interaction it simply forwards the messages being sent out by \(M\) to \(R\) and vice versa. We claim that given the above \(S\), the ensembles \(\text{dist}_1\) and \(\text{dist}_2\) are computationally indistinguishable.
Suppose, towards contradiction, that there exists a distinguisher $D$ which can distinguish $\text{dist}_1$ and $\text{dist}_2$ with an advantage $r(k) \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(k)}$ for infinitely many values of $k$. That is, $|\Pr[D(\text{dist}_1) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{dist}_2) = 1]| \geq 2r(k)$.

Now, fix any such generic $k$ and consider the real experiment where the adversary $M$ interacts with a committer $C$ in the left interaction and with a receiver $R$ in the right one. Given the view of $M$ in such real experiment, we then show how to construct an extractor $E$ which outputs the value $\hat{\sigma}$ committed by $M$ in the right interaction with probability at least $1 - r(k)$ without rewinding $C$ (i.e., without having access to the value and the random coins used by $C$ in the left interaction, similarly to [DDN91, LPV08]). However, the existence of such an extractor $E$ along with the successful malleability attack, contradicts the (stand-alone) computational hiding property of the commitment scheme NMCS. Therefore, to show that there exists no such a distinguisher $D$, the only thing that remains to show is how to construct an extractor that succeeds with probability at least $1 - r(k)$. For simplicity, we analyze the failure probability of our extractor conditioned on the event that given the completed (i.e., all messages have been played in both sessions and no party aborted) main thread, there is exactly one value $\sigma \neq \bot$ consistent with the transcript of the right interaction. We prove it in the following lemma. Note that the corresponding lemma in [Goy11] was immediate because of the usage of zero-knowledge proofs.

**Lemma 1** Let $R$ be an honest receiver that completes without aborting the commitment phase with a PPT sender $M$. Then with all but negligible probability, the commitments $\tilde{V}_1^1, \ldots, \tilde{V}_k^1$ sent by $M$ uniquely define the string corresponding to the concatenation of $\sigma$, $s$, and $\{a_i^0, a_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ (i.e., the string that the reconstruction phase of the VSS scheme would reconstruct), and this string is not equal to $\bot$. In fact, at least $99$ percent of the commitments are valid views such that these views are also all consistent with each other.

**Proof.** For the receiver to not abort, the set of views selected by $\Lambda$ does not contain any pair of inconsistent views, and no view in the set disqualifies the dealer. Consider any arbitrary constant $c$.

**Case 1: Large enough consistent set of views.** Assume that there is a set of views of size $\ell > k - \lambda/c$ such that all pairs of views in the set are consistent. By the definition of consistency, it holds that all such views consist of honestly performed local computations. Moreover, the fact that all pairs of views in the set are consistent means that outgoing messages in a view of each player in the set, correspond to incoming messages of another player in the set (of course this is true only for messages sent to players in the set). Therefore, we have that the above $\ell$ views correspond to an execution of VSS where these $\ell$ players are honest and the remaining less than $\lambda$ (in fact less than $\lambda/c$) players can instead be corrupted. Since the number of corrupted players is below the security threshold of the implemented VSS, we can now rely on the commitment property of VSS. Indeed, it guarantees that there exists one fixed string that $\Pi_{\text{VSSrecon}}$ would reconstruct and give in output to those honest players, unless all those players accused the dealer in the sharing phase. However this last case can not hold because (by pigeon hole principle) at least one index of those $\ell$ views is in $\Lambda$ and therefore the commitment phase would have showed the disqualification of the dealer, and this has been already ruled out at the beginning of the proof.

**Case 2: Too many inconsistent pairs of views.** In contrast to Case 1, assume that there is no set of views of size $\ell > k - \lambda/c$ such that all pairs of views in the set are consistent. Similar to [IKOS07], consider the following inconsistency graph $G$, defined based on the $k$ committed views. The graph $G$ has $k$ vertices (corresponding to the $k$ views) and there is an edge between two vertices in $G$ if the corresponding pair of views is inconsistent (see Definition 12).

Observe that the size of the minimum vertex cover of $G$ is at least $\lambda/c$. This is because otherwise, we get a fully consistent set of size greater than $k - \lambda/c$ (which includes views corresponding to all vertices except those in the vertex cover). Now, we observe that $G$ must have a matching of size at least $\lambda/2c$. This follows from the well known connection between the size of minimum vertex cover and the size of a maximal matching. The following combinatorial claim is implicit in [IKOS07].
Claim 2 Consider a graph $G$ having $k$ vertices and a matching of size at least $k/C$ in $G$ (where $C$ is a constant). Select a constant fraction of vertices at random. Then the probability that the resulting subgraph does not cover any edge of the matching is negligible in $k$. [IKOS07]

This means that if we were to choose the set $\Lambda$ at random after the graph is defined, Case 2 will happen only with negligible probability. This is because the challenge $\Lambda$ will select at least one inconsistent pair of views (making the receiver abort). Instead in our protocol, $\Lambda$ is committed by the receiver before the graph $G$ is fixed by the committer. Hence, we will now rely on the hiding of the commitment to $\Lambda$ and (weak) extractability of the commitments to views. Consider the following experiment.

An external challenger gives a commitment to $\Lambda$ consisting of $\lambda$ random indices in $[k]$. We will construct an adversary $A$ which guesses “non-trivial and hard to guess” information about $\Lambda$ with non-negligible probability thus contradicting the hiding property of the commitment to $\Lambda$.

The adversary $A$ works as follows. It receives the commitment to $\Lambda$ and simply forwards it to $M$. Now $A$ receives from $M$ the commitments to the $k$ views using $\text{WECS}$. Next, $A$ will rewind (multiple times) $M$ and extract at least $k - \log^2 k$ views (by simply choosing a random $k$-bit challenge string each time $M$ is rewound). We now prove that this can be done in polynomial time. The proof relies on the specific construction of weakly extractable commitment scheme shown in Section 2.

Claim 3 If $M$ completes successfully the commitment phase with non-negligible probability, then the extraction of the views fails for at most $\log^2 k$ commitments.

Proof. The fact that $M$ completes successfully the commitment phase implies that, for some polynomial $p$, $M$ answers correctly (i.e., without aborting) to a $1/p(k)$ fraction of the $k$-bit challenge used in the second round of the commitments of the $k$ views through $\text{WECS}$. Assume there are $\log^2 k$ commitments that are completed with probability at most $1/(p(k)k)$ (taken over the entire challenge space). Note that any random challenge selects at least one of them except with negligible probability. Thus, with probability $1/p(k) - \epsilon(k)$, for a negligible function $\epsilon$, $M$ opens one of these shares. However by union bound, this probability can be at most $(\log^2 k)/(p(k)k)$. This is a contradiction. Therefore there exists at least $k - \log^2 k$ commitments that are opened with probability at least $1/p(k)k$, and thus they can all be extracted in polynomial time.

Thus, observe that $A$ has now extracted a subgraph of $G$ consisting of at least $k - \log^2 k$ vertices (corresponding to the views it could extract). Since we are in Case 2, even this subgraph must have a matching of size at least $\lambda/2c - \log^2 k$ (this is because $G$ is guaranteed to have a matching of size at least $\lambda/2c$).

The adversary $A$ simply outputs the indices of the vertices of each edge from this matching and halts. If Case 2 happens with non-negligible probability (i.e., there is no fully consistent set of size greater than $k - \lambda/c$ and still $M$ manages to successfully finish the commitment stage), we have that with non-negligible probability, $A$ outputs a matching of size at least $\lambda/2c - \log^2 k$ such that the challenge $\Lambda$ does not cover any edge in this matching (this follows from the fact when $M$ is successful, all pairs of views with indexes in $\Lambda$ are consistent). If this happens, we say that $A$ is successful.

By Claim 2, this should happen only with negligible probability if $\Lambda$ was chosen at random after the graph $G$ was defined. However now since we are taking the commitment to $\Lambda$ from an external challenger, we can simply rely on the semantic security of the commitment scheme. Even if the external challenger gives a commitment to an all zero string (instead of $\Lambda$), $A$ will still be successful with non-negligible probability. However this is a contradiction.

The extractor $E$. Let $\ell = \ell(k) = k \cdot \text{tag}$ and $\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{\ell}(k) = k \cdot \tilde{\text{tag}}$. Given the view of $M$ in the real experiment as input, $E$ first honestly simulates the view, by replaying the same messages; we refer to this part of the execution as the “main thread” and denote it by $MT$. If the adversary $M$ aborts before the main thread is completed, $E$ simply outputs $\bot$ and halts (similar to [Goy11], if the parties $C$ or $R$
terminate the protocol before it was finished due to an obvious cheating by \( M \), we consider the behavior of \( M \) as an abort). Otherwise, \( E \) rewinds \( M \) up to \( \frac{k\tilde{t}(k)}{r(k)^{3}} \) times. For \( j \in \left[ \frac{k\tilde{t}(k)}{r(k)^{3}} \right] \), do as follows.

- \( E \) rewinds the right interaction to the beginning of the Step 1.4 of the protocol. It sends to \( M \) a new random challenge \( \tilde{c}h[j] \in \{0,1\}^{\ell} \) in the right interaction and receives from \( M \) a challenge \( ch[j] \in \{0,1\}^{\ell} \) in the left interaction.
- Since \( E \) is not allowed to rewind the committer \( C \) to make additional queries, it has to prepare the simulated response to the challenge \( ch[j] \) on its own. Notice that the challenge \( ch[j] \) induces a selection of \( \ell \) secrets on the left, and there are \( \ell \) secret values \( \{\alpha_{i}^{ch_{i}} \}_{i \in [\ell]} \) on the left already “recovered” in the main thread (i.e., they were asked by \( M \) and given by \( C \) in the main thread). Therefore, \( E \) should respond to \( M \) the same value if the same \( \alpha_{i}^{ch_{i}} \) appears in this recovered set. Otherwise, \( E \) simply chooses a random string and uses that string as the response to \( M \).
- \( E \) receives the response corresponding to \( \tilde{c}h[j] \) from \( M \) in the right interaction. \( E \) checks if there exists an index \( i \) such that one of \( (\tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{0}, \tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{1}) \) was received during the main thread while the other was received as part of the current response in rewinding \( j \). If so, \( E \) further computes the hash values of \( (\tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{0}, \tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{1}) \) using the same function \( \tilde{h} \) sent in the main thread and compares these new hash values with all the value it got in the main thread. If they match, \( E \) outputs \( \text{Ext}(\tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{0}; s) \) and \( \text{Ext}(\tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{1}; s) \), and then recovers and outputs the committed value \( \tilde{\sigma} \) from \( B_{i} \). Otherwise, \( E \) goes to the beginning of this loop.

If \( E \) did not success in outputting the value \( \tilde{\sigma} \) after \( \frac{k\tilde{t}(k)}{r(k)^{3}} \) rewinding (e.g., due to \( M \) aborting or not revealing the correct values associated with the commitments), it aborts and outputs \( \text{Ext,Fail} \). Notice that since \( r(k) \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(k)} \), it is clear that \( E \) runs in probabilistic polynomial time. Rest of the proof will have two part: (a) we will analyze the probability with which the string \( \tilde{\sigma} \) output by the extractor does not correspond to the committed string (conditioned on the event \( E \) does not abort), and, (b) we will analyze the probability with which \( E \) aborts and outputs \( \text{Ext,Fail} \) in the rest of the proof.

**Lemma 2** The probability with which the string \( \tilde{\sigma} \) output by the extractor does not correspond to the committed string (conditioned on the event \( E \) does not abort) is negligible.

**Proof.** In this proof, we will make use of the pairwise independence property of the hash function \( h \). In particular, we will rely on the fact that if during rewinding, the extractors extracts a value \( \tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{1} \) which is different from what was committed to, w.h.p., it will hash to a different value than the one appearing in the main thread.

Recall that the extractor runs as honest receiver (in the main thread), gets \( \tilde{\ell} \) secret values \( \{\alpha_{i}^{ch_{i}} \}_{i \in [\tilde{\ell}]} \) first, and then performs the extraction procedure to get other secret values \( \{\tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{ch_{i}} \}_{i \in [\tilde{\ell}]} \) such that at least one of the hash values of these secrets (i.e., \( \{h(\tilde{\alpha}_{i}^{ch_{i}}) \}_{i \in [\tilde{\ell}]} \) was already received when playing as honest receiver. Now, suppose that the honest receiver gets some \( \alpha_{i}^{0} \) first (in the main thread). Also, it received \( u = h(\alpha_{i}^{1}) \) in the main thread. Now say during rewinding, the extractor receives another value \( \alpha_{i}^{1} \neq \alpha_{i}^{1} \). Observe that at the point the extractor receives this value from the adversary, the adversary still has not received the function \( h \) from \( E \). This implies that by the pairwise independence of \( h \), probability that \( h(\alpha_{i}^{1}) = h(\alpha_{i}^{1}) \) is negligible. Hence, it follows that except with negligible probability, \( \alpha_{i}^{1} = \alpha_{i}^{1} \). However this means that the extractor has extracted the correct value \( \tilde{\sigma} \).

**Lemma 3** The probability that the extractor \( E \) aborts is bounded by \( r(k) \) for large enough \( k \).

**Proof.** We will closely follow the definition and proof technique used in [Goy11]. First, we call a main thread “bad” if the probability (over the randomness used in the rewinds) of \( E \) outputting \( \text{Ext,Fail} \) is noticeable. Then we divide these “bad” main threads into three different categories, where each of them satisfy a different property. We also define the prefix of a given main thread as the transcript of the left and the right interaction up to Step 1.3. For a fixed prefix, we denote by \( p \) the probability (over the
randomness used by $C$ and $R$ after Step 1.3) that $M$ completes the main thread without aborting, and let $q$ be the probability that $E$ succeeds in extracting in a single rewinding using a simulated response.

Next, we recall the notion of a fraction of main threads. If the fraction of main threads with a particular property is $f$, it means that the probability (over the randomness of the entire experiment) that $E$ receives a completed main thread with that property is $f$. We choose three arbitrary constants $C_1, C_2, C_3$ such that $\frac{1}{C_1} + \frac{1}{C_2} + \frac{1}{C_3} \leq \frac{3}{4}$. Note that though these constants could in fact be the same and arbitrarily big, we will use three distinct constants to make the connections between the different parts of proof more clear.

**Lemma 4** The fraction of main threads for which $p < \frac{r(k)}{C_1}$ is bounded by $\frac{r(k)}{C_1}$. We call these threads as **MT of type bad1**.

**Proof.** Note that $E$ never aborts and outputs Ext.Fail if a main thread was not completed. Therefore,

$$\Pr[\text{MT is of type bad1}] \leq \Pr[\text{MT has a prefix with } p < \frac{r(k)}{C_1}] \cdot \Pr[\text{MT is completed } | p < \frac{r(k)}{C_1}] \leq 1 \cdot \frac{r(k)}{C_1}.$$

Next, given a main thread, we define the **dependent set of secrets $S$** in the right interaction as follows. Recall that the committer $C$ will choose $\ell$ pairs of secrets $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ which will later be used with Ext to “encrypt” the value $\sigma$. Notice that these secret values were shared among $k$ players implementing the $\textbf{Share}$ functionality of a VSS scheme (and hence, being committed in views $\{V_i^1\}_{i \in [k]}$), and the challenge $ch[j]$ in fact induces a selection to recover $\ell$ of such secret values on the left. These $\ell$ values are in the “recovered” set of secrets, since they were revealed by the committer in the main thread and hence known by the extractor. Intuitively, the secrets in the set $S$ are the secrets that were added by mauling one (or more) of the “unrecovered” secrets that are hidden in committed views in the left interaction. Hence, to correctly reveal the views which are consistent with the secrets in $S$ in the right interaction, $M$ has to get the correct value from the committed views $\{V_i^1\}_{i \in [k]}$ in the left interaction and use the underlying secrets to compute $\{\tilde{V}_i^1\}_{i \in [k]}$. Throughout the paper, we say the secret is “revealed correctly” by $M$, if there exist openings of the committed views which are consistent to this value.

**Definition 15 (Dependent Set of Secrets)** Let $ch$ be the challenge from $M$ in the left interaction in the main thread. The probabilities below are taken over the randomness of the experiment after the prefix completion. We say $S$ is a dependent set of secrets of a main thread iff the following two conditions hold: for every secret $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ in $S$,

1. The probability that the secret $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ is selected by $R$ AND its value is revealed correctly by $M$ on the right is at least $\frac{r(k)}{3C_1}$ (for this prefix).

2. The probability that the secret $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ is selected by $R$ AND its value is revealed correctly by $M$ on the right is less than $\frac{r(k)}{2C_2\ell(k)}$ conditioned on the event that the challenge by $M$ in the left interaction is $ch$.

Observe that the first probability in the above definition is dependent only on what the prefix in the main thread is, while, the second one depends on the prefix as well as what the left challenge $ch$ appearing in the main thread is. Both these probabilities values are well defined for a given main thread.

**Lemma 5** Let $S$ be the dependent set of secrets of a main thread and $|S|$ denote the number of secrets in the set $S$. $|S| > \ell + \log^2 k$ for at most a $\frac{r(k)}{C_2} + \text{negl}(k)$ fraction of the main threads. Call these threads as **MT of type bad2**.
**Intuition.** Consider the following. Assume that the extractor had the power of sampling multiple transcripts with the same prefix and having the same left challenge. Then all except for at most $\ell + \log^2 k$ secrets on the right have a good probability of being revealed correct by $M$ (i.e., except in $\frac{r(k)}{C_2} + \negl(k)$ fraction of the main threads). Hence such an extractor will be successful except for $\frac{r(k)}{C_2} + \negl(k)$ fraction of the main threads. At a high level, this is because there is an exponential number of right challenges for each left challenge (on an average) and obtaining a correct response for any two such right challenges enables extraction.

**Proof.** For a given prefix, consider a set $S$ for a challenge $ch$ such that $|S| > \ell + \log^2 k$ and a random challenge $\tilde{ch}$ given by $R$ in the right interaction. We observe the following:

- The probability that the set of secrets selected by $\tilde{ch}$ and the set $S$ are disjoint is at most $\frac{1}{2^{\ell + \log^2 k}}$. More precisely, this probability is either 0 or $\frac{1}{2^{|S|}}$; it is 0 when a pair of secrets $(\tilde{a}_i^0, \tilde{a}_i^1)$ appear in $S$ and $\frac{1}{2^{|S|}}$ otherwise. This is because each secret in $S$ is selected independently with probability one half.

- Depending on the choice of the challenge $ch \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, there are at most $2^\ell$ possibilities for such a set $S$. Taking the union bound over all such sets, we get that the probability that the set of secrets selected by $\tilde{ch}$ is disjoint with any such set $S$ (with $|S| > \ell + \log^2 k$) is at most $\frac{2^\ell}{2^{\ell + \log^2 k}} = \negl(k)$.

- By the second condition of Definition 15, the probability that for some $\tilde{a}_i^b \in S$, $M$ revealed the correct value in the right interaction in the main thread is bounded by $\frac{r(k)}{C_2}$. This is by taking the union bound over all $\tilde{a}_i^b \in S$, given that $|S|$ cannot exceed $2\ell(k)$.

Therefore, we have the following:

$$\Pr[\text{MT is of type bad2}] \leq \Pr[\tilde{ch} \text{ does not select any secret in } S] + \Pr[\text{MT is completed } | \tilde{ch} \text{ selects a secret in } S] \leq \negl(k) + \Pr[\exists \tilde{a}_i^b \in S \text{ s.t. } M \text{ revealed the correct value of } \tilde{a}_i^b \text{ in MT}]$$

Hence, the fraction of main threads of type bad2 is bounded by $\frac{r(k)}{C_2} + \negl(k)$.

This lemma shows that there are at most $\ell + \log^2 k$ secret values on the right which are “dependent” on the left secrets whose value $E$ did not recover in the main thread. However the total number of secrets on the right is $2 \cdot \ell > 2(\ell + \log^2 k)$ (since $tag > tag$). Hence, there should exists at least one pair of secrets on the right such that $M$ can correctly reveal both the values (without asking for values unrecovered in the main thread). If that is the case, $E$ is successful in extracting the value $\sigma$ committed on the right without any “additional queries” on the left.

Continuing the intuition from Lemma 5. The primary hurdle in completing the proof is the following. Our ppt extractor will not have the power of sampling transcripts with “collision” (i.e., with the same left challenge). The extractor gets a different challenge from $M$ (compared to the main thread) while rewinding $M$ and provides a “simulated” response. We now need to analyze such an experiment. Intuitively, suppose there is a secret on the right which is revealed correctly with good probability in the “absence” of values from the unrecovered set of secrets (i.e., conditioned on the event when the left challenge is the same as the main thread). Then this means that the right secrets were not formed by “mauling” one of secrets in the unrecovered set. Hence even if a secret in the unrecovered set was given incorrectly, $M$ hopefully should still reveal that secret value correctly on the right. We first introduce the following definition and formally analyze this case.
Definition 16 (Strictly Dependent Set of Secrets) $G$ is the strictly dependent set of secrets for a main thread iff the following two conditions are satisfied. For every secret value $\tilde{\alpha}^b_i$ in $G$,

1. The probability that the secret $\tilde{\alpha}^b_i$ is selected by $R$ AND its value is revealed correctly by $M$ is at least $\frac{r(k)}{3C_1}$ (for this prefix). Notice that this condition is the same as in the definition of dependent set of commitments and refers to the real honest experiment with the given prefix.

2. The probability that the secret $\tilde{\alpha}^b_i$ is selected by $E$ in a rewinding AND its value is revealed correctly by $M$ on the right is less than $\frac{r(k)^3}{50r(k)^2C_1C_2C_3}$ (i.e., the probability in the experiment where $M$ gets random strings in places of left secret values unrecovered in the main thread).

Again, the first probability in the above definition is dependent only on what the prefix in the main thread is, while, the second one depends on the prefix as well as the left challenge $ch$ appearing in the main thread. We now prove the following lemma.

Lemma 6 Let $S$ and $G$ respectively be the dependent set and strictly dependent set of secrets of a main thread. Then $G \not\subseteq S$ for at most $\frac{r(k)}{C_3}$ fraction of the main threads. Call these threads as $MT$ of type $bad3$.

Proof. Assume, towards contradiction, that for at least a fraction $\frac{r(k)}{C_3}$ of the main threads, there exists a secret value $\tilde{\alpha}^b_i$ in $G$ but not in $S$. This means the following three conditions hold for these main threads (where the probabilities are taken over the randomness of the experiment after the prefix completion).

1. Consider the condition of a secret not being in $S$. This means that the second condition of being in $S$ is not satisfied (since the first condition is the same as that in $G$). Conditioned on the event that $M$ does not ask any of the values from the unrecovered set of secrets (i.e., its challenge on the left is $ch$ w.r.t. which $S$ and $G$ are defined), $M$ reveals the correct value of $\tilde{\alpha}^b_i$ on the right with “large” probability (i.e., at least $\frac{r(k)}{2C_2\ell(k)}$).

2. Consider the first condition of being in $G$. If the secret values in the unrecovered set are given correctly on the left, $M$ reveals the correct value of $\tilde{\alpha}^b_i$ on the right with “large” probability (i.e., at least $\frac{r(k)}{3C_1}$).

3. Consider the second condition of being in $G$. That is, if the secret values in the unrecovered set are given randomly on the left (i.e., the response is simulated), $M$ reveals the correct value of $\tilde{\alpha}^b_i$ on the right with “small” probability (i.e., less than $\frac{r(k)^3}{50r(k)^2C_1C_2C_3}$).

We now construct an adversary $A$ to show that the above conditions violate the (computational) hiding property of the commitment scheme $W\text{ExCS}$. Consider the following experiment between the adversary $A$ and an external challenger $Chal$.

1. $A$ starts the execution of $M$ and gives it honestly the messages in the right session. The messages received from $M$ in the left session are forwarded to $Chal$ and its reply is forwarded to $A$ until the protocol is completed till Step 1.5 (on both left and right interactions).

2. Now $Chal$ provides to $A$ a total of $M = \frac{255r(k)^2C_1C_2C_3}{r(k)^3}$ candidate tuples for the values in the unrecovered set of secrets on the left. Exactly one of the candidate tuples has correct values for all the secrets in the unrecovered set. All the values in the rest of the candidate tuples are generated by $Chal$ randomly. The goal of $A$ would be to guess which of the $M$ tuples is the correct one. $A$ is not allowed any further interaction with $Chal$ (including running the protocol beyond step 1).

3. $A$ now rewinds $M$ exactly $M$ times. In the $i$-th rewind, $M$ gives a challenge $ch[i]$ on the left (if it aborts at any point, we move on the next rewinding). To construct the response, for the secrets in the unrecovered set picked by $ch[i], A$ uses the values in the $i$-th candidate tuple. Observe that for exactly one rewind, the response given by $A$ would be correct and in all other cases, it would be the simulated response as given by the extractor $E$ when it rewinds.
4. $A$ proceeds as follows. It selects a secret $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ from the right interaction as a guess for a secret in $G - S$ (if one exists).

5. Now we consider the case where the following happens. In the main thread, the secret $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ was selected and received by $A$. There is exactly one rewind (say index $\text{ind}$), such that the secret $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ was selected by $A$ AND a value $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b[\text{ind}] = \tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ was received (i.e., the values seen in the main thread and this rewind match). If that is the case, $A$ outputs the index $\text{ind}$ to $\text{Chal}$ as its guess for the correct value tuple. In all other cases, $A$ aborts and outputs ⊥.

We now analyze the success probability of $A$. Let $E$ denote the event that main thread is of type bad3, we define the following events:

- $E_1$: $(E \land \tilde{\alpha}_i^b \in (G - S))$.
- $E_2$: $(E_1 \land \text{correct value } \tilde{\alpha}_i^b \text{ appears in the main thread})$.
- $E_3$: $(E_1 \land \text{correct value } \tilde{\alpha}_i^b \text{ appears in the rewind with correct response})$.
- $E_4$: $(E_1 \land \text{correct value } \tilde{\alpha}_i^b \text{ does not appear in any rewind with simulated response})$.

Then we have

$$\Pr[A \text{ outputs the correct guess}] \geq \Pr[E] \cdot \Pr[E_1 | E] \cdot \Pr[E_2 | E_1] \cdot \Pr[E_3 | E_1] \cdot \Pr[E_4 | E_1].$$

Note that the last three probability terms are results of experiments run with independent random coins and hence are independent.

$$\Pr[A \text{ outputs the correct guess}] \geq \frac{r(k)}{C_3} \cdot \frac{1}{2\ell(k)} \cdot \frac{r(k)}{2C_2\ell(k)} \cdot \frac{r(k)}{3C_1} \cdot \frac{1}{2}$$

Also note that the expected number of times correct value $\tilde{\alpha}_i^b$ appears in simulated responses is

$$\frac{r(k)^3}{50\ell(k)^2C_1C_2C_3} \cdot \left( \frac{25\ell(k)^2C_1C_2C_3}{r(k)^4} - 1 \right) < \frac{1}{2},$$

hence at least with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, there are 0 such appearances.

$$\Pr[A \text{ outputs the correct guess}] \geq \frac{r(k)^3}{24\ell(k)^2C_1C_2C_3}$$

(1)

Claim 4 In the above experiment, assuming the commitment scheme $\text{com}$ is computationally hiding, the probability of any PPT $A$ outputting the correct guess is bounded by $\frac{r(k)^3}{25\ell(k)^2C_1C_2C_3} + \text{negl}(k)$.

Here we provide a sketch of the proof. This claim relies on a hybrid argument\(^\dagger\). In the $i$-th hybrid experiment, in the chosen tuple (out of $M$ tuples) $\text{Chal}$ keeps the values for the first $i$ unrecovered secrets to be random and the rest correct. In the $\ell(k)$-th hybrid, clearly the probability of $A$ winning is exactly $\frac{1}{M}$ since the chosen tuple distribution is identical to the rest. Hence, there should exists a hybrid $i$ in which the probability of $A$ winning changes by a noticeable amount from the last hybrid. Then it can be shown that the hiding property of the commitment scheme $\text{WExCom}$ can be broken with a noticeable advantage.

The above claim is in contradiction to the equation (1). Thus concludes the proof of Lemma 6.

\(^\dagger\)Since $\text{Chal}$ provides just the committed values and not any opening to the commitments, there are no issues related to “selective opening attacks” (see [BHY09] and the reference therein).
Concluding the Analysis. We now conclude the proof of Lemma 3. Very roughly, we have already established that there are only a “small” number of secrets on the right (i.e., secrets in set G) which go from being correct with “large” probability (given a correct response on the left) to being correct only with “small” probability (given a simulated response on the left). Thus, there are sufficiently large number of secrets on the right such that given a simulated response, they are revealed correctly by \( M \) (thus implying success for the extractor \( E \)). In more detail, for the prefix of the given main thread, let \( p \) denote the probability that \( M \) completes the main thread (i.e., the real experiment) without aborting (i.e., the probability is taken over the random coins after step 1.(c)). For the given main thread, let \( q \) denote the probability of \( E \) succeeding in extracting in a rewinding using a simulated response. Since \( E \) rewraps \( M \) at most \( \frac{k\ell(k)}{r(k)^3} \) times,

\[
Pr[\mathcal{E} \text{ aborts}] \leq p \cdot (1 - q)^{\frac{k\ell(k)}{r(k)^3}}
\]

We note that the exact equality may not be satisfied because \( M \) may abort even before prefix completion. Now this value is noticeable only if \( q = o\left(\frac{r(k)^3}{\ell(k)}\right) \), or, in other words, \( q < \frac{r(k)^3}{50\ell(k)}C_1C_2C_3 \). On the other hand,

\[
Pr[\mathcal{E} \text{ aborts}] \leq Pr[\text{MT is of type bad1 or bad2 or bad3}] + Pr[\mathcal{E} \text{ aborts } | \text{MT is neither of these 3 types}]
\]

To compute the second term, we first compute \( p \) for the main thread. Note that the main thread being not of type bad2 or bad3 implies that \( |G| \leq \ell + \log^2 k \) (since \( |S| \leq \ell + \log^2 k \) and \( G \subseteq S \)). Also, since the main thread is not of type bad1, there are at most \( O(\log k) \) secrets in the right interaction for which the probability of getting asked on the right (which happens with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \)) AND revealed correctly by \( M \) is less than \( \frac{r(k)}{\ell k} \) (otherwise, it is easy to show that \( p < \frac{r(k)}{C_1} \)). Or in other words, there are at least \( 2\ell - \log^2 k \) secret values on the right with probability of getting asked and revealed correctly is at least \( \frac{r(k)}{3\ell k} \). Out of these, at most \( \ell + \log^2 k \) are in \( G \). Hence, (for large enough \( k \)) there are at least \( \ell + 1 \) secret values (i.e., in other words at least one pair of secrets on the right) such that the probability that such a secret is selected by \( E \) in a rewinding and \( M \) reveals the correct value is at least \( \frac{r(k)^3}{50\ell(k)}C_1C_2C_3 \). This means for such a main thread, \( q \geq \frac{r(k)^3}{50\ell(k)}C_1C_2C_3 \). Thus, we complete the proof by having

\[
Pr[\mathcal{E} \text{ aborts}] \leq \frac{r(k)}{C_1} + \frac{r(k)}{C_2} + \frac{r(k)}{C_3} + \text{negl}(k) \\
\leq \frac{3}{4} r(k) + \text{negl}(k).
\]

This concludes the proof of Theorem 6. \( \square \)

### 3.2 Getting Full-Fledged Non-Malleable Commitments for Small Tags

We now extend the above construction to get constant round many-many non-malleable commitments (for small tags). The basic construction in the previous section can be extended with only an additive constant increase in the round complexity. Furthermore, the extended scheme is still based only on a black-box use of one-way functions.

**Getting non-malleable commitments for small tags:** We construct a non-malleable commitment scheme for small tags (i.e., \( \text{tag} \in [2n] \)) against a synchronizing adversary. This can be done very similar to the construction by Goyal (which is based on ideas from Pass and Rosen [PR05a, PR08b]). Denote by \( \ell[a] \) the value \( k \cdot \text{tag} \) and by \( \ell[b] \) the value \( k \cdot (2n - \text{tag}) \). The idea is to have two slots (each representing a rewinding opportunity) such that for exactly one of these slots, the “tag being used on the right” is larger than the one on the left. The extractor will now rewind this slot and extract the value \( v \). To prove many-many security of the above scheme, we first prove one-many security by simply applying the
extractor $E$ one by one on all sessions on the right and then resort to a general result of Lin et al. [LPV08] (as in Goyal’s construction).

**Security against Non-Synchronizing Adversaries:** Similar to Goyal’s construction, briefly, the basic idea to get security against non-synchronizing adversaries is to rely on the techniques of robust non-malleability due to Lin and Pass [LP09]. We increase the number of rewinding opportunities such that the primary and the secondary slot become robust w.r.t. the proof of consistency. We are able to achieve this by only relying on one-way functions in a black-box way.

### 3.2.1 Non-Malleable Commitments for Small Tags

We first present a non-malleable commitment scheme for small tags against synchronizing adversaries, therefore removing from the previous construction the “one-sided” limitation. This can be achieved in a way very similar to Goyal [Goy11]. Let $\tag \in [2n]$, $\ell = k \cdot \tag$, $\ell' = k \cdot (2n - \tag)$ and $\lambda = \lfloor k/4 \rfloor$. Intuitively, the new protocol will sequentially execute two slots such that for exactly one of them, the “tag being used on the right” is larger than the one used on the left. Then the extractor will now rewind the slot that has a larger tag on the right and extract the committed string $\sigma$.

#### Commitment Phase.

0. **Initial setup.** $R$ picks $\lambda$ distinct players at random (i.e., randomly selects $\lambda$ distinct indices $\Lambda = \{r_1, \ldots, r_\lambda\}$ where $r_i \in [k]$ for any $i \in [\lambda]$). For each $r_i$, $R$ sends an extractable commitment $c_i$ of $r_i$ using ExCS.

1. **Primary slots.** Let $\Pi_{VSS_{share}}$ be a protocol implementing the Share phase of a $(k+1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme. We require the VSS protocol to have a deterministic reconstruction phase.

   1.1. Given the string $\sigma$ to commit, $C$ generates a $k$-bit random string $s$, $\ell$ pairs of random strings $\{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ and $\ell'$ pairs of random strings $\{\alpha_i'^0, \alpha_i'^1\}_{i \in [\ell']}$ of length $4k$ each.

   1.2. $C$ sets the input of $P_{k+1}$ (i.e., the Dealer) to the concatenation of $\sigma, s, \{\alpha_i^0, \alpha_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$, and $\{\alpha_i'^0, \alpha_i'^1\}_{i \in [\ell']}$ while each other player has no input. Then $C$ runs $\Pi_{VSS_{share}}$ and each player $P_i$ obtains shares $w_i$, for any $i \in [k]$.

   1.3. Let $\text{view}^1_1, \ldots, \text{view}^{k+1}_1$ be the views of the $k+1$ players describing the execution of $\Pi_{VSS_{share}}$. $C$ uses $\text{WExCS}$ to send a commitment $V_i^1$ of $\text{view}^1_i$ to $R$, in parallel for any $i \in [k]$.

   1.4. $R$ sends a random $\ell$-bit challenge string $ch = (ch_1, \ldots, ch_\ell)$.

   1.5. $C$ sends $\{\alpha_i^{ch_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ to $R$.

   1.6. $R$ sends a random $\ell'$-bit challenge string $ch' = (ch'_1, \ldots, ch'_{\ell'})$.

   1.7. $C$ sends $\{\alpha_i^{ch'_i}\}_{i \in [\ell']} to $R$.

2. **Verification message.** Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a family of pairwise-independent hash functions with domain $\{0,1\}^{4k}$ and range $\{0,1\}^k$, and $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^{4k} \times \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^k$ be a strong randomness $(3k, 2^{-k})$-extractor.

   2.1. $R$ picks a function $h$ at random from $\mathcal{H}$ and sends it to $C$.

   2.2. $C$ sends to $R$ $s, \{h(\alpha_0^0, h(\alpha_1^0), B_i = \sigma \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^0, s) \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^1, s)\}_{i \in [\ell]},$ and $\{h(\alpha_{i}'^0), h(\alpha_{i}'^1), B_i' = \sigma \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_{i}'^0, s') \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_{i}'^1, s')\}_{i \in [\ell']}$.

3. **Consistency proof.**

   3.1. Let $\Pi_{ch_{ch'}}$ be a $(k, \lambda)$-statistically secure MPC protocol such that given $ch, ch'$ as public input and $w_i$ as private input of $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$, at the end of the computation $\{\alpha_i^{ch_i}\}_{i \in [\ell]} \{\alpha_i^{ch'_i}\}_{i \in [\ell']}$ are received in output by $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$.

   $C$ runs internally $\Pi_{ch_{ch'}}$ and sends a commitment $V_i^2$ of the view $\text{view}^2_i$ of $P_i$ when executing $\Pi_{ch_{ch'}}$ using $\text{WExCS}$ in parallel for any $i \in [k]$ to $R$.  

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3.2. Let $\Pi_h$ be a $(k, \lambda)$-statistically secure MPC protocol such that given $h$ as public input and $w_i$ as private input of $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$, at the end of the computation $(s, \{h(\alpha_i^0), h(\alpha_i^1)\}_{i \in [\ell]}, \{B_i = \sigma \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^0, s) \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^1, s)\}_{i \in [\ell]}, \{h(\alpha_i^0), h(\alpha_i^1)\}_{i \in [\ell]}, \{B'_i = \sigma \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^0, s) \oplus \text{Ext}(\alpha_i^1, s)\}_{i \in [\ell]}$) is received in output by $P_i$ for any $i \in [k]$. $C$ runs internally $\Pi_h$ and sends to $R$ a commitment $V^3$ of the view $\text{view}^3_i$ of $P_i$ when executing $\Pi_h$ using $\text{WExCS}$ in parallel for any $i \in [k]$.  

3.3. $R$ decommits $\{c_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$. 

3.4. $C$ decommits $\{V^1_i, V^2_i, V^3_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ (i.e., the subset of views $\{\text{view}^1_i, \text{view}^2_i, \text{view}^3_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$). 

3.5. For $j = 1, 2, 3, R$ verifies that all pairs of views in $\{\text{view}^2_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ are consistent (according to Definition 12) and that the dealer $P_{k+1}$ has not been disqualified by any player, otherwise $R$ aborts; moreover for $j = 1, 2$ and $i = 1, \ldots, \lambda$, $R$ checks that $\text{view}^1_i$ is a prefix of $\text{view}^1_{i+1}$, otherwise $R$ aborts. 

**Decommitment Phase.**
1. $C$ decommits $\{V^1_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ as $\{\text{view}^1_i\}_{i \in [k]}$. 
2. $R$ checks that all commitments are opened correctly in the previous step and sets a revealed valued to $0^k$ otherwise. 
3. Let $\Pi_{VSSrecon}$ be a protocol implementing the Recon phase corresponding to the $(k+1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS Share phase (which includes the string $\sigma$) used in the commitment phase. $R$ runs $\Pi_{VSSrecon}$ using $\text{view}^1_1, \ldots, \text{view}^1_{k+1}$ as inputs to reconstruct and output the first substring of the value that the majority of the players would output in the reconstruction. If there is no majority, then output $\bot$.  

**Theorem 7** The commitment scheme $\text{NMCS}_S$ is a constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme with short tags secure against synchronized adversaries and with black-box use only of one-way functions.  

**Proof.** The security proof of the protocol $\text{NMCS}_S$ is essentially identical to that of our basic protocol $\text{NMCS}$. 

Indeed Lemma 1 will still hold and thus the very same $k$-bit string is used twice by any PPT sender, including $M$. Therefore during the proof of non-malleability it will be sufficient to extract that $k$-bit string from any of the two slots (i.e., Steps 1.4-1.5 and Steps 1.6-1.7). Notice that $M$ is a synchronizing adversary, $\ell = k \cdot \text{tag}$ and $\ell' = k \cdot (2n - \text{tag})$. Assuming $\text{tag} \neq \text{tag}$, we only need to consider exactly one of the following two cases: 

- $\ell < \ell'$. The proof of this case is the same as the “one-side” protocol. The extractor $E$ simply performs its rewinding on Step 1.4 by giving simulated responses for the challenges of $M$ on the left in Step 1.5. 

- $\ell' < \ell'$. In this case $E$ will rewind to Step 1.6 by giving simulated responses for the challenges of $M$ on the left in Step 1.7. 

In both cases, the proof of security (and in particular the proof of all of our 3 key lemmas bounding the fraction of bad main threads) remains essentially identical (similar to Goyal [Goy11]). 

**Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments for Small Tags.** To prove that the above construction is also a many-many (or concurrent) non-malleable commitment scheme for small tags, we first focus on showing one-many security. That is, we consider only a left execution with tag $\text{tag}$ and several right executions with tags $\text{tag}_1, \ldots, \text{tag}_m$. The interesting case is when $\text{tag}_i \neq \text{tag}$ for all $i \in [m]$. The idea is to simply apply the extractor $E$ one by one for all $m$ sessions (as in the construction of Goyal [Goy11]). In more detail, for each session $i \in [m]$, do the following: 

- Let $M_i$ be a machine that “emulates” all the right sessions on its own except session $i$. 

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• $M_i$ exposes the $i$-th session to an outside receiver $R_i$.

• Given the left view and the right view of the $i$-th session in the main thread as inputs, run the extractor $E$ on the machine $M_i$.

The probability that the extractor fails can be computed by a union bound over the $m$ right sessions (and can be made smaller than $\frac{1}{\text{poly}(k)}$ for any polynomial function $\text{poly}(k)$ as in the previous section). By using a result proved in [LPV08], that shows that any one-left many-right non-malleable commitment is also a many-left many-right non-malleable commitment, we obtain the following lemma.

**Lemma 7** There exists a many-many non-malleable commitment scheme for tags of length $\log(n) + 1$ that is secure against synchronizing adversaries and only makes a black-box use of a one-way function.

### 3.2.2 Security Against Non-Synchronizing Adversaries

Based on the commitment scheme that is secure against synchronizing adversaries, some well known techniques can be applied to extend the basic scheme to obtain one that is even secure against a non-synchronizing adversary. For example, the constructions in [Wee10] and [Goy11] can be used to transform any non-malleable commitment scheme that is secure against synchronizing adversaries into one that is secure against arbitrary scheduling strategies. We now show how to apply a similar transformation to the commitment scheme $\text{NMCS}_S$ to obtain a constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme with black-box use of any one-way function and with security against non-synchronizing adversaries.

The intuition behind the transformation is similar to the one in Goyal’s construction [Goy11]. Consider a non-synchronizing adversary $M$. In this case, the proof already given for synchronizing adversaries does not go through when $M$ asks for the execution of Step 2 in the left interaction before finishing the primary slot in the right interaction. This is because if $M$ asks for Step 2 during rewinding, our extractor will not be able to answer queries consistently with the messages played in the primary slots. Therefore, by applying the similar ideas from [LP09], we will add additional “secondary slots” to make our proof of security go through. More specifically, each of these additional slots will provide an extra rewinding opportunity. If $M$ asks for Step 2 on the left before finishing Step 1 on the right (in the main thread), it will be possible to exploit these additional rewinding opportunities on the right (such that $M$ does not ask for messages in the left interaction while $E$ is rewinding such slots).

Assuming that Step 4 (i.e., consistency proof) in the protocol below requires $c_v$ messages sent out by the committer, the modified protocol $\text{NS-NMCS}_S$ proceeds as follows.

**Commitment Phase.**

0. **Initial setup.** Identical to protocol $\text{NMCS}_S$.

1. **Primary slots.** Identical to protocol $\text{NMCS}_S$.

2. **Secondary slots.**

   For all $j \in [c_v + 1]$, $C$ sequentially do as follows.

   2.j. $C$ uses $\text{WExCS}$ to send a commitment $W^i_j$ of $\text{view}^1_i$ to $R_i$, in parallel for any $i \in [k]$.

3. **Verification message.** Identical to protocol $\text{NMCS}_S$.

4. **Consistency proof.**

   4.1. Identical to Step 3.1 of $\text{NMCS}_S$.
   4.2. Identical to Step 3.2 of $\text{NMCS}_S$.
   4.3. Identical to Step 3.3 of $\text{NMCS}_S$. 
4.4. Identical to Step 3.4 of NMCS$_S$.

4.5. $\mathcal{C}$ decommits $\{W^j_i\}_{i \in \lambda, j \in [c_v + 1]}$.

4.5. For $j = 1, 2, 3$, $\mathcal{R}$ verifies that all pairs of views in $\{\text{view}^j_i\}_{i \in \lambda}$ are consistent (according to Definition 12) and that the dealer $P_{k+1}$ has not been disqualified by any player, otherwise $\mathcal{R}$ aborts; moreover for $j = 1, 2$ and $i = 1, \ldots, \lambda$, $\mathcal{R}$ checks that $\text{view}^j_i$ is a prefix of $\text{view}^{j+1}_i$, otherwise $\mathcal{R}$ aborts. Finally $\mathcal{R}$ verifies that decommitment of $V^1_i$ is equal to the decommitment of $W^j_i$, for $i \in \lambda$ and $j \in [c_v + 1]$.

**Decommitment Phase.** Identical to protocol NMCS$_S$. Also notice that $\mathcal{R}$ does not need to check decommitment of views committed in Step 2. We first prove the following lemma.

**Lemma 8** Except with negligible probability, $\mathcal{M}$ is successful in the commitment phase only if in all (i.e., both primary and secondary) slots the committed string (i.e., the one that would be reconstructed from the committed views) is the same.

**Proof.** If different strings are committed in different slots, we have that at least $1/4$ of the views committed in one slot must be different with respect to the views committed in the other slot, otherwise the reconstructions of the strings from the views would generate the same output. The fact that $\mathcal{M}$ is successful, implies that all the indexes of those different views do not belong to $\Lambda$. The probability that this happens is negligible if $\Lambda$ is just a random challenge generated after the commitment of the views. However, since $\Lambda$ was previously committed, similarly to Lemma 1, here one can break the hiding property of the commitment of $\Lambda$ by relying on the weak extractability of the commitments of the views.

Now we claim the security of the new scheme.

**Theorem 8** The above scheme NS-NMCS$_S$ is a constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme with short tags secure against non-synchronized adversaries and with black-box use only of a one-way function.

**Proof.** We consider the following two different interleavings in the main thread.

- **Case 1:** The verification message (i.e., Step 3) in the left interaction is completed before the end of the primary slots (i.e., Step 1) in the right interaction. This is the case where the original proof fails, and secondary slots will be useful. Observe that when this case happens:
  - Since in each session, the verification message is played in the protocol after the secondary slots, all the secondary slots in the left interaction are executed (along with the verification message) before the primary slot finishes on the right.
  - Now consider the point where the primary slot in the right interaction finishes. There are at most $c_v$ messages remaining in the left interaction (i.e., message in the consistency proof step) and $c_v + 1$ secondary slots remaining in the right interaction.
  - Hence, by pigeon-hole principle, there exists at least one secondary slot in the right interaction such that during its execution, there are no message in the left interaction. Call this the secondary slot $j$.

Now the extractor $\mathcal{E}$ can rewind the secondary slot $j$ in the right interaction and extract the value $\sigma$ in the following way. First, it runs the extractor of $\text{WExCS}$. We have that $\mathcal{E}$ obtains a large portion of the views$^8$ that allows to run the reconstruction of the VSS scheme to output a value in $\{0, 1\}^n$.

$^8$Because of weak extractability there will be at most $\log^2 k$ non-extracted views.
or \(\perp\). By Lemma 8, we have that the reconstructed value from views committed in secondary slot \(j\) corresponds to the value committed in the primary slot, i.e., the committed value that will be considered in the opening.

If during rewinding, \(M\) changes the scheduling to ask for a message in the consistency proof step (as opposed to its strategy in the main thread), \(E\) simply rewinds and runs again the extractor of \(\text{ExCS}\) with a different randomness. Since \(c_v + 1\) is a constant, these additional rewinds do not harm the polynomial time of \(E\), so that given any \(r(k) = \frac{1}{\text{poly}(k)}\), one can construct an extractor which performs a strict polynomial number of rewinds and succeeds with probability at least \((1 - r(k))\).

- **Case 2: The verification message in the left interaction appears after the end of primary slots in the right interaction.** The proof for this case is similar to the one for synchronizing adversaries. The only difference is that the secondary slots in the left interaction might now appear before the primary slots in the right interaction finish. However during the rewinds, \(E\) does not have to provide the verification message or the consistency proof (if upon rewinding, \(M\) changes its scheduling to ask for such messages, \(E\) simply rewinds again). Hence during the rewinds, \(E\) can run the required secondary slots without any problem by simply committing to random views. Summing up, the hiding property of \(\text{WExCS}\) guarantees that the extraction goes through.

Similarly to before, to prove many-many security of the above scheme, we first prove one-many security by simply applying the extractor \(E\) one by one on all sessions on the right and then resort to a general result of Lin et al. \([LPV08]\). Therefore we obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 9** There exists a constant-round many-many non-malleable commitment scheme for tags of length \(\log(n) + 1\) which is secure against non-synchronizing adversaries and uses a one-way function in a black-box manner.

### 3.3 Black-Box Amplification with Non-Synchronizing Adversaries

Given a one-many non-malleable commitment scheme \(s_{NM} = (s_{Com}, s_{Rec})\) for tags of length \(\log(n) + 1\), we present a general and black-box transformation to obtain a one-many non-malleable commitment scheme for tags of length \(n\). Furthermore, our construction preserves the security property against non-synchronizing adversaries. If the commitment scheme \(s_{NM}\) given as input to the transformation is secure against non-synchronizing adversaries, the resulting protocol for tags of length \(n\) is secure against non-synchronizing adversaries as well. This transformation can be seen as a generalization of a previous transformation of \([Wee10]\).

The idea of our construction is similar in spirit to the technique used in \([DDN91]\) to obtain logarithmic round complexity. Each execution of the commitment scheme is associated to an \(n\)-bit tag \(Tag\). The committer \(C\) runs a \((k + 1, [k/4])\)-perfectly secure VSS scheme with deterministic reconstruction. That is, \(C\) shares the committed value \(\sigma\) and the randomness to the \(i\)-th player \(P_i\) for \(i \in [k]\). Then \(C\) commits to the views of \(n\) VSS shareholders using \(n\) times the scheme \(s_{Com}\) and \(n\) different short tags that are derived by \(Tag\).

The key idea is that by applying again the cut and choose techniques on the VSS computation, the adversary is essentially forced in committing to correct views almost in all commitments computed with \(s_{Com}\). Then, by noticing that in each commitment of the adversary there are always views of the VSS players that are committed with a tag that has not been used in the commitment received by the adversary, it holds that such views are independent (this comes from non-malleability). Therefore we will be able in the hybrid experiments to change the message committed in the left session while the adversary will still commit to the same message on the right sessions.

Another crucial idea is the fact that the above commitments of the views of the VSS computation must be repeated 3 times. The reason we need this extra technique is that during the hybrid games,
we will need to compute commitments of inconsistent views that however will not be detected by the adversary since we will extract first the indexes of the views that the adversary wants to see later. This extraction will require to rewind the adversary, and thus the need of 3 repetitions of the sub-commitment protocol comes from the need of having the guarantee that at least one of such sub-commitments is not disturbed by the above rewind.

Let $k$ be the security parameter and let $\lambda = \lfloor k/4 \rfloor$. Each execution of the commitment scheme is associated to an $n$-bit tag $Tag$. The committer $C$ runs a $(k + 1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme with deterministic reconstruction. That is, $C$ shares the committed value $\sigma$ and the randomness to the $i$-th player $P_i$ for $i \in [k]$. Then $C$ commits each of these shares $n$ times using $sCom$ (with shorter tags). Also, using the same idea in previous section, such a commitment is sequentially repeated 3 The modified protocol NS-NMCS = $(C, R)$ between a committer $C$ and a receiver $R$ proceeds as follows to commit to a string $\sigma$.

**Commitment Phase (tag $Tag$ is an $n$-bit string, and $C$’s input is a $k$-bit string $\sigma$).**

0. **Initial setup.**
   1. $R$ picks at random $\lambda$ distinct indices $\Lambda = \{r_1, \ldots, r_\lambda\}$ where $r_i \in [k]$ for any $i \in [\lambda]$. For all $r_i$ in parallel, $R$ sends an extractable commitment $c_i$ (of $r_i$) using ExCS.
   2. Let $\Pi_{VSSshare}$ be a protocol implementing the $Share$ phase of a $(k+1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme. We require the VSS protocol to have a deterministic reconstruction phase. Given the string $\sigma$ to commit, $C$ first sets the input of $P_{k+1}$ (i.e., the Dealer) to $\sigma$, while each other player has no input. Then $C$ runs $\Pi_{VSSshare}$. Let $view_i$ be the view of player $P_i$ for all $i \in [k]$.

1. **Primary slots.** Let $Tag_j$ be the $j$-th bit of $Tag$, and $tag_{ij}$ be the $(\log n + 1)$-bit string $(j, Tag_j)$ for $j \in [n]$. For $\ell = 1, 2, 3$ (sequentially) $C$ commits to $n$ copies of $view_i$ using as tag $tag_{ij}$ respectively. That is, $C$ invokes $sCom$ $kn$ times in parallel and sends $S^\ell_{i,j} = sCom(view_i, tag_{ij})$ for all $i \in [k]$ and for all $j \in [n]$. Therefore the commitments sent are $S^1_{i,j}, S^2_{i,j}, S^3_{i,j}$ for all $i \in [k]$ and for all $j \in [n]$.

3. **Consistency proof.**
   1. $R$ decommits $\{c_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.
   2. $C$ decommits $\{S^1_{i,j}, \ldots, S^3_{i,j}\}$ for all $i \in [\lambda]$ and for all $j \in [n]$.
   3. $R$ verifies that for all $i \in [\lambda]$, the $3n$ commitments $\{S^1_{i,j}, \ldots, S^3_{i,j}\}$ correspond to the same string for all $j \in [n]$. Moreover it verifies that all the opened views are consistent (according to Definition 12) and outputs $\bot$ otherwise.

**Decommitment Phase.**

1. $C$ decommits $\{S^1_{i,j}, \ldots, S^4_{i,j}\}$ for all $i \in [k]$ and for all $j \in [n]$.
2. $R$ checks that for all $i \in [k]$ and all $j \in [n]$ all commitments $\{S^1_{i,j}, \ldots, S^4_{i,j}\}$ have been decommitted correctly and sets a revealed view to $0^k$ otherwise.
3. Let $\Pi_{VSSrecon}$ be a protocol implementing the $Recon$ phase corresponding to the $(k+1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS $Share$ phase. $R$ runs $\Pi_{VSSrecon}$ using the shares included in $view_1, \ldots, view_k$ (i.e., the openings of $S_{1,1}^1, \ldots, S_{n,1}^k$) as inputs, and computes and outputs the value $\sigma' = \{0, 1\}^n$ that the majority of the players obtains in output during the computation. If there is no majority, then it considers the committer to have aborted and outputs $\bot$.

**Lemma 9** Except with negligible probability, $M$ is successful in the commitment phase only if in all $3n$ sub-commitments, the committed string (i.e., the one that would be reconstructed from the committed views) is the same.

**Proof.** The proof is very similar to the one of Lemma 8. If different strings are committed in different sub-commitments, we have that at least $1/4$ of the views committed in one sub-commitment must be different with respect to the views committed in the other sub-commitment, otherwise the reconstructions
of the strings from the views would generate the same output. The fact that \( \mathcal{M} \) is successful, implies that all the indexes of those different views do not belong to \( \Lambda \). The probability that this happens is negligible if \( \Lambda \) is just a random challenge generated after the commitment of the views. However, since \( \Lambda \) was previously committed, similarly to Lemma 1 here one can break the hiding property of the commitment of \( \Lambda \) by relying on the weak extractability of the commitments of the views.

**Theorem 10** Given a one-many non-malleable commitment scheme \( s_{NM} \) for tags of length \( \log(n) + 1 \) secure against non-synchronizing adversaries that only needs a black-box use of a one-way function, there exist a one-many (and hence many-many) non-malleable commitment scheme \( NS_{NMCS} \) for tags of length \( n \) that is secure against non-synchronizing adversaries, that only needs a black-box use of a one-way function and with only an additive constant increase in the round complexity.

**Proof.** We can prove the above theorem by considering the following sequence of experiments. In the following, let \( \text{dist}_\mathcal{M}(m) \) denote the random variable describing the output of the adversary in \( NS_{NMCS} \) when \( C \) commits \( m \), and let \( \text{dist}_i(m) \) (resp. \( \text{dist}_i^{(j)}(m) \)) denote the random variable describing the output of the adversary of \( NS_{NMCS} \) when \( S \) commits \( m \) in experiment \( \mathcal{H}_i \) (resp. \( \mathcal{H}_i^{(j)} \)). Then, we consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments.

**Experiment** \( \mathcal{H}_0 \). In this experiment, \( S \) honestly runs \( C \) and interacts with \( \mathcal{M} \). That is, in the left interaction, \( S \) honestly commits to the string \( m_0 \) to \( \mathcal{M} \), while in the right interactions it simply forwards the messages being sent out by \( \mathcal{M} \) to \( \mathcal{R} \) and vice versa. Clearly, \( \text{dist}_\mathcal{M}(m_0) \equiv \text{dist}_0(m_0) \).

**Experiment** \( \mathcal{H}_1 \). In this experiment, \( S \) executes the protocol identically to \( \mathcal{H}_0 \) except that it also runs the extractor of \( \text{ExCS} \) to retrieve all the indices \( r_i \) selected by \( \mathcal{M} \), and it aborts if the extraction fails. After getting \( r_i \) for all \( i \in [\lambda] \), \( S \) executes the rest of the protocol as in \( \mathcal{H}_0 \). Since the only difference in the view of \( \mathcal{H}_0 \) and \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) consists in the aborts performed when the extraction fails, by the extractability of \( \text{ExCS} \) we have that \( \text{dist}_0(m_0) \approx \text{dist}_1(m_0) \). (Notice that if \( \mathcal{M} \) completes the commitment phase in the left interaction with non-negligible probability, then the extractor of \( \text{ExCS} \) fails with negligible probability only.)

**Experiment** \( \mathcal{H}_2 \). In this experiment, \( S \) executes the protocol identically to \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) except that it changes the commitments that will not be opened (on the left) to commitments to random strings. For each of the 3 blocks of commitments (i.e., \( \{S_{ij}^\ell\}_{i \in [\lambda], j \in [n]} \) with \( \ell = 1, 2, 3 \)) on the right, consider the set of commitments to the views with a tag different from all the tags used on the left (call it special tag). We now distinguish 3 cases.

**Case 1:** The block in question finishes before the initial commitment to \( \Lambda \) finishes on the left. Until this point in the experiment, \( \mathcal{H}_1 \) and \( \mathcal{H}_2 \) are identical. Hence, the views committed to in that block on the right will have identical distribution as before. Hence, the set of commitments to the views with the different tag will have indistinguishable distribution.

**Case 2:** The block in question starts after the initial commitment to \( \Lambda \) finishes on the left. Hence, this block of commitments is not rewound at all when the indices \( r_i \) are retrieved (and in particular \( \mathcal{M} \) could be committing to an external receiver). Further, at least one set of commitments to the views is done with a tag different from all the tags on the left. Then, by the many-many non-malleability of \( s_{Com} \), this set of commitments to the views is unchanged: i.e., the set of views committed to is computationally indistinguishable from the one in the previous experiment.

**Case 3:** None of the above. This case can happen with only one of the 3 blocks.

Thus, note that in at least 2 out of 3 blocks, distribution of views (for special tag) is indistinguishable from \( \mathcal{H}_1 \).
Experiment $\mathcal{H}_3$. In this experiment, the simulator $S$ proceeds identically to $\mathcal{H}_2$ with the following exception. Run the Share phase of the underlying $(k + 1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme (in the head) assuming that the string to be shared is $m_1$. Then for every player $i \in \Lambda$, our simulator $S$ will commit the views being so generated (as opposed to being generated using the string $m_0$). The main idea is that since $\lambda$ is below the threshold for the perfect security VSS protocol, these views are such that they are perfectly indistinguishable to the views in $\mathcal{H}_2$.

Experiment $\mathcal{H}_4$. In this experiment, we proceed identically to $\mathcal{H}_3$, except that for all commitments that will not be opened to $M$, $S$ will now change back the committed values from the random strings to the views that are consistent with committed value $m_1$.

Similarly to $\mathcal{H}_2$, at least in 2 blocks the distribution of the views for the special tag is indistinguishable form $\mathcal{H}_3$. Therefore there is at least one block such that the distribution of the views is indistinguishable with respect to $\mathcal{H}_0$.

Note that this hybrid corresponds to the honest execution with value $m_1$. By Lemma 9 we know that the distribution of the views in all blocks are the same, which means that they are all indistinguishable with respect to the original ones. Therefore, by applying the sequences of hybrid experiments shown above, we have $\text{dist}_M(m_0) \approx \text{dist}_M(m_1)$.

4 Applications

We also show how to use our concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme combined with our new use of the computation in the head paradigm in order to achieve two additional new results. The first result is the first multi-party constant-round coin tossing protocol (with a broadcast channel) with the sole use of a one-way function in a black-box fashion. The second result is the first non-malleable (with respect to opening) statistically hiding commitment scheme with the sole use of any statistically hiding commitment scheme in a black-box fashion.

4.1 Multi-Party Constant-Round Parallel Coin-Tossing Protocol

Informally, a coin-tossing protocol allows parties to generate a common unbiased random output. We show here a constant-round protocol based on the black-box use of any one-way function. In our protocol the adversary can control up to $n - 1$ players and computations are performed through a broadcast channel. We will show a simulator that is able to bias the outcome of the joint computation to a specific string that it receives as the input.

Notice that the many-many non-malleable commitment scheme based on the black-box use of any one-way function that we have presented in this work also enjoys a (stand-alone) extractability property. The extractor works by running the extractor associated to $\text{WExCS}$, therefore obtaining a large number of views from which the reconstruction of the committed value can be easily computed. Given a constant-round many-many non-malleable extractable commitment scheme $\text{NMExCS}$, we now present a fully black-box multi-party constant-round coin-tossing protocol.

Let $k$ be the security parameter. Each party $P_i$ as sender to send its contribution to the coin-tossing protocol, by running a perfectly secure $(k + 1, \lambda)$-party VSS scheme with deterministic reconstruction where $\lambda = \lfloor k/4 \rfloor$. To share a random $k$-bit string $\sigma_i$, $P_i$ will use $\text{NMExCS}$ to commit to the views of the above VSS players, moreover the above process is repeated twice. Then, a $(k, \lambda)$-perfectly secure MPC protocol is invoked to ensure that the same string $\sigma_i$ has been shared in the two above VSS executions.

Formally, $P_i$ behaves as sender $S$ to commit to his contribution $\sigma$ and as receiver $R$ with each other party. An execution of $S$ and $R$ goes as follows.
The \([S(\sigma), R]\) sub-protocol.

0. Initial setup.

1. \(R\) picks at random \(\lambda\) distinct indices \(\Lambda = \{r_1, \ldots, r_\lambda\}\) where \(r_i \in [k]\) for any \(i \in [\lambda]\). For each \(r_i\), \(R\) sends extractable commitments \(c_i\) (of \(r_i\)) using ExCS.

2. Let \(\Pi_{VSS_{share}}\) be a protocol implementing the Share phase of a \((k+1, \lambda)\)-perfectly secure VSS scheme. We require the VSS protocol to have a deterministic reconstruction phase. \(S\) picks a random string \(\sigma\) and sets the input of \(P_{k+1}\) (i.e., the Dealer) to \(\sigma\), while each other player has no input. Then \(S\) runs \(\Pi_{VSS_{share}}\). Let \(view_0^i\) be the view of player \(P_i\) for all \(i \in [k]\). The same VSS computation is repeated to share again \(\sigma\) but players are allowed to use fresh randomness. Let \(view_1^i\) be the view of player \(P_i\) for all \(i \in [k]\) in this second execution.

1. 1st Slot. \(S\) commits to the views of \(P_1, \ldots, P_k\) during the first VSS execution using \(\text{NMExCS}\). That is, \(S\) sends non-malleable extractable commitments \(\alpha_{0,i}\) (of \(view_0^i\)) for all \(i \in [k]\) in parallel.

2. 2nd Slot. \(S\) commits to the views of \(P_1, \ldots, P_k\) during the second VSS execution using \(\text{NMExCS}\). That is, \(S\) sends non-malleable extractable commitments \(\alpha_{1,i}\) (of \(view_1^i\)) for all \(i \in [k]\) in parallel.

3. Consistency proof.

1. Let \(\alpha_0\) be the value reconstructed from all views \(view_0^i\), and \(\alpha_1\) be the value reconstructed from all views \(view_1^i\) for all \(i \in [k]\).

2. Let \(\Pi_{eq}\) be a \((k, \lambda)\)-statistically secure MPC protocol such that given \(view_0^i\) and \(view_1^i\) as input for any \(i \in [k]\), at the end of the computation, 1 is given in output by any honest party \(P_i\) for any \(i \in [k]\) if \(\alpha_0 = \alpha_1\), otherwise, all honest parties output 0.

3. \(S\) runs internally \(\Pi_{eq}\) and sends to \(R\) non-malleable extractable commitments \(\beta_i\) (of \(view_1^i\)) of \(P_i\) during the execution of \(\Pi_{eq}\) using \(\text{NMExCS}\) for all \(i \in [k]\).

4. Output.

1. \(R\) decommits \(\{c_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}\).

2. \(S\) sends \(\sigma\) and decommits \(\{\alpha_{0,i}, \alpha_{1,i}, \beta_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}\) (i.e., the subset of views \(\{view_0^i, view_1^i, view_2^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}\)). For \(j = 0, 1, 2\), \(R\) verifies that all pairs of views in \(\{view_j^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}\) are consistent (according to Definition 12) and that the dealer \(P_{k+1}\) has not been disqualified by any player, otherwise \(R\) aborts; moreover for \(j = 0, 1\) and \(i = 1, \ldots, \lambda\), \(R\) checks that \(view_j^i\) is a prefix of \(view_{j+1}^i\), otherwise \(R\) aborts. If the output in \(\{view_2^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}\) is not 1, \(R\) aborts.

3. \(S\) decommits \(\alpha_{1,i}\) for all \(i \in [k]\), \(R\) verifies that each decommitment is correct otherwise it sets to 0 a revealed view.

4. Let \(\Pi_{VSS_{recon}}\) be a protocol implementing the Recon phase corresponding to the \((k+1, \lambda)\)-perfectly secure VSS Share phase used above. \(R\) runs \(\Pi_{VSS_{recon}}\) using \(view_1^1, \ldots, view_1^k\), and computes and outputs the value \(\sigma'\) that the majority of the players obtains in output during the computation. If \(\sigma' \neq \sigma\) or there is no majority, then output \(\bot\), otherwise output \(\sigma\).

The fully black-box multi-party constant-round coin-tossing protocol. Each party \(P_i\) selects a random \(k\)-bit string \(\sigma_i\) and runs in parallel the above sub-protocol \(\langle S(\sigma_i), R\rangle\) with every other party. Next, \(P_i\) checks that each player played the same string with each other player, otherwise it aborts. If there is no abort, the final outcome of the protocol is \(\sigma = \sigma_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \sigma_n\).

The use of the broadcast channel guarantees that an adversary is forced in using the same string in all parallel executions, since otherwise if two different strings are noticed in the broadcast channel, honest players would abort.

Proof Sketch. The security proof of the protocol relies on the extractability and the non-malleability of the underlying commitment scheme and we provide the high level idea as follows. Assume wlog that the adversary controls \(n-1\) players. The simulator, on input a target random string \(\sigma\) first runs Step 0 and then extracts the set of challenge indices (i.e., \(\Lambda\)) when playing as receiver against each party controlled by the adversary. Then it runs honestly during the 1st slot (Step 1), by using a random string \(\sigma^*\). Next,
the simulator extracts the shares committed by parties controlled by the adversary (using the extractor of \( \text{NMExCS} \)), and can therefore use in the 2nd slot (Step 2) an adjusted string \( \sigma' \) so that the XOR of the extracted strings and \( \sigma' \) produces the target string \( \sigma \). Next, the simulator can exploit knowledge of \( \Lambda \) to cheat in Step 3 on the views of the player \( P_i \) for all \( i \in [\lambda] \), so that the combination of both non-opened views and opened views will be indistinguishable from a honest player execution, even though in this case \( \sigma' \) is different from \( \sigma^* \).

More formally, a sequence of hybrid experiments can show the correctness of the above simulator. First of all, consider an experiment \( H_1 \) where the simulator plays honestly but extracts \( \Lambda \) when playing as sender, and \( \sigma_i \) when playing as receiver with player \( P_i \). By the extractability of \( \text{ExCS} \) and \( \text{NMExCS} \), the shares revealed by \( P_i \) correspond to \( \sigma_i \) and are distributed identically to the shares revealed in the real game.

Then, consider an experiment \( H_2 \) where in contrast to \( H_1 \), the simulator uses knowledge of \( \Lambda \) when running Step 3, by committing to random strings in the positions out of \( \Lambda \) and to simulated views in the positions in \( \Lambda \). Here the perfect security of the VSS scheme, the fact that only a small portion of the views are opened, and the fact that the employed commitment scheme is non-malleable, guarantee that the views revealed in \( H_2 \) by the adversary are computationally indistinguishable from the ones revealed in \( H_1 \).

Next consider an experiment \( H_3 \) where in Step 2 the simulator actually uses the above discussed adjusted string \( \sigma' \). Again, the non-malleability of \( \text{NMExCS} \) guarantees that the distribution of views committed by the adversary in Step 2 does not change, and thus the distribution of the shares opened by the adversary does not change too.

This final experiment corresponds to the actual simulation that is therefore successful.

4.2 Non-Malleable Statistically Hiding Commitments

We now show that our techniques and our non-malleable commitment scheme can also be used to construct the first non-malleable statistically hiding commitment scheme \( \text{NM-SHCS} \) with black-box use of any statistically hiding commitment scheme. The notion of non-malleability that we use for the statistically hiding commitment is that of non-malleability with respect to opening.

We will actually need as ingredient an extractable statistically hiding commitment scheme \( \text{ExSHCS} = (\text{ExSHCom}, \text{ExSHRec}) \), that however can be easily constructed using as a black-box any statistically hiding commitment scheme, similarly to the statistically binding case.

Let \( k \) be the security parameter and \( \lambda = \lfloor k/4 \rfloor \). Similarly to previous sections, to commit a string \( \sigma \) to a receiver \( R \), the committer \( C \) will run a perfectly secure \((k + 1, \lambda)\)-party VSS protocol (in his head) with deterministic reconstruction.

Commitment Phase.

0. **Initial setup.** \( R \) picks \( \lambda \) distinct players at random (i.e., randomly selects \( \lambda \) distinct indices \( \Lambda = \{r_1, \ldots, r_\lambda\} \) where \( r_i \in [k] \) for any \( i \in [\lambda] \)). For each \( r_i \), \( R \) sends an extractable commitment \( c_i \) of \( r_i \) using \( \text{ExCS} \).

1. **Commitment.** Let \( \Pi_{\text{VSSshare}} \) be a protocol implementing the \text{Share} phase of a \((k + 1, \lambda)\)-perfectly secure VSS scheme. We require the VSS protocol to have a deterministic reconstruction phase. Given the string \( \sigma \) to commit, \( C \) first sets the input of \( P_{k+1} \) (i.e., the Dealer) to \( \sigma \), while each other player has no input. Then \( C \) runs \( \Pi_{\text{VSSshare}} \). Let \( \text{view}^1_i \) be the view of player \( P_i \) for all \( i \in [k] \).

1.1. \( C \) commits to \( \text{view}^1_i \) using an extractable statistically hiding commitment scheme \( \text{ExSHCS} \). That is, \( C \) runs \( \text{ExSHCS} \) \( k \) times in parallel, and let \( V^1_i \) be the transcript of the commitment of \( \text{view}^1_i \) computed through \( \text{ExSHCS} \) for all \( i \in [k] \).
Decommitment Phase.

1. Let $\Pi_{VSSrecon}$ be a protocol implementing the Recon phase corresponding to the $(k+1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS Share phase used in the commitment phase. $C$ runs $\Pi_{VSSrecon}$ using $\text{view}_1^1, \ldots, \text{view}_k^1$ so that the $k$ players reconstruct the shared secret. Let $\text{view}_i^2$ be the resulting view of player $P_i$ for all $i \in [k]$.

1.1. $C$ sends the original string $\sigma$ to $R$.

1.2. $C$ commits to $\text{view}_i^2$ using a many-many non-malleable commitment scheme $\text{NS-NMCS}$. That is, $C$ invokes $\text{NS-NMCS}$ $k$ times in parallel. Let $V_i^2$ be the transcript of the commitment of $\text{view}_i^2$ computed through $\text{NS-NMCS}$ for all $i \in [k]$.

2. $R$ decommits $\{c_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.

3. $C$ decommits $\{V_i^1\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ (i.e., the subset of views $\{\text{view}_r^1\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$) and views $\{V_i^2\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ (i.e., the subset of views $\{\text{view}_2^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$).

4. $R$ verifies that views $\{\text{view}_r^1\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ are consistent according to Definition 12, $\{\text{view}_2^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ are consistent according to Definition 12, that $\text{view}_r^1$ corresponds to the first part of $\text{view}_2^i$ for all $i \in [\lambda]$, and that the output in all views $\text{view}_i^2$ for all $i \in [\lambda]$ is $\sigma$, and outputs $\sigma$, otherwise it outputs $\perp$.

**Theorem 11** The commitment scheme $\text{NM-SHCS}$ is a non-malleable (with respect to opening) statistically hiding commitment scheme with black-box use only of a statistically hiding commitment scheme.

We now give a sketch of the proof that $\text{NM-SHCS}$ satisfies the following three properties: statistically hiding, computationally binding and non-malleability with respect to opening.

**Lemma 10** The commitment scheme $\text{NM-SHCS}$ is statistically hiding.

**Proof.** Since the sender in the commitment phase only commits using statistically hiding commitments (and sends no other information), we have that the claim holds.

**Lemma 11** The commitment scheme $\text{NM-SHCS}$ is computationally binding.

**Proof.**

Assume by contradiction that the binding of $\text{NM-SHCS}$ does not hold. Therefore there is an efficient adversary that provides two accepting openings of the same commitment. Since the output $\sigma$ of the receiver is the value in views $\{\text{view}_2^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$, we have that the adversary succeeds in committing (and decommitting) during the decommitment phase to different views $\{\text{view}_r^1\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and $\{\text{view}_2^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ depending on the message to be opened.

Notice that if different strings are committed in $\{\text{view}_r^1\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and $\{\text{view}_2^i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ (resp., $\{\text{view}_r^1\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$), we have that at least 1/4 of the views committed in one slot must be different with respect to the views committed in the other slot, otherwise the reconstructions of the strings from the views would generate the same output. The fact that $M$ is successful, implies that all the indexes of those different views do not belong to $\Lambda$. The probability that this happens is negligible if $\Lambda$ is just a random challenge generated after the commitment of the views. However, since $\Lambda$ was previously committed, similarly to Lemma 1, here one can break the hiding property of the commitment of $\Lambda$ by relying on the weak extractability of the commitments of the views.

**Lemma 12** The commitment scheme $\text{NM-SHCS}$ is non-malleable with respect to opening.

**Proof.**

The security proof of the non-malleability relies on hybrid arguments such that when changing the opened value on the left execution, the value opened in the right execution remains the same. In the following, let $\text{dist}_M(m)$ denote the random variable describing the opening of the adversary in $\text{NM-SHCS}$ when $C$ opens to $m$, and let $\text{dist}_i(m)$ (resp. $\text{dist}_i^{(j)}(m)$) denote the random variable describing the opening of the adversary of $\text{NM-SHCS}$ when $S$ opens to $m$ in experiment $H_i$ (resp. $H_i^{(j)}$). Then, we consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments.
Experiment $H_0$. In this experiment, the simulator $S$ honestly runs $C$ and interacts with $M$. That is, in the left interaction, $S$ honestly commits to the string $m$ to $M$, while in the right interactions it simply forwards the messages being sent out by $M$ to $R$ and vice versa. Clearly, $\text{dist}_M(m) \equiv \text{dist}_0(m)$.

Experiment $H_1$. In this experiment, $S$ executes the protocol identically to $H_0$ except that it also runs the extractor of $\text{ExCS}$ to retrieve all the indices $r_i$ selected by $M$, and it aborts if the extraction fails. After getting $r_i$ for all $i \in [\lambda]$, $S$ executes the rest of the protocol as in $H_0$. Since the only difference in the view of $H_0$ and $H_1$ consists in the aborts performed when the extraction fails, by the extractability of $\text{ExCS}$ we have that $\text{dist}_0(m) \approx \text{dist}_1(m)$. (Notice that if $M$ completes the commitment phase in the left interaction with non-negligible probability, then the extractor of $\text{ExCS}$ fails with negligible probability only.)

Experiment $H_2^{(1)}$ to $H_2^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}$. These experiments deviate from $H_1$ as follows. For all commitments of the views that will not be opened to $M$, the simulator $S$ will gradually change the committed values to commitments of random strings. Notice these changed commitments are never opened in the decommitment phase. The statistical hiding of $\text{ExSHCS}$ guarantees that the distribution of the opened message by $M$ does not change in this considered sequence of experiments. Therefore we have that $\text{dist}_1(m) \approx \text{dist}_2^{(1)}(m) \approx \cdots \approx \text{dist}_2^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}(m)$.

Experiment $H_3$. In this experiment, the simulator $S$ proceeds identically to $H_2^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}$ with the following exception. Let $S_{VSS}$ be the simulator of the Share phase of the underlying $(k+1, \lambda)$-perfectly secure VSS scheme, where $S_{VSS}$ will simulate the VSS computations with malicious players in the positions of $\Lambda$ and forcing the output to be $m$. Then for every player $i \in \Lambda$, $S$ will commit the shares being generated by $S_{VSS}$. The main idea is that since $\lambda$ is below the threshold for the perfect security VSS protocol, the outputs of $S_{VSS}$ generate these shares so that they are perfectly indistinguishable from the shares of $\text{dist}_2^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}(m)$.

Experiment $H_4^{(1)}$ to $H_4^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}$. These steps are analogous to experiment $H_2^{(1)}$ to $H_2^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}$. In these experiments we proceed identically to $H_3$, except that for all commitments that will not be opened to $M$, $S$ will gradually changes back the committed values from the random strings to shares that are consistent with committed value $m_1$. By the same arguments in experiments $H_2^{(m)}$, relying on the binding of the statistically hiding commitment scheme and on the non-malleability of NS-NMCS, we have that $\text{dist}_4(m) \approx \text{dist}_4^{(1)}(m_1) \approx \cdots \approx \text{dist}_4^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}(m_1)$.

Experiment $H_5$. In this experiment, the simulator honestly executes the protocol by committing to $m_1$ and giving in output the corresponding views. The only difference between $H_5$ and $H_4^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)}$ is that now the opened shares are not simulated anymore. However, notice that these opened shares were previously perfectly indistinguishable with respect to simulated shares. Thus, $H_4^{(n(k-\lambda)+1)} \equiv \text{dist}_5(m_1) \equiv \text{dist}_M(m_1)$.

Therefore, by applying the sequences of hybrid experiments shown above, we have $\text{dist}_M(m) \approx \text{dist}_M(m_1)$.

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