Rafail Ostrovsky - Publications

Impossibility of Black−Box Simulation Against Leakage Attaccks

Rafail Ostrovsky, Giuseppe Persiano, Ivaan Visconti

Abstract:

In this work,we show how to use the positive results in succinct argument systems to prove impossibility results on leakage−resilient black−box zero knowledge. This recently proposed notion of zero knowledge deals with an adversary that can make leakage queries on the state of the prover. Our result holds for black−box simulation only and we also give some −insights on the non−black−box case. Additionally, we show that, for several functionalities, leakage−resilient multi−party computation is impossible (regardless of the number of players and even if just one player is corrupted).

More in details, we achieve the above results by extending a technique of [Nielsen,Venturi, Zottarel]−PKC₁₃] to prove lower bounds for leakage−resilient security. Indeed,we use leakage queries to run an execution of communication−efficient protocol in the head of the adversary. Moreover,to defeat the black−box simulator we connect the above technique for leakage resilience to security against reset attacks.

Our results show that the open problem of [Annanth, Goyal, Pandy−Crypto 14](i.e.,continual leakage−resilient proofs without a common reference string)has a negative answer when security through black−box simulation is desired.Moreover; our results close the open problem of [Boyle et al.−STOC₁₂ for the case of black−box simulation (i.e., the possibility of continual leakage−resilient secure computation without a leak−free interactive preprocessing).

comment: CRYOPTO 2015 PP:130−149

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