Impossibility of Black−Box Simulation Against Leakage Attaccks
Rafail Ostrovsky, Giuseppe Persiano, Ivaan Visconti
In this work,we show how to use the positive results in succinct argument systems to prove impossibility results on leakage−resilient black−box zero knowledge. This recently proposed notion of zero knowledge deals with an adversary that can make leakage queries on the state of the prover. Our result holds for black−box simulation only and we also give some −insights on the non−black−box case. Additionally, we show that, for several functionalities, leakage−resilient multi−party computation is impossible (regardless of the number of players and even if just one player is corrupted).
More in details, we achieve the above results by extending a technique of [Nielsen,Venturi, Zottarel]−PKC13] to prove lower bounds for leakage−resilient security. Indeed,we use leakage queries to run an execution of communication−efficient protocol in the head of the adversary. Moreover,to defeat the black−box simulator we connect the above technique for leakage resilience to security against reset attacks.
Our results show that the open problem of [Annanth, Goyal, Pandy−Crypto 14](i.e.,continual leakage−resilient proofs without a common reference string)has a negative answer when security through black−box simulation is desired.Moreover; our results close the open problem of [Boyle et al.−STOC12 for the case of black−box simulation (i.e., the possibility of continual leakage−resilient secure computation without a leak−free interactive preprocessing).
comment: CRYOPTO 2015 PP:130−149
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