Secure End-to-End Communication with Optimal Throughput and Resilience Against Malicious Adversary.
Paul Bunn, Rafail Ostrovsky
We demonstrate the feasibility of end-to-end communication in highly unreliable networks. Modeling a network as a graph with vertices representing nodes and edges representing the links between them, we consider two forms of unreliability: Unpredictable edge-failures, and deliberate deviation from protocol specifications by corrupt and maliciously controlled nodes.
We present a routing protocol for end-to-end communication that is simultaneously resilient to both forms of unreliability. In Particular, we prove that our protocol is secure against arbitrary actions of the corrupt nodes controlled by a polynomial-time adversary, achieves correctness (Receiver get all of the messages from Sender and without modification), and enjoys provably optimal throughput performance, as measured using competitive analysis. Competitive analysis is utilized to provide protocol guarantees again malicious behavior without placing limits on the number of the corrupted nodes in the network.
Furthermore, our protocol does not incur any asymptotic memory overhead as compared to other protocols that are unable to handle malicious interference of corrupt nodes. In particular, our protocol requires O(n2) memory per processor, where n is the size of network . This represents an O(n2) improvement over all existing protocols that have been designed for this network model.comment: DISC 2013 PP: 403-417
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